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Apples for Oranges: The Role of Currencies
in Environmental Trading Markets
by James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl
Introduction
Two major, integrally related trends define U.S. environmental law at the millennium. The first trend is to bring
presently unregulated risks under the control of the regulatory system. The second trend... is toward bigger bubbles-toward broader and broader trading among pollutants and even among various types of risk reduction... .

P

icture a playground where children trade environmental protection like baseball cards. The front sides bear
slick images of endangered species, drops of acid rain, and
vanishing habitats. The flip sides show all the statistics-population remaining, acreage consumed, who benefits from the wetlands, who is harmed by the pollution. And
the kids sit huddled in an excited circle, busily swapping
cards. To snag Jamie's prized cattail wetlands, Ben must
part with his cherished saltwater marsh.
There are differences, of course, between this imaginary
playground and a market in real environmental commodities. A "bad trade" in baseball cards is in the eyes of the beholder and, at worst, damages only a kid's pride. When parties trade environmental protection, though, what seems a
good trade looking at the pictures may lose its appeal once
we take a closer look at the statistics and the effects of the
trade on the environment itself.
Over the last decade, there has been a sea change in environmental law and policy, marked by growing interest in
market-based instruments of environmental protection. In
particular, approaches that explicitly commodify environmental impacts by creating markets for their sale are on the
rise. These environmental trading markets (ETMs) now operate in a range of regulatory settings where parties exchange credits to emit air gollutants, extract natural resources, and develop habitat. In fact, every major environJames Salzman is a Professor at the Washington College of Law at American University. J.B. Ruhl is a Professor at the Florida State University
School of Law. Parts of this Article were published in the December 2000,
issue of the Stanford Law Review and are republished with permission.
This Article has been edited by the Environmental Law Reporter'sstaff.
The empirical research for this Article was supported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Science to Achieve Results (STAR)
program grant R82612-01. Because this Article has not been subjected to
any EPA review and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency,
no official endorsement should be inferred.
1. E. Donald Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles, F. FOR
APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1998, at 48 [hereinafter Elliott

& Charnley].
2. First proposed in the 1960s, ETMs have been championed by legal
and economics scholars as superior to traditional command-and-control regulatory approaches. Proponents claim that by
allowing parties to weigh the marginal costs ofactually reducing impacts against purchasing the rights of reduced impacts elsewhere,
trading should provide the same or better environmental protection

mental policy review in the last five years has called for even
greater use of ETMs.3 Markets for environmental commodities represent the new wave of environmental protection and,
despite critiques both subtle and shrill, they are still building.
ETMs have provided an enormously fertile area for
scholarship. Articles have explored the mechanics of trading programs, 4 debated the advantages of trading over comat less cost. Assuming that compliance monitoring, information, and
transaction costs are low, in theory a trading regime should be more
efficient than regulatory standards when polluters have heterogeneous cost abatement schedules. Using pollution as an example,
parties can gain emission credits by paying those with cheaper marginal abatement opportunities to reduce their pollution further as
well as encouraging regulated entities to select among a range of
compliance options. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE

E. OATES,

THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

177-89 (2d

ed. 1988) (arguing for marketable emission permits as an alternative to effluent fees).
3. The President's Council on Sustainable Development, a high-level
stakeholder advisory group assembled by President William J.
Clinton, produced a consensus report on the future direction ofenvironmental policy. One of its key recommendations was to: "Make
Greater Use of Market Forces. Sustainable development objectives
must harness market forces through policy tools, such as emissions
trading deposit/refund systems and tax and subsidy reform. This approach can substantially influence the behavior of firms, governments, and individuals." PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR
PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR
THE FUTURE 26 (1996).

The "Next Generation Project," sponsored by Yale with experts
from academia such as Carol Rose and Don Elliott, also called for
much greater use of market mechanisms such as ETMs. Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty, Introduction to THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 11
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); Robert Stavins &
Bradley Whitehead, Market-BasedEnvironmentalPolicies,id. at 105.
Enterprise for the Environment, a consensus panel bringing together influential environmental policy figures such as former EPA
Administrators Bill Ruckelshaus and Bill Reilly, concluded that
"[e]missions trading programs hold great promise as cost-effective
methods for achieving environmental goals and encouraging technological innovation. Trading can be a useful policy tool with or
without a cap on total emissions.... Greater use of this method could
help solve a number of persistent environmental problems." ENTERPRISE FOR THE ENV'T, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
IN TRANSITION: TOWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE 39 (1998).

While many policy recommendations have encouraged greater
use of market instruments generally, it is worth noting that "when
market-based systems are implemented, tradable permitting
schemes generally prevail over alternatives such as emissions
taxes." Jeffrey M. Hirsch, EmissionsAllowance Trading Under the
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future EnvironmentalRegulations?, 7
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352, 358 (1999) [hereinafter Hirsch]. This
shows that, within the calls for greater use of market instruments,
ETMs have been much more important than fees or taxes.
4. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, EnvironmentalMarkets
in the Year 2000, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 351 (1990) (examining
prospects for and design of marketable emissions permits); Tom
Tietenberg, EthicalInfluences on the Evolution ofthe U.S. Tradable
PermitApproach to Air Pollution Control,24 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
241, 243 (1998) [hereinafter Tietenberg I] (explaining how emissions reduction credits may be stored and spent).
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mand-and-control regulation, 5 and, most recently, assessed
the application of ETMs in the international sphere. 6 Within
this wealth of literature, however, a basic aspect of trading
has largely escaped attention. Perhaps because it is so obvious, there has been scant consideration of the simple question-what is actually being traded?

If one compares trading programs, they all seem to share a
basic feature. The chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), fisheries, and
proposed greenhouse gas ETMs, for example, all exchange
commodities that appear to be fungible. One molecule of
CFC, kilo of halibut, or ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) seems
much the same as another, both in terms of identity and impact. It is trading apples for apples (or pork bellies for pork
bellies). Thus ETMs are considered a type of commodity
market, where environmental credits go to the highest bidder. And for good reason, since the Chicago Board of Trade
now sells rights to emit sulfur dioxide (SO2) alongside pork
bellies, orange juice, and grain futures.7
Indeed ETMs must assume fungibility-that the things
exchanged are sufficiently similar in ways important to the
goals of environmental protection-otherwise there would
be no assurance that trading ensured environmental protection. While the precondition of fungibility may seem
self-evident, this core assumption turns out to be more problematic than it first appears.
As an example of why fungibility matters, consider
wetlands mitigation banking. This policy permits develop5. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1985) ("The current
system does not in fact 'work' and its malfunctions ... will become
progressively more serious ....); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172 (1988) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Democratic Case] ("A reform relying on
market incentives is just plain better, in terms of all relevant public
values, than the status quo."); Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 547 (1992) (arguing for the
use of market-based incentives rather than command-and-control
regulation); see also DALLAS BURTRAW, COST SAVINGS, MARKET
PERFORMANCE, AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE U.S. ACID RAIN

PROGRAM (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No.
98-28-REV, 1988) (arguing that the acid rain program has induced
innovation); Byron Swift, The AcidRain Test, ENVTL. F., May/June
1997, at 16 (arguing that the acid rain program has allowed utilities
to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities). But see David M.
Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command-and-Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen I]
(arguing that trading offers few advantages compared to traditional permitting); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing
Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300 (1995) [hereinafter
Heinzerling] (arguing that emissions trading does not promote
democratic deliberation).
6. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in
a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1(2000) (examining international allowance trading); David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or
Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change
Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
Driesen II] (suggesting limits to international emissions trading programs); Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 798 (1999)
[hereinafter Wiener] ("Global environmental protection should,
therefore, presumptively favor quantity-based tradeable allowances,
unless other policy attributes ... persuasively overcome the presumptive advantage .... ).
7. See Implementation ofthe Acid Rain Provisions ofthe Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air
and Nuclear Regulation of the Comm. on Ev'? and Public Works,
103d Cong. 23-25 (1993) (statement of Patrick Arbor, Chairman,
Chicago Board of Trade).
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ers, once they have taken steps to avoid and minimize wetland loss, to compensate for wetlands that will be destroyed
through development by ensuring the restoration of
wetlands in another location.8 The regulations mandate
trades that ensure equivalent value and function between
destroyed and restored wetlands. In practice most trades are
valued in units of acreage. Within very loose guidelines,
trades between productive (though soon to be destroyed)
wetlands and restored wetlands are approved on an
acre-for-acre basis. More sophisticated banks require ratios,
trading development on one acre of productive wetlands for,
say, restoration of four or five acres of wetlands somewhere
else. Counting acres may make for easy accounting, but it is
poor policy.
Why? The social value of the habitat is absent from the
transaction. The ecosystem services provided by the
wetlands-positive externalities such as water purification,
groundwater recharge, and flood control-are largely ignored. Opinions may differ over the value of a wetland's
scenic vista, but they are in universal accord over the contri-9
butions of clean water and flood control to social welfare.
Trading acres for acres provides an inadequate measure to
capture what is really being traded of significance. To be
sure, such a simple metric allows trades, but other important, unaccounted trade offs are occurring. The program can
suffer from a lack of accountability (or, more accurately, a
lack of countability).
In fact, upon close inspection, it turns out that most ETMs
involve commodities and trades that exhibit a range of
fungibilities. Legal trades can range from relatively
straightforward kilos of surf clams to trades involving the
exchange of different types of habitat (that may provide
very different social benefits). To achieve the optimal outcome from ETMs, we need to understand and account much
better for the qualities being traded. To do so requires careful consideration of the measure of exchange-the currency-since, in the final analysis, the currency forms the
very basis of the transaction. The trading currency superficially makes the commodities fungible, determining what is
being traded and, therefore, protected.
Many of the currencies employed by ETMs present
trades of an acre of wetland here for an acre of wetland there,
or a ton of emissions here for a ton there, as a basic exchange
of apples for apples. In reality, though, this is a misleading
description. More times than one might think, we are trading
Macintoshes for Granny Smiths, apples for oranges, and, in
some cases, apples for Buicks. Put simply, we can end up
trading the wrong things.
8. This example is explored in detail in Part III.A.
9. "Processes which occur in wetlands (plant production, bacterial decomposition, nutrient recycling, etc.) ... contribute to functions in
the landscape that have ecological significance (i.e., trapping nutrients and sediments, supporting bird and mammal populations, etc.).
From these functions, one can derive values that have social significance." The Status of Wetlands Science: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Envtl. Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env 't and
Public Works, 102d Cong. 36 (1991) (statement of Mark M.
Brinson), quoted in Virginia C. Veltman, Banking on the Future of
Wetlands Using Federal Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 654, 655 (1995)
[hereinafter Veltman]; see also Katherine C. Ewel, Water Quality
Improvement by Wetlands, in NATURE'S SERVICES 329-44 (Gretchen
C. Daily ed., 1997) (explaining the services provided by wetlands);
Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 78-80 (1983) (describing studies that value the water purification service of Barataria Basin wetlands at $5.6 to $23.6 million per year).
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Within the vast literature on ETMs, important and insightful work has explored the related issues of hot spots and
the nature of tradable rights, 10 but none has focused explicitly on the central role that currency selection plays in the
structure and effectiveness of ETMs." In this Article, we
reconceptualize the debate whether ETMs promote environmental protection and social welfare. By exploring efforts to promote nonfungible trading-trading environmental apples for oranges-we undertake a rigorous examination of environmental commodities and the currencies we
use to trade them. We argue that nonfungibilities and currencies drive the structure of ETMs, directly influencing their
construction, rules of exchange, and provision for public
participation. In short, we contend that a more complete understanding of the root issues of commodity and currency
provides a previously unlaid and strong foundation to understand better the potential and design of ETMs.
By breaking down the problem of ensuring environmental protection in the face of nonfungibilities, we create an analytical framework that can inform the assessment of any
ETM. The structure flows from three distinct stages of an
ETM's operation. Currencyadequacy involves selection of
the currency unit-can the metric capture the significant
values exchanged or do some important features remain external to the trades? Part I of the Article sets out the theoretical issues underlying a currency's adequacy, including the
metric of exchange and the persistent inability of many
ETMs to account for nonfungibilities. Part II explores the
construction of the exchange market, known as exchange
adequacy, and how regulators in the environmental market
must compensate for the inadequacy of currencies. Parts III
10. Anyone familiar with air pollutant trading is familiar with the hot
spots issue-where the effects of pollution are concentrated in a
small geographic area. As a result, nitrous oxides and aromatic hydrocarbon molecules aren't completely fungible because the marginal impacts of emission depend on where (and when) they're emitted. In programs that trade habitat, the problem of nonfungibility becomes even more accentuated because the parcels have unique landscape characteristics. For examples of hot spots scholarship, see
Hirsch, supra note 3, at 373-75, 393 (discussing the hot spots issue in
the SO 2 trading program); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based EnvironmentalReforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 129 (1999)
[hereinafter Johnson] (explaining environmental justice scholarship
on hot spots); Robert Mendelsohn, Regulating HeterogeneousEmissions, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 301 (1986) [hereinafter
Mendelsohn] (discussing the heterogeneity of emissions);
Tietenberg I, supra note 4.
The nature of the property right is clearly related to the currency; it
explains what you can do and fundamentally determines the right's
value, but the currency serves as the actual medium of exchange. See
Robert Hahn, Trade Offs in DesigningMarkets With Multiple Objectives, 13 J. ENvrL. EcoN. & MGMT. 1, 1-6 (1986) [hereinafter Hahn
I] (examining how to define an emissions permit); Carol Rose, Property in the Global Environmental Commons: Comparing Newfangled TradableAllowances to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVrL. L. &POL'Y F. 45 (1999) [hereinafter Rose];
Richard B. Stewart, Economics,Environment, and the Limits ofLegal Control, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1985) [hereinafter
Stewart] (describing an ETM's need for a quantifiable common
measure of pollution, environmental degradation, or risk).
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and IV focus on habitat ETMs, where the latent nonfungibilities found in all trading markets are greatly exacerbated. Part III applies the model developed in Parts I and
II to a case study of major habitat ETM-wetlands mitigation banking.
Part IV examines the institutional mechanisms for reviewing trades known as review adequacy. We argue that
when currency and exchange adequacy are not ensured, the
model of exchange transforms from a commodity market to
a barter market, from anonymous trading of generic commodities to individuals haggling over goods and services
with unique attributes. In this setting, to what extent should
we be willing to let owners of nonfungible environmental
features strike deals which the rest of us cannot evaluate
through any common medium of exchange and which many
of us might not strike? Put more generally, who should determine the equivalency of such trades?
The rise of nonfungible trades creates significant concerns over protecting public interests. Our discussion explores measures that regulators can take to "police" ETMs
when the combination of inadequate currencies and inadequate exchange procedures leaves the door open to trades
that lead to a loss of social welfare. Breaking from what has
effectively become a passive ex ante model for trade approval in most ETMs, we call for greater use of ex post approval measures, in part to ensure meaningful valuation of
the public goods exchanged and in part to counteract the
agencies' and trading parties' institutional biases to encourage nonfungible trades. We further argue that it is inappropriate to continue to use the conventional environmental
permitting process to carry out nonfungible trades. In exploring this challenge, we analyze options for new institutional designs of a "permit-plus" system for habitat and similar ETMs.
ETMs can provide, and have provided, an important policy tool to achieve effective, efficient environmental protection. As a result, support for the use of ETMs to achieve environmental protection will surely continue to grow. Increased trading, however, necessarily requires application2
in an even broader spectrum of environmental contexts.'
The best settings for ETMs-where currencies serve as effective proxies for environmental values, markets are rich
with supply and diversity, and policing is straightforward-have largely been developed. 3 As trading programs

tion of the ETM. See, e.g.,

12. See generally Elliott & Chamley, supra note I, at 48 (identifying a
trend toward broader trading among pollutants and types of risk reduction); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of FederalLaws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: ime
for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 555,
661-69 (1995) (suggesting a free-standing statute for biodiversity
conservation); David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks
to Species: Extending the TradablePermitApproach From Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 405, 450-51
(1996) [hereinafter Sohn & Cohen] ("Ultimately, implementing a
well-designed market scheme may provide a mechanism for ongoing habitat conservation and land-use management that can survive
independent of the ESA's fate."). The Framework Convention on
Climate Change and subsequent Kyoto Protocol's provisions for
joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism may
create the possibility for a range of innovative trades of greenhouse
gases and sequestration projects. See Wiener, supra note 6, at
710-13.

ELI-WETLAND] (examining the definition of credits in wetland mitigation banking); Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs:
Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REv. 527,
531 (1996) [hereinafter Gardner I] (discussing the value of mitigation credits).

13. As Bill Pedersen describes, "trading is best suited to broad environmental problems where the same emissions have about the same effect everywhere, where the 'pollutant' being traded is relatively easy
to measure, and where the market is restricted to a limited number of
large sources that can bear the transaction costs." William F.

11. A number of articles on specific ETMs have pointed out the importance of currencies, but none have analyzed how they are determined
and their central role in determining the ultimate structure and operaENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST. (ELI),
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 77-94 (1993) [hereinafter
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continue to move into settings in which environmental commodities are increasingly heterogeneous, currency, exchange, and review adequacy will become increasingly difficult to satisfy. This Article explains why. More important,
it explores the basic challenges of program design in the face
of nonfungibilities that ETM proponents have neither fully
addressed nor, in some cases, considered.
I. Currency Adequacy: Selection of the Currency
Instrument
A. The Mechanics of Marketable Permits

Before examining currency selection within ETMs, it is
worthwhile to set out their basic operation. Dating from the
first trading program in 1974, ETMs have reduced emissions of a wide range of pollutants, 14 managed fisheries and6
lobster harvests, t5 and channeled habitat development.1
Pedersen Jr., The Limits of Market-Based Approaches to Environmental Protection, 24 ELR 10173, 10174 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter
Pedersen]; see alsoJaime Larmann, ComparingApplesto Oranges?
EPA Faces Difficultiesin Bringingto Fruitionan Emissions Trading
Programfor NO, 6 ENVrL. LAW. 603 (2000).
14. EPA has implemented trading markets for acid rain, codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671 (q), ELR STAT. CAA §§ 101-618
(Clean Air Act), CFCs, 40 C.F.R. §§82.5, 82.12 (2000), auto fuel efficiency standards, 15 U.S.C. §§2002, 2003 (repealed), leaded gasoline, 40 C.F.R. §80.20(d) (repealed), and other pollutants. Most
emissions trading under the CAA has been in the form of netting, offsets, and bubbles. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester,
MarketablePermits:Lessonsfor Theory and Practice,16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 361, 368-76 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Marketable
Permits](describing these practices and their performance); Robert
W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An
Analysis ofEPA 'S Emissions TradingProgram,6 YALE J. ON REG.
109 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets
Go?] (describing offsets, bubbles, and netting in ETMs); James T.B.
Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing
Successful TransferableRights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369,
385-86 (1989) (describing some of the problems with EPA's bubble
policy). EPA endorsed the use of ETMs in its 1986 emissions policy
trading statement. General Principles for Creation, Banking, and
Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43814 (Dec. 4,
1986) (emissions trading policy statement). The CAA and its 1990
Amendments provided further authority for EPA and states to control air pollution through tradable allowances. 42 U.S.C.
§§7401-7671(q), ELR STAT. CAA §§101-618. California has created trading programs for nitrogen oxides (NO.), sulfur oxides, and
volatile organic compounds (VOCs). See Matthew Polesetsky, Willa
Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation'S DirtiestAir? A Study of
the South CoastAir Quality Management District'sRegional Clean
AirIncentivesMarket, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1995) (examining the
marketable permit program in the Los Angeles Air Basin). Trading
markets have also been created to address international environmental problems. The Montreal Protocol permits trading of production
rights among member countries and within regional economic integration organizations. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, arts. 2(5), 2(8), 26 I.L.M. 1550, 1553
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
While less common than markets for air pollutants, several states
have created markets to control point and nonpoint source water
pollution. See generally Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits,supra note 14, at 391-96 (describing trading of water pollution rights
in Wisconsin).
15. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have become a common management tool for fisheries in Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, and
other countries. See Kirsten M. Batkin, New Zealand's Quota Management System: A Solution to the US. FederalFisheriesManagement Crisis?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 615, 626-31 (1996); Shi-Ling
Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Managementand the 1996 SustainableFisheriesAct, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1997); Alison Rieser,
Prescriptions
for the Commons: EnvironmentalScholarshipand the
FishingQuotasDebate, 23 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 393 (1999); Alison
Rieser, PropertyRights and Ecosystem Managementin US. Fisheries:
Contractingfor the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813 (1997).
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Despite the myriad of ETMs and the many differences

among them, their basic structure is simple. 7 The basis for

trading environmental commodities is a regulatory proscription of behavior followed by regulatory permission of
the behavior under controlled conditions. 18 In establishing a
market, the government first creates a new form of property-legal entitlements to emit pollutants, catch fish, develop habitat-and then imposes a set of rules governing
their exchange.19 In the typical "cap-and-trade program" for
pollution, policymakers establish a socially desirable level
of aggregate emissions for a given pollutant. Regulators
then determine a formula for initial allocation of emissions
among sources and issue permits to members of the regulated community that entitle each bearer to emit a given
quantity of that pollutant. In sum, the total quantity of emissions allowed by those permits should equal the aggregate
level set by policymakers. Similarly, in the context of scarce
natural resources, permits cap the bearer's right to take a
specified amount of the resource and the total quantity of
permits is equal to the aggregate extraction or harvest level
set by policymakers. All trading programs, therefore, take
place within carefully constructed markets. Absent legal restrictions on pollutant emissions, fish landings, or wetlands
development, and the creation of alienable entitlements to
these activities, few if any trades would take place.
In practice, permits are exchanged through three types of
trades. Air pollutant trades typically take place when the
government allocates or sells transferable credits to A to
pollute (see Figure 1). Once A has a credit, A can use it or
sell it to B. B may then use the credit to pollute. In environmental terms, the benefit of A's 20foregone impact is traded
for B's impact somewhere else.
16. Tradable development right (TDR) programs have enabled local
and state governments to direct development in order to protect
landmarks and conserve open space and other sensitive areas. See,
e.g., Robert M.L. Bellandi & Robert D. Hennigan, The Why and
How of TransferableDevelopment Rights, 2 REAL EST. REV. 60
(1977); Arik Levinson, Why Oppose TDRs?: TransferableDevelopment Rights Can Increase OverallDevelopment, 27 REGIONAL
SCI. & URB. ECON. 283 (1997); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J.
Dudek, Institutional Guidelinesfor Designing Successful TransferableRights Programs,6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 378-82 (1989);
Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338
(1972).
17. See generally Richard E. Ayres, Developing a Market in Emission
Credits Incrementally: An "Open Market" Paradigmfor Market-Based Pollution Control, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1522 (Dec. 2,
1994) (describing the differences between open market, hybrid command-and-control, and closed market systems).
18. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 7 ("Demand for compensatory [wetland] mitigation exists only because it is a government-imposed condition on wetland development."); Royal C. Gardner, Federal Wetland Mitigation Banking Guidance: Missed Opportunities,
26 ELR 10075, 10077 (Feb. 1996) ("[U]nlike typical markets, regulatory agencies control both the supply ofand demand for [wetlands]
mitigation.") [hereinafter Gardner 11].
19. David Driesen argues that the usual description of ETMs creating a
legal "right" to pollute or destroy is inaccurate since holders of these
rights may still face common-law liability for pollution damages, absent preemption (and the acid rain program specifically states that no
property right is created, 42 U.S.C. §7651b(f), ELR STAT. CAA
§§403(f)). He describes ETMs as "allowing evasion of imposed limits in exchange for compensating improvements elsewhere.
Overcompliance by some actors is traded for undercompliance by
others." Interview with David Driesen, Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law (Dec. 16, 1999).
20. It is assumed that the avoided environmental cost by A not causing
an impact is equal to or greater than the cost of B's impact. The same
structure is used for many fishery ETMs.
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permits achieve the same level of protection as comFigure

mand-and-control alternatives at a lower cost.2 1 Such a pro-

I

Traditional "Cap-and-Trade" ETM
EPA
750 tons

1250 tons

cess, trading supporters argue, should also be more democratic than traditional command-and-control regulations because it forces regulators and elected officials to deliberately consider environmental goals and to discuss explicitly
the appropriate level of pollution.2 2 The net result thereby
delegates power from the government to actors held ac-

countable in the marketplace, allowing the regulated community to select appropriate control strategies and encour-
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Proponents of trading programs argue that such arrangements increase efficiencies. In the case of air pollutant
trades, for example, by letting the market rather than regulators determine individual actors' impacts, profit-motivated
agents who can control pollution at low cost will reduce
more emissions than needed to comply with permit limits.
They can then sell surplus allowances at a profit to higher
cost agents. Thus, the greatest share of reductions will come
from agents who can do so at the cheapest cost, allowing
each polluter to weigh the marginal cost of abatement
against the cost of buying credits and make an efficient individual decision. If the cap is set appropriately, marketable

aging innovative practices and technologies.2 3
The trading scheme challenged in the classic Chevron,
24
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

case presents a case in point. Bubbling allowed the regulated facility to allocate emissions within its bubble (a form
of internal trading) to maximize efficient production while
meeting the emissions cap. 25 The acid rain trading program
has also been regarded as a success story. Trading of allowances has been very active, and as a result, facilities have
overcomplied with the reduction requirements. In 1995,

utilities emitted 40% less SO 2 than permitted.26 Economists
estimate the compliance costs to achieve such reductions
were up to 40% lower than would have been the case
27 under
the existing command-and-control requirements.
These enthusiastic claims have not gone unchallenged,
however. Recent scholarship has contended that in many
cases trading has not delivered the same or better protection
at less cost, and has proven overly complex to administer
and enforce.28 Strong normative critiques contend that trad-

21. ETMs can thus promote increased production efficiency (similar
levels of protection as command-and-control but at less cost) and
allocational efficiency (best distribution ofcosts). See Vivien Foster
& Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons
From Los Angeles Smog Control,38 J.L. & EcoN. 19,21 (1995) (estimating savings from the ETM in Los Angeles); Don Fullerton et
al., Sulfur Dioxide Compliance of a Regulated Utility, 34 J. ENVTL.
ECON. &MGMT. 32 (1997) (showing that regulatory rules can double
the cost of compliance). In 1997, EPA estimated that 5.1 million allowances were traded on private markets. Hirsch, supra note 3, at
387-88.
22. Ackerman & Stewart, DemocraticCase, supra note 5, at 172 ("A reform relying on market incentives is just plain better, in terms of all
relevant public values, than the status quo."). But see Driesen I, supra note 5, at 329; Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 343 ("[I]n deciding
whether to adopt a trading program... 'democracy' cannot be
counted on the side of pollution trading.").
23. Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This
ThoroughbredHobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 219 (1988)
("The bottom line is that the successes of emissions trading cannot
be denied."); Robert W. Hahn, Economic PrescriptionsforEnvironmental Problems: How the PatientFollowed the Doctors Orders,3
J. ECON. PERisP. 95, 96 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn II] ("One instrument which has been shown to supply the appropriate incentives...
is marketable permits.").
24. 467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
25. Elliott & Chamley, supra note i, at 49. Bubbling refers to the practice of treating multiple sources of air pollution at a single site as if
they were covered underneath a large bubble, i.e., as a single source.
26. Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New StandardofPerformance:An
Analysis of the Clean Air Act s Acid Rain Program, 26 ELR 10411
(Aug. 1996) [hereinafter Burtraw & Swift].
27. Id.; Richard Schmalansee et al., An Interim EvaluationofSulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading,12 J. EcoN. PERSP. 53, 64 (1998) (estimating savings between $225 and $375 million per year).
28. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-ControlEfficient? Institutions,Technology, andthe ComparativeEfficiency ofAlternative Regulatory Regimesfor Environmental Protection, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 887 (arguing the benefits of
command-and-control regulations); Driesen I, supra note 5, at
311-22 (assessing the performance of bubbling and the lead and acid
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ing programs legitimize pollution, weakening the environment's special claim to public protection. 29 And both envi-

biodiversity. 33 From this vantage, the ideal currency would
likely be a measure of social value. In the context of trades

ronmental justice and economics scholarship clearly recognize that certain air pollutant 30trading may lead to hot spots
and distributional inequities.
The respective merits of ETMs versus command-andcontrol regulation, while an extremely important debate,
lies beyond the scope of this Article. In practical terms, there
is undeniably strong and growing support for increased use
of ETMs to achieve environmental protection. Assuming
that trading will continue, what are the implications of trading nonfungible commodities?

among greenhouse gases, the ideal unit would be marginal
cost to society from the emission's contribution to climate
change. However, such measures of utility cannot be calculated with any certainty so we rely on a proxy-in this case
the emission's global warming potential.34
Indeed, environmental law relies almost entirely on
proxy measures. In the case of power plant emissions, for
example, what we care about is the environmental and consequential social impact of acid deposition, but we do not
regulate or trade units of acid rain impact. Instead we use the
proxy of tons of sulfur emitted, which is assumed to be a suf35
ficient indicator of potential impact on social welfare.

B. Measures of Exchange

The basic goal in any trading system is to move toward a
pareto-efficient outcome, allowing sufficient exchanges
such that each party reaches a point where it is worse off by
engaging in further trades. The key question, though, is how
31

can "worse off" be measured? Whether we can confidently
trade x for y depends on what we are trying to maximize and
on our standard of measurement. And that turns on the currency of exchange.32
Unfortunately, environmental law lacks a common unit
of exchange. We tend to think of environmental protection
simply in terms of reducing physical impacts on the environment-less pollution and less development means more
protection. Most observers, though (and most of our laws),
value environmental protection through the anthropocentric
view-that is, how those reduced impacts directly relate to
human quality of life, whether that be reduced health risks,
clearing the haze in the Grand Canyon, or conserving
rain ETMs); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Placefor PollutantTrading?, 23 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 137, 140-41 (1998) [hereinafter Powers] (listing problems to date of ETMs' thinness, high transaction costs, and uncertainty over security of property rights).
It is important to note that many of these critiques have come from
strong proponents of trading. Dudek and Hahn are big supporters of
trading but they have also been leading critics of some trading programs in practice. See, e.g., Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 23, at
241 (noting industry's hesitation to trade); Alex Farrell et al., The
NO, Budget: Market-Based Control of Tropospheric Ozone in the
Northeastern United States, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 103,
112 (1999) (showing sources of uncertainty and potential problems
with the NO, ETM); Hahn 1I, supra note 23, at 98-101 (describing
performance of ETMs).
29. STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (198 1) (discussing ethical concerns with trading
pollution rights); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (examining the function of law in "making statements"); Tietenberg 1, supra note 4, at
253 ("The environmental community... argued that the air belongs
to the people and it, as a matter of ethics, should not become private
property."). Commensurability issues are discussed infra note 64.
30. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions:
Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to EnvironmentalJustice, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,72-74 (1995) (discussing environmental justice issues); Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits for Pollution Control
When Emission Location Matters: What Have We Learned?, 5
ENVTL. &RESOURCE ECON. 95 (1995) [hereinafter Tietenberg II].
31. And worse offfor whom? If the two trading parties are better offbut
third-party interests are ignored, the trade may well end up being
pareto-inferior.
32. We use the term, "currency," to refer to the denomination of the exchange, the measurement metric. Thus the currency of money would
be dollars, not the dollar bills themselves. In the acid rain trading program, the currency would be tons of sulfur, not the actual allowance
stating this.

Regulating at the source of emission is less environmentally
meaningful than at the point of impact, the receptor, but cost
and technological constraints force our hand.36 Hence, if our
33. We appreciate that this is explicitly an anthropocentric approach,
quite at odds with deep ecology or land ethic norms, but we believe it
describes accurately the perspective of most citizens. It certainly explains the broad resonance we find when teaching Bill Baxter's classic utilitarian argument of "people or penguins" in our environmental law classes. WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE
CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974); see also Barton H. Thompson Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Searchfor Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1127-30 (1999)(describ-

ing the continuing relevance and influence of Baxter's book). Indeed
with the exception of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, and minor provisions of other statutes, the
fact that our environmental laws take an anthropocentric perspective, focusing on protection of human health and the human environment, seems an unobjectionable description.
34. Global warming potential is a measure that compares different
greenhouse gases' relative contribution to global warming, i.e., the
capacity to trap heat in the atmosphere. The global warming potential of carbon dioxide (CO2) is set at 1.Note that this does not directly
correlate with increasing temperatures, rising sea levels, or other
physical impacts of climate change.
35. One can equally describe this as identifying the optimal point of regulation. In the pollution context, ideally one wants to regulate based
on units of risk to individual receptors. This is technically too difficult
and expensive, however. Short of that, we should seek to regulate the
level of exposure to classes of receptors (accepting that individuals
have different sensitivities), then the ambient concentration (realizing
that airsheds and wind patterns are not uniform), and finally at the
level of particular emission sources (the site we actually do regulate).
At each step further from the ideal point of regulation, the currency
less accurately reflects what we care about. As Rose has observed:
[E]ntitlements must be created in resource features that can
be identified, measured and monitored, but careful management of those features does not necessarily overlap with the
best protection for the resource in question. For example,
tradable [SO 2] allowances are calculated in tons of emissions, because emissions by weight are relatively easy to
measure and monitor. But, because of wind and weather conditions, emissions in some places cause more damage to forests and lakes than do emissions in other places. Trading in
the wrong direction, as it were, from emitters in downwind or
forested areas to upwind emitters, thus has the potential to
create greater damage rather than would be the case if rights
could not be traded and moved about.
Rose, supra note 10, at 60-61.
Note that even though the ultimate point of regulation is quite far
downstream from our ultimate concern (in this case the impacts of
acid deposition), it still may be optimal once technological limitations and costs are taken into account if a close correlation exists between a source's emissions and the risk to individuals, trees, or
aquatic life. Hence complex modeling is used to justify state implementation plans under the CAA.
36. Proxy choice is not solely a challenge for ETMs. We do the same for
traditional command-and-control regulation. The emissions from
coal-fired utilities, for example, are limited in terms oftons of sulfur,
not by the net impact from their release.
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proxy for impacts of acid deposition is sulfur emissions, the
currency will necessarily be some variant of tons of sulfur. It
is vital, then, that we get the proxy right, for it determines the
currency for both the medium of trading and the goal of environmental protection.
To express this in a simple example, let's consider the
ideal case of fungibility where variance across space, type,
and time are eliminated. Here, trades of homogeneous commodities simultaneously take place in a small, discrete location-small blue marbles traded at the same time across a
kitchen table. If we are trading identical blue marbles, the
number of marbles may serve as a perfectly adequate metric.
If we are trading blue and yellow marbles, the number and
color of marbles are adequate currencies. If, however, some
marbles are highly radioactive and others are not, the simple
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currency metrics of color and quantity fail to capture an important variable.37 If the currency cannot incorporate the environmental values we care about, these become external to
the exchange and, as a result, trades may actually worsen the
environment or natural services delivered. Inadequate currencies allow externalities to bleed out of the trading market. We may end up with a nice pile of marbles that glow in
the dark.38 In the extreme case, the currency can actually encourage environmentally harmful behavior.39
Nonfungibilities can arise across three dimensions-space, type, and time-and depending on the market
an effective currency may need to capture all three.4 ° Chart 1
gives practical examples across different ETMs. It is important to note that all three types of nonfungibilities may be
present in the same ETM.

Chart 1
Examples of Nonfungibilities in ETMs
Environmental Trading Market

Nonfungibility of Space

Nonfungibility of Type

Nonfungibility of Time

Rule 1610:
Program allowstradingofreduced
vehicle volatile organic emissions
for increased refinery volatile
organic emissions

Vehicle emissions are
geographically diffused
versus "hot spot" of
concentrated refinery
emissions

Vehicle emissions may be
less carcinogenic than
refinery emissions

Vehicle emissions fluctuate
in regular patterns over 24hour periods whereas refinery
emissions experience regular
peaks

Wetlands Mitigation Banking:
Corps of Engineers permit allows
destruction of wetlands in return
for contributing to wetlands
restoration project located
elsewhere

The lost ecosystem services
may have been delivered to
many people whereas the
services of the restored
wetlands may be delivered
to few

The destroyed wetlands may
have had a higher capacity
or service provision
compared to the restored
wetlands

The permit may allow
destruction of the wetlands
before the quality of the
restoration of other wetlands
is known

Habitat Conservation Plans:
The lost habitat may have
Fish and Wildlife Service permit been part of a contiguous
allows destruction of endangered habitat system for the species,
species habitat in return for
whereas the preserved
securing preservation of another i habitat may be isolated and
parcel of the habitat located
thus of less overall value
elsewhere

The lost and preserved habitats
may have provided functional
values to different populations of
the species, and we do not know
which population is more
important to the overall viability
of the species

The lost habitat may have
been of ideal vegetative
maturity for the species,
while the preserved habitat
may require time to achieve
that state

Alaska Halibut Individual
Transferable Quotas:
Permits to catch Alaska Halibut are
traded among fishers to avoid
derby pressures in fishery

Tons ofhalibutdoes notaccount
for bycatch, highgrading or size
of fish (juvenile instead of
mature)

One fisher may catch halibut
during breeding season,
while other catches out of
breeding season

One fisher may catch in
halibut breeding area, while
other may catch fish in
nonbreeding zones

37. To take another example, knowing that one car costs $20,000 and another costs $80,000 tells me a great deal about the cars and that consumers value
one more than the other; but if I need to buy a car that can haul a trailer, the currency ofdollars is inadequate. It fails to capture an important value and
express it. Or, to introduce a market dynamic, assume that apple trees in an orchard produce two types ofapples, pretty and ugly, but that both taste the
same. Farmers currently sell apples by the bushel. A supermarket will pay a higher price per bushel than a canning factory but only wants to buy
pretty apples. In this case, there is a market incentive to develop a grading system (a more sophisticated currency) so the values important to the supermarket are meaningfully captured and communicated.
38. In the above example, the currency must capture color, number, and, hopefully, radioactivity. Note, however, that a similar result may occur even if
the currency does capture radioactivity. This will happen if the parties are indifferent to this value. In such a case the disjunction between private and
public interests in trading can result in a loss of social welfare.
Choosing the wrong currency increases the chances that environmental protection will suffer, but one might argue that serendipity can work both
ways on a case-by-case basis and may, on occasion, lead to environmental improvements. Part IV explains why, in the case ofhabitat ETMs, trades
will generally not result in environmental benefits.
39.
[W]ith respect to fishing allowances, a [tradable environmental allowance] may employ a relatively simple measure, as would be the case
where an individual fishing quota is measured in pounds or tons ofa particular target fish. But fishermen know that bigger fish bring more at
the market than smaller ones, and this can induce them to "high-grade," keeping the bigger fish and simply discarding the smaller (and now
dead) specimens, with potentially disastrous effects on the fish population as a whole.... [T]he quest for simplicity in [tradable environmental allowances] has feedback effects on what actually gets preserved.
Rose, supra note 10, at 60.
40. Writing about trading bubbles, Elliott and Charnley identify four dimensions: "geographic, inter-temporal, inter-pollutant, and inter-risk." Elliott &
Chamley, supra note I, at 49.
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1. Nonfungibilities of Space
Because most ETMs trade commodities from different locations, spatial nonfungibilities can easily arise. ETMs for
CO 2 and CFCs do not raise spatial concerns because the
compounds mix in the upper atmosphere independent of the
site of emission. But once the trading area exceeds the area
of harm or benefit, affected populations are no longer indifferent to the trades. 41 Rather than simply allocating among
parties for greatest efficiency, there are now clear winners
and losers. Concentrations of pollutants such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and air toxics, for example, can
elevate health risks through the creation of local hot spots.
Indeed, J.H. Dales' seminal discussion of ETMs specifically noted the problem posed by hot spots. 42 This problem has been well recognized both in practice and in the
literature and, not surprisingly, the vast majority of ETM
scholarship addressing nonfungibilities has focused on
spatial nonfungibilities.4 3
The most illustrative recent example of spatial
nonfungibility concerns Los Angeles' attempt to trade VOC
emissions between cars and oil refineries.44 In its Rule 1610
program, California's South Coast Air Quality Management
District program allows VOC emitters to purchase old polluting cars and scrap them in exchange for VOC reduction
credits. 45 The large polluters (primarily oil refineries) can
avoid lowering their actual emissions or installing new
equipment to satisfy permit standards if they can purchase
and retire enough cars, thereby gaining sufficient emission
credits. The net result, proponents claim, is overall reduction of VOC emissions in the Los Angeles airshed at least
cost, since taking old polluting cars off the road may prove
cheaper than pollution control retrofits. Despite retiring
41. "Pollutants also vary in their dispersion factors with some pollutants
detoxifying quickly or settling rapidly into a less harmful medium.
The location of a source of emissions is important because dispersion from different points will result in varying exposures to sensitive populations." Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 301.
"[A]s quality becomes scarcer in an area, people care very intensely about additional damage. Additionally, concentrating damages raises serious equity considerations, since one group (possibly
lower-income people or others with relatively little political power)
will suffer the damages while others are free of them." Gloria E.
Helfand & Jonathan Rubin, Spreading Versus Concentrating Damages: Environmental Policy in the Presence of Nonconvexities, 27 J.
ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 84, 90-91 (1994).
42. J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES 79 (1968) ("(I]t is
immediately pointed out that a ton of any particular kind of waste
will do much more damage in some places than in others ....
).
43. "Given local and long distance dispersion and the distribution of human and nonhuman populations, it is clear that the damage from
emissions varies dramatically across space. Treating all areas alike
completely ignores these spatial considerations." Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 309; see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 5, at
1350 (arguing that established regional boundaries do not take into
account spatial considerations); Tietenberg I, supra note 4, at 249-50
(addressing spatial issues with tradable permits); Technology-Based
Emission and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient
Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792, 810-14 (1982) (Prof.
Richard Revesz's student notes proposing a zoned permit solution to
hot spots).
44. VOCs are regulated because of their role in creating tropospheric
ozone, better known as smog.
45. The operation of Rule 1610 is set out in detail by Richard T. Drury et
al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles'
Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. &POL'Y
F. 231, 252 (1999) [hereinafter Drury]; see also Lily N. Chinn, Can
the Market Be Fair and Efficient?: An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999).
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over 17,000 cars, this program has been sharply criticized
by environmental justice groups who claim that the bulk of
trades were carried out by four refineries operating in close
proximity to two Latino communities. 46 Diffuse vehicular
emissions formerly spread across 12,000 square miles, they
charge, effectively have been exchanged for refinery emissions concentrated across only 20 square miles.4 ' This presents a classic, though far from unique, hot-spot problem.
2. Nonfungibilities of Type
The most basic, and obvious, currency unit is type. Apples
are traded for apples, not oranges. Under the acid rain program, a tradable allowance provides regulatory "permission" to emit a ton of sulfur, not nitrogen, not carbon, not
hydrocarbons. Nonfungibility of type may seem obvious
for pollutants, but as one moves into habitat trading, clear
delineations of type begin to blur as the units become increasingly nonfungible. Habitats are inevitably heterogeneous, both in biophysical terms (their soil, flora and
fauna, hydrology, climate) and as a result of the services
they provide. Yet a simple currency of acres will never capture these differences.
Even trades among the same pollutants, upon closer inspection, demonstrate that simple metrics of type can mask
significant differences. Article 5(3) of the Kyoto Protocol,
for example, relies on the currency of global warming potential to convert six greenhouse gases into a carbon equivalent index. 49 However, each of the gases has different monitoring and, as a result, different enforcement uncertainties
associated with it. For example, we know much more about
the sources and emissions of hydrofluorocarbons than we
do about methane. As a result, by bundling these different
gases together in the same currency, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is camouflaging oranges to appear as apples. 50 VOCs are treated the same
way. The category of VOCs comprises more than 600 different compounds. Many have differing reactivities and some,
46. Johnson, supra note 10, at 131.
47. Drury, supra note 45, at 252-54. In fighting this program, Citizens
for a Better Environment and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund challenged the auto-scrapping program claiming it violated civil rights
laws and had not been approved under California's state implementation plan. In response, the South Coast Air Quality Management
District (SCAQMD) has put the program on hold and adopted a
10-point plan aimed at preventing toxic hot spots in minority communities. Johnson, supra note 10, at 166 n. 108 (complaint on file
with authors).
48. See Part llI.B. In a similar example from British Columbia described
by Prof. Jody Freeman, the Ministry of Forests (Ministry) calculated
how much land to set aside for ecosystem preservation and reforestation purposes when allocating timber in the annual allowable cut.
The Ministry's goal was to preserve 2% of the total stock-regardless ofwhere it comes from, regardless of its suitability as habitat, regardless of how productive it would be for reforestation efforts. In
practice, then, the Ministry would set aside random parcels that
weren't even connected. One might ask how the bear population is
supposed to cross from one section of their habitat to another 10
miles away, but the Ministry's simple currency of acres could not account for these important considerations. Interview with Jody Freeman, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (Feb. 15, 2000).
49. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. The gases are CO2,
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.
50. Interview with Tom Tietenberg, Professor, Colby College (Apr. 20,
1999).
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such as benzene, are serious carcinogens. ETMs, however,
treat VOCs identically and fail to differentiate on the basis
of toxicity or reactivity. 51 Indeed the Rule 1610 ETM, described above, has come under its harshest criticism for this
very reason. Not only does the program concentrate on
VOCs, critics charge, but it effectively trades less carcinogenic VOCs (car emissions) for more carcinogenic ones (refinery emissions).
3. Nonfungibilities of Time
The last dimension of fungibility is time. Trades may involve disparate benefits over time periods, also resulting in
winners and losers. This is clearest in the case of habitat
trades, discussed in Part III, where timing problems can lead
to significant gaps in environmental values. For example, if
we allow a party to destroy mature forested wetlands in exchange for engaging in a seedling planting restoration project in another location, even if the restoration project is
vastly larger in size we will experience a temporary net loss
of habitat values.
Time nonfungibilities occur not only as uncertain future
events but also seasonally. Smog formation, for example,
requires sunlight, still air, nitrogen oxides (NOx), and
VOCs. Depending on local or seasonal conditions, either
of the chemical compounds can prove the limiting factor
for the reaction. Thus, at times when NO. is scarce, additional VOC emissions contribute nothing to tropospheric
ozone formation; yet when NO, is abundant, marginal
VOC emissions cause smog formation. Depending on
when they are emitted,
53 VOCs can have very different impacts on air quality.
C. CurrencyDesign Strategies
The test of a currency's effectiveness lies in how well it captures these different dimensions. In assessing the practice of
VOC trading under Rule 16 10, for example, the currency of
tons fares poorly. In regard to space, it tells us nothing about
where, within the airshed, the VOCs were emitted and the
likelihood of hot spots. 5 4 While a measure of tons certainly
tells us the general type and number of molecules exchanged, it does not distinguish the more hazardous from
less hazardous VOCs.55 Nor, ultimately, does it indicate the
51. VOCs are treated as a single, uniform class of compounds by command-and-control regulations under the CAA as well. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §7545, ELR STAT. CAA §211 (requiring reformulated gasoline that reduces ozone-forming VOCs).
52. See Drury, supra note 45, at 255-57 (claiming that cancer risks from
refinery emissions (including benzene) are greater than the risks
from vehicular emissions and that refinery emissions have more
toxic co-pollutants than exhaust emissions from a car's tail pipe).
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likelihood that VOC emissions over a given time could contribute to smog formation.56 Thus, VOC trading can involve
significant nonfungibilities, leading to increased or concentrated impacts in the name of environmental protection. One
VOC molecule may well not be the same as another. And, as
Chart 1 demonstrates, upon further investigation this holds
true for most trading programs.
A key issue to recognize at this point is the importance of
explicitly constructing the ETM around defined environmental protection goals. To rephrase the question posed in
the Introduction: What should we actually be trading?
Bruce Ackerman and Dick Stewart have argued that trading
is a more democratic process than command-and-control
approaches because it requires determining the total level of
allowable emissions or, more broadly, of environmental impact.57 Our analysis builds on this argument by contending
that ETM design requires focusing on not only the quantitative level of environmental impact but also the qualitative
goal of the ETM. If our principal objective in wetlands protection is conservation of open space, then acres may be an
adequate currency for a wetlands ETM. If the goal is conservation and delivery of services, then acres fare poorly. Put
another way, focusing on currencies forces us to consider
what we should be protecting, not simply how much. Absent
this clear articulation of qualitative goals, the currency cannot be adequately determined.
Assuming the goals have been articulated, though, how can
currency design capture the important variance across nonfungible commodities? Consider three basic strategies: simple
currency, universal currency, and comprehensive currency.
1. Simple Currency
The first strategy keeps the simple currencieswe currently
employ-acres for wetlands, tons for VOCs-and lives
with their shortcomings, muddling on as best we can. After
all, nonfungibilities exist in every ETM. The main issue is
whether they matter. While upon close inspection one might
find we really are trading Granny Smiths for Macintoshes,
the differences may not be meaningful because it still
amounts to apples for apples. And, in some key respects,
simplicity does have its virtues. While obvious, it needs to
be recognized that ETMs with simple currencies function.58 Simple currencies ensure that all the parties to the
transaction, as well as those outside, understand the commodities exchanged and can clearly communicate with one
another. Developers, local politicians, and environmental
groups all understand trades for acres better than trades for
services. Moreover, successors-in-interest know the rights
they have acquired. 59
2. Universal Currency

53. Described more technically,
a marketable emissions allowance system that regulates the
cumulative emissions of sources over a fixed period may
have a difficult time controlling a secondary pollutant like
ozone because both precursor emission rates and the rate at
which precursors are transformed into ozone change from
hour to hour and day to day.
Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 109.
54. To do so would require a currency that had a spatial component identifying the location of the emission.
55. To do so would require separate currencies identifying discrete
classes of VOCs grouped by carcinogenicity.

Second, one could rely on a universal currency, such as
money or risk. Indeed the problems posed by currency ade56. To do so would require a currency that identified the time (or season)

of emission.
57. Ackerman & Stewart, Democratic Case, supra note 5.

58. "Markets work best under simple trading rules. That gives those who
design markets an incentive to oversimplify environmental problems to make their market mechanisms more workable." Pedersen,
supra note 13, at 10175.
59. See Rose, supra note 10, at 59.
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quacy-the challenge of accounting for trades of nonfungible commodities-seem remarkably similar to those
faced by practitioners of cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment. After all, the idea of exchange is basic
to any policy decision since it will necessarily involve trade
offs, often of nonfungible units. Banning the use of CFCs,
for example, decreases the risk of skin cancer from ozone
depletion but may increase threats from climate change.6 °
Improving vehicle fuel efficiency may lessen the risk of climate change but increase traffic fatalities.

61

These are often

characterized as risk-risk dilemmas, but canjust as easily be
characterized as trading one type of risk for another.
When the same impact is shared by alternate activities,
comparisons are relatively straightforward. Seatbelt laws
may save some lives but endanger others by increasing reckless driving; yet in both cases the common measure to assess
the outcomes is the same-traffic injuries. But for heterogeneous harms (such as skin cancers versus climate change),
the comparisons must be indirect. Similarly, monetizing
costs and benefits is relatively straightforward when the
significant variables are all exchanged in markets.62 Once
one takes into consideration nonmarketed goods, such as
human lives and scenic vistas, valuation turns to shadow
pricing techniques to provide a common monetary unit
for comparison.63

Both methodologies seek to reduce disparate, seemingly
nonfungible features to a common currency, whether it be
dollars or deaths per 100,000 people. Such common units
could, in theory, embrace a wide range of externalities and
justify trades in seemingly different, perhaps incommensurable, commodities. 64 While admitting that the calculations
60. The common replacement for CFCs, compounds known as HFCs
and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), while not strong ozone
depleters, do unfortunately act as strong greenhouse gases. To a certain extent, the choice between CFCs and their replacements is a
choice between contributing to ozone depletion or to climate change.
See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW AND POLICY 551 (1998).
61. Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control,24 ENVrL. L. 887,
949 n.237 (1994) ("Efforts to conserve gasoline with greater automobile fuel efficiency may cause as many as 20,000 additional
deaths from smaller cars.").
62. Once you have a common currency that captures the values ofdifferent commodities through a common unit, e.g., gin and pork bellies
expressed in dollars, it allows trading of different things and society
can move from a barter economy to a market economy. The prerequisite, though, is a market mechanism through which meaningful valuation will occur.
63. Shadow pricing techniques, such as contingent valuation or hedonic
pricing, attempt to create a market where none exists through polling
people's willingness to pay or observing the premium people pay to
benefit from certain environmental amenities. See James Salzman,
Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 893 (1997)
[hereinafter Salzman].
64. An important question in the context of cost-benefit analysis, and
with implications for ETMs, centers on the issue of
incommensurability-the legitimacy of trading nonfungible commodities at all. The literature on incommensurability does not provide a commonly agreed upon definition of the term. See Richard
Craswell, Incommensurabilin,, Welfare Economics, and the Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1998). In the context of trading,
though, its application is straightforward. Apples cannot legitimately be traded for oranges, one might argue, because there is no
meaningful basis to compare the goods.
Some go farther and argue that it is immoral to reduce certain
things to monetary currency, e.g., value of a human life, and, therefore, trading is inappropriate. Others contend that reducing certain
features to commodities creates spill-over effects. We will be conditioned to think about nature differently, forexample. As Sunstein has
described, "emissions trading has damaging effects on social norms
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are inexact, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysts seek
to reduce the uncertainty by improving methodology and
process. For example, Don Elliott and Gail Charnley, two of
the major proponents of ETMs, have called for greater use
of trading among different pollutants in cases where the
benefits of reduced risk are clear.65 As John Graham and
Jonathan Wiener have suggested:
But it is chiefly our lack of methods of comparison-of

ways of seeing commonality among these risks-that
makes these risks seem dissimilar or noncomparable, not
an inherent incommensurability. As we improve methods of risk analysis, the idea of calculating the "net risk"
of a risk portfolio, or the change in a net risk due to a risk
tradeoff, may become more meaningful. 66

Thus one might argue that in analyzing the trading of
nonfungible commodities one need look no farther than the
cost-benefit and risk debates.
While these insights do inform our analysis, it is important to note that in practice neither money nor measures of
risk have often been used as trading currencies for three basic reasons. 6 ' The first concerns fit. Many environmental
by making environmental amenities seem like any othercommodity:
a good that has its price, to be set through market mechanisms."
Sunstein, supra note 29, at 2046; see also Michael J. Sandel, It'Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23
(discussing the argument put forth by some developing countries
that an international emissions trading program would allow developed nations to buy their way out of reductions). But see Martha
Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits ofCost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005 (arguing that assigning monetary values to goods does not necessarily mean that our values, as
well, have been changed).
For our purposes, the first criticism is most relevant. While trade
offs clearly must be made for society to function, in deciding which
trade offs to accept there may be no objective way to come up with a
single scale to rank them, no defensible way to combine or aggregate
assessment across different dimensions of value. One could choose
between policies by counting the number of letters in each proposal,
of course, but the result is meaningless. This is where concerns over
nonfungibility and commensurability mesh, and it is a key issue in
Part IV's discussion of institutional review of trades.
65. In response to the criticism that one cannot measure risks accurately
enough to trade, Elliott and Charnley argue that although one cannot
measure exactly, one can still assess the relative magnitude of the options. Thus "easy trades" between seemingly nonfungible options
are entirely appropriate if the magnitude of differences between the
two risks is large enough with little uncertainty. As they note: "It is
undeniably correct that we cannot make risk comparisons when we
have many alternatives to compare; the uncertainties and debatable
value judgments are simply too large in those cases. But we can nevertheless make valid comparisons among different environmental
risk reductions in many cases." Elliott & Charnley, supra note I,
at 51.
66. John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, Confronting Risk Trade
Offs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADE OFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33 (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener

eds., 1995). There is a large and growing literature on the merits and
practice of such valuation, and whether such dollar figures or risk
statistics are usefully accurate. See generally Matthew D. Adler &
Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165 (1999) (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis by government agencies in project evaluation).
67. Some habitat ETMs do allow monetary payments in exchange for
permits (often on a per acre basis), known as "in-lieu fees," either to
a habitat bank or the government. The assumption is that the funds
will be spent by the relevant agency or group for equivalent and appropriate habitat or for other purposes that presumably offset the permitted impacts. Royal C. Gardner, Moneyfor Nothing? The Rise of
Wetland Fee Mitigation, 19 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter
Gardner III]. Unstructured in-lieu fees in general, and all in-lieu fees
in wetlands mitigation banking, are disfavored. See, e.g., Branhaven
Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d 847 (Conn.
1999) (holding that the commission could not accept monetary and
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trades, particularly those involving habitat management, are

not amenable to measures of risk. As one moves from regulation of pollutants to habitat, the risk paradigm becomes
awkward because the loss of habitat may have little bearing
on human health.68 The second reason concerns efficiency.
It is one thing to undertake detailed cost-benefit and risk
analyses over several months (or years) to evaluate regulatory initiatives, poring over the data to craft policy instruments. It is quite another to determine prices for pork bellies
on the Chicago Board of Trade or barter goods on the town
square. Put simply, currencies in regulatory and trading settings must satisfy very different institutional requirements.
The conversion of environmental commodities to dollars or
units of risk will often simply take too long or be too expensive to be useful in an active trading setting.69 Finally, proper
risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses provide a range
of estimates reflecting data uncertainty and assumptions. 0
For a trading program to operate, it goes without saying that
the price and quantity must be specific, not estimates within
one standard deviation.

nursery habitat), and delivery of services (size of local population affected). 7'

While theoretically an attractive solution, merely recommending that we tailor the currencies more precisely conflicts with the goal of efficiency. Accounting meaningfully
for nonfungibilities across type, space, and time imposes a
heavy information burden on those designing and supervising the trading regime.72 As the cost goes up, parties (both to

the transaction and third parties) become less likely to participate and, at a certain point, may reach a state where no
trading takes place. 73 Recall that the prime attraction of trad-

71. Wetlands ecologist King has developed an analytical method that accounts for these dimensions. The model takes into account the biophysical capacity of the site to produce services, the opportunity that

services will be actually delivered to a population, the scarcity and
demand that would make these services valuable to the population,
and equity concerns over which populations are gaining and which
are losing in a wetlands trade. The method does not attempt to convert these measures into a common unit but, rather, provides a series
of scales through which to evaluate particular aspects of the trade.
Needless to say, this is a complex undertaking. An EPA study, for
which one of the authors is the principal investigator, is applying this
method to evaluate a current wetlands trade to see if it can be applied
in practice. See Lisa Wainger et al., Wetland Value Indicatorsfor
Scoring Mitigation Trades, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 413 (2001).
One could equally imagine the use of a "currency vectors" approach, where the currency captured both basic measures (such as
acreage) and the direction of the trade (improved flood controls, decreased waterfowl habitat, decreased nutrient filtration, reduced service delivery to populations, etc.). Though less precise than the
COPE model, such a currency would provide meaningful information across the range of nonfungibilities. Of course, in some cases
even a comprehensive currency will be inadequate to achieve certain
policy goals. As Rieser has noted in discussing ITQs:

3. Comprehensive Currency
A third currency design strategy is in some respects the most
obvious-develop a comprehensive currency to ensure the

trades are equitable. To return to the blue marbles example,
the currency should capture not only the number of marbles
and their color but their radioactivity as well. In a more familiar setting to those contemplating marriage, diamonds
are not assessed simply by the number of carats. Diamonds
are also differentiated by gradations in quality. This more
precise approach to pricing increases the transaction costs
(particularly the information costs) associated with buying
and selling diamonds, but those additional transaction
costs obviously are worth it to the buyers and sellers. Similarly, in the wetlands context one could imagine a currency
that captured acreage, provision of key services (biophysical capacity for nutrient filtration, floodwater retention,

ITQs alone do not create an institutional framework within
which fishermen must work with other groups and individuals who depend upon and are concerned with a healthy, functioning marine ecosystem. In this way ITQs may run counter
to the trend in environmental policy generally and, in particular, the new mandates of the Sustainable Fisheries Act that require fisheries management to take account of the inter-relatedness of species and their habitats, as well as the ecological
ramifications ofheavy fishing pressure on increasingly lower
trophic levels. These changes in the law, which reflect the
growing global concern for preserving biological and ecological diversity, may mean the ITQ with its emphasis on achieving efficiency is already an obsolete policy instrument.

in-kind contributions from permittee in mitigation for wetlands
damage because the use of the funds was unspecified); see also
Gardner I, supra note 11, at 583; David T. Urban & John H. Ryan, A
Lieu-Lieu Policy With Serious Shortcomings, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL., July/Aug. 1999, at 5, 9-10.
68. Establishing monetary values for many ecosystem services is infeasible, as well. "Wetland functions provide a wide range of services
and products with economic benefits that accrue primarily off-site.
Most of these are not reflected in markets, or at least not in markets
directly linked with wetlands, and cannot be captured as income by
the owners of wetlands." Dennis King, The Dollar Value of Wetlands: Trap Set, Bait Taken, Don "tSwallow, NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSL., July/Aug. 1998, at 9.
69. "For a variety of reasons, there is a growing perception within the
field ofeconomics and elsewhere that estimating the overall value of
specific habitats in dollar terms is impractical.... The authors of several recent reviews of habitat valuation have reached this conclusion." James Boyd, Indicators of Ecosystem Value (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
Determining values for ecosystem services will be especially difficult because a number of shadow pricing methodologies assume
that the polled people have a sufficient knowledge of functions provided by nature to give meaningful responses. See Salzman, supra
note 63, at 895. As the costs of these methodologies drop, however,
some of this criticism will be mooted.
70. Interview with Kip Viscusi, Professor, Harvard Law School (Feb. 8,
2000); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So
Paradoxical:The Rationalefor Technology-BasedRegulation, 1991
DUKE L.J. 729, 731-32 (describing the wide uncertainty range in
risk assessments).
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Alison Rieser, Prescriptionsfor the Commons: Environmental
Scholarshipand the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 393, 417 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
72.
Not only does an efficiency target make it necessary to
track the physical relationships underlying the emission,
transport, and chemical reactions of the polluting substances,
it also requires calculating the degree of exposure to those
substances and relating that exposure to physical and, ultimately, monetized damage (both human and nonhuman).
Each of these steps is subject to data limitations and uncertainty .... In principle, tradeable rights could be more closely
calibrated to location, but in practice, such closer refinements
would be likely to make rights considerably more complex
and hence less easy to define, trade and monitor.
Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at 96.
73. The experience of the Grand Parkway Association, the group responsible for development of Houston's third outer loop highway,
provides an analogous and illustrative example. In order to evaluate
development alternatives, the association created a matrix with 49
different criteria (such as presence of endangered species, type of
wetland habitat impacted, effect on dark skies, cemeteries, etc.). Diane Schenke, the executive director of the project, described the net
result as paralysis by analysis. They were faced with too many variables to reach a consensus. Interview with Diane Schenke, Executive Director, Grand Parkway Association (Apr. 28, 2000).
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ing programs is their efficiency. As transaction costs increase, potential efficiency improvements are lost. Thus the
policy instrument's viability rests on a balance.74
In the context of wetlands mitigation banking, regulators
have sought to develop and employ more comprehensive
currencies. But the net result, described in Part III, has been
Gresham's Law in practice-just as bad money drives out
good money, simple currencies drive out complex ones.
Thus, of the three currency designs to satisfy exchange adequacy-simple currency, universal currencies of dollars and
risk, or comprehensive currency-the first has been overwhelmingly adopted by trading programs. Relying on a simple currency, though, may create important externalities to
the trade. In response, and in an effort to minimize these externalities, ETMs often restrict exchanges of environmental
commodities, which we now turn to in Part II.
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or replace the currency shortcomings with more deeply
rooted problems. Indeed, these second-level market imperfections-arbitrage and thin markets-may be more difficult to detect and correct without completely undermining
the advantages of trading that motivate the experiment in the
first place.

Figure 4
Currency adequacy versus Exchange Restrictions

Currency
Adequacy

",

II. Exchange Adequacy: Constructing the Exchange
Market

When the condition of fungibility is imperfectly satisfied

Exchange
Restrictions

and the currency does not adequately capture important val-

ues, how can the market be structured to minimize externalities and ensure that trades promote environmental protection? Currency imperfections do not, in and of themselves,
present an insurmountable barrier to efficient use of trading
mechanisms in effectuating environmental policy. As in any
market context, if the externalities caused by poor currency
design can be identified, then the rules of the market itself
can be manipulated to close the holes. Indeed, since environmental trading markets are creatures of regulatory construction in the first instance, further refinements of the market can be carried out directly through regulatory fiat.
In practice, the problems posed by currency shortcom-

ings have been addressed through restrictions of market exchange-limiting who can trade, where they can trade,
when they can trade,
75 and what the exchange rate of the currency should be. In fact, we argue that ETMs demonstrate
an inverse correlation between currency adequacy and the
intensity of market constraint. As Figure 4 demonstrates
graphically, comprehensive currencies reduce the need for
exchange controls; conversely, crude currencies will often
result in tightly constrained trading schemes because the
market maker desires to minimize environmental externalities. The danger of engaging in aggressive market construction to restrict the currency's application, though, lurks in
the very real potential for market-design errors to compound
74. Transaction costs can, of course, arise from a number of sources,

such as information collection, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement. This problem has been studied in depth by both economists and law professors. As Hahn has succinctly observed: "There
is an unavoidable trade-offthat must be entertained-the relative ef-

ficacy ofa market and the degree to which environmental quality objectives will be met." Hahn I, supra note 10, at 10; see also John P.
Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in ControllingAir Pollution:
California "sMarketable Permits Program, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103
(1993) [hereinafter Dwyer] (demonstrating the importance of transaction costs to active trading); Juan-Pablo Montero, MarketablePollution Permits With Uncertainty and Transaction Costs, 20 RE-

SOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 27, 29 (1997) (modeling the effects of
transaction costs and uncertainty on ETM efficiency); Robert N.
Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENVrL.
ECON. & MGMT. 133 (1995) (describing the importance of transaction costs in ETM design).
75. See, e.g., Hahn 1,supra note 10, at 8-9 (listing the range of rules limiting exchanges within state emissions trading programs).

A. Market Refinements Across Space, Type, and 7ime
Nonfungibilities of space are neutralized by restricting the
area of exchange. While there are sound environmental reasons to encourage trading within a large area, 76 when the location of sources counts and space heterogeneity is high,
emissions of the same type can cause different impacts. For
example, a recent market was established among water
treatment plants in the Long Island Sound (the Sound) to reduce nitrogen discharge loads causing hypoxia (oxygen depletion) conditions.7 The program quickly ran into the
problem that ecological effects of nitrogen discharges are
not uniform throughout the Sound. Because of complex
flow and circulation patterns, the areas of greatest hypoxia
occur in the western end of the Sound, near New York City.
Nitrogen discharged anywhere in the Sound contributes to
hypoxia in the western end, albeit in varying degrees depending on location, as well as to local hypoxia. Hence, the
basic unit of currency for the trading-nitrogen discharges-failed to capture the spatial concentration of
hypoxia impacts. It failed the standard of currency adequacy. To compensate for the inadequate currency, those
studying the viability of the trading program proposed a
market construction alternative-divide the Sound into different discharge zones corresponding to different effects on
western end hypoxia levels, assign each zone a "value"
based on proportionate impact using the zone with the high76.
[I]nterest in trading remains strong at the federal level, and
in some localities. This interest is stimulated in part by the

growing recognition that some water quality problems can be
addressed only on a large geographic scale. A federal policy
shift toward increasing emphasis on watershed management
coincides with, and perhaps encourages, consideration of
trading schemes.
Powers, supra note 28, at 142.
77. See id at 197-206.
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est impact as value "1.0," and use the relative values to es78
tablish nitrogen discharge trading ratios between zones.
Beyond using coefficients to weigh currencies, it is useful
to consider not only what the currency is but, equally, how
and when it may be spent. Thus some currencies effectively
become legal tender based on where they are traded in order
to minimize distributional inequities.79 Unrestricted trading
of air pollutants across airsheds therefore is allowed for
CFCs, which mix in the upper atmosphere independent of
the site of emission, but not for NO, or VOCs.80 Opponents
of the Rule 16 10 program described in Part I have called for
banning trades by sources located near hot spots. 8' Some local governments have banned distant trades and others,
lacking this authorit use creative incentives to reduce spatial nonfungibilities. 2
Some programs appear to gloss over spatial nonfungibilities, using currencies regarded, rightly or not, as reliable indicators of true environmental impact. The sulfur
trading program, for example, assumes that a ton of SO 2
emitted in the Midwest has the same potential for acid rain
as a ton emitted on Long Island, and therefore permits trades
between New York and Ohio utilities.8 3 This freedom to
78. Trading ratios are found in other ETMs, including wetlands and air
emissions. The San Francisco Bay area AQMD, for example, sets
offset ratios of 1.1: 1 for trades within 2 miles, 1.2:1 for trades from
2-15 miles, and 2:1 for trades over 15 miles. Tietenberg II, supra note
30, at 107-08.
79. Some ETMs rely on restricting trades within a pre-defined zone. See
Tietenberg 1,supra note 4, at 249-50 (describing the Ozone Transport Commission's restrictions on trading of NO, along the eastern
seaboard). The 1990 CAA Amendments also control ozone through
categories. Offsets must come from areas with equal or more
nonattainment, and the most severe nonattainment areas can sell, but
not purchase, offsets. The SCAQMD divided the Los Angeles Basin
into 38 zones, only allowing sale of emission credits to downwind
partners. Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at 107.
80. Compare 42 U.S.C. §7671f(a), ELR STAT. CAA §601(a), allowing
trading of CFCs, with 42 U.S.C. §7503(c) ELR STAT. CAA § 173(c),
limiting inter-airshed trades of criteria pollutants in nonattainment areas.
81. Citizens for a Better Environment has called for a prohibition on
trades of toxic substances, trades into overburdened communities
(determined by using a cumulative risk threshold), trades that will
have adverse impact on environmental justice, and cross-pollutant
trades if the traded pollutant is less hazardous than those emitted. In
accordance with the National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (NEJAC) guidelines, it would allow community review and
comment on proposed trades. See Drury, supra note 45, at 283-87.
82. Lake County, Illinois, for example, requires that all wetlands mitigation take place in the county. Another town in Illinois, while lacking
authority to ban certain types of trades, leveraged its stormwater permitting authority to require a wetlands mitigation ratio of 1:1.5
within the town limits and 1:3 outside the town. Interview with Mark
Burkland, Attorney, Knight & Holland (Apr. 28, 2000).
83. In response to the acid rain trading program, for example, a spokesman for the Adirondack Council stated that "[tihe trading program
didn't take into consideration where the pollution would fall after it
was traded ....We have Lilco [a Long Island utility], whose pollution will go out to sea, trading to the Midwest, whose pollution will
fall on us." James Dao, A New, Unregulated Market: Selling the
Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at Al.
Several state attorneys general, from New York, Connecticut,
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, have criticized the amendments for not focusing on areas most affected by acid rain.
While they failed to get EPA to prevent hot spots, the attorneys general and the Adirondack Council, an environmental
group, sued EPA for refusing to allow states to block allowance trading when running permit programs under the CAA.
Hirsch, supra note 3, at 393. In the same vein, the New York legislature recently passed a law penalizing New York utilities that sell pollution credits to coal-burning power plants in the Midwest and the
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trade freely across airsheds, however, is curtailed by a series
of regulatory restrictions on where the currency may be
are efficient or effective
used. 4 Whether such restrictions
85
remains a topic of debate.
South. Raymond Hernandez, Albany Battles AcidRain Fed by Other
States, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2000, at Al.
The program designers were aware of these potential problems,
but "preimplementation modeling showed that the expected reductions from an unrestricted trading system would take place in precisely the areas that would be targeted for greater control by a more
complicated system. Therefore the gains from implementing a more
complicated system appeared small in comparison to the administrative cost." Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at 98. Another factor that
may be in play is the level of emissions reduction. That is, the deep
reductions mandated in the ETM may also alleviate the problem of
spatial nonfungibilities. While certain areas might receive more
emissions than others, hot spots might still occur, but as a result of
net reductions over the entire trading area, the local concentrations
are not very hot-we may not need to care about heterogeneity
of distribution.
84. This is known as regulatory tiering. Thus, in the acid rain trading
program, sulfur allowances may be traded nationally but may only
be used in locations where they satisfy the state implementation program and the national ambient air quality standards. Tietenberg II,
supra note 30, at 103. According to EPA's emissions trading policy
statement, published in the FederalRegister in 1986 and reflected in
several rules, emission trades must be environmentally equivalent.
Thus distant trades are only supposed to be approved pending a demonstration of air quality equivalence. 51 Fed. Reg. at 43814.
Skeptical that these guidelines will restrict ETM activities, some
states have taken the issue on themselves. "[E]nvironmental concerns have prompted New York to consider restricting allowance
sales to [M]idwest utilities upwind from New York's Adirondack
Mountains. According to some midwestern and New York utilities,
this possibility has diminished their inclination to trade with one another because of the threat that the trades could be overturned in the
future." Sohn & Cohen, supra note 12. New York has told Long Island Lighting that it can't sell its allowances to anyone upwind. Raymond Hernandez, Lilco Is to Stop Selling Creditsto UpwindProducers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at B I. Some ETMs also require detailed
modeling before allowing trading. Hahn I, supra note 10, at 7.
85. A number of commentators believe spatial restrictions on trades are
misguided. In writing about the NO, trading program, Farrell et
al. write:
[A]n analysis of the effects of restricting the allowance market by geographic zones to prevent wrong-way trades shows
that such restrictions would be expensive but have little, if
any, environmental effect. Similarly, preventing sources
from banking excess allowances from one year to another
also has significant costs while it is not clear there are any environmental benefits from doing so.
Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 121-22.
Environmental justice advocates, on the other hand, argue that the
spatial restrictions are not tight enough. As Johnson relates:
Critics might argue that the concerns about toxic hot spots are
inflated. Trading schemes are often coupled with command
and control standards, so that an industrial source must meet
certain technology-based standards before they can trade for
pollution rights.... Thus, there are limits on the amount of
pollution that will flow to a toxic hot spot. This criticism is
flawed for several reasons. Technology-based standards are
not necessarily designed to protect human health or the environment .... Thus, if several sources are emitting pollution
into the air or water at levels that meet technology-based
standards in a toxic hot spot, those standards will not necessarily protect the health or environment of the surrounding
community. Although states may impose more stringent limits on sources in those toxic hot spots in order to meet
health-based or environmentally-based water quality standards or air quality standards, the health-based or environmentally-based standards do not necessarily protect the
health and safety of communities because the standards are
set based on risk assessments that do not address the cumulative or synergistic impacts that pollution can have on persons.
Johnson, supra note 10, at 130 n.97.
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Nonfungibilities of type are neutralized by explicitly restricting exchanges to the same commodity. In the pollutant
context, heterogeneous trades are rare. Under the Clean Air
Act (CAA), there are separate trading programs for SO 2,
No,, hazardous air pollutants, CFCs, etc. 86 Both Congress
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have
87
emphatically declared that toxin trading is unacceptable.
The Clean Water Act's (CWA's) total maximum daily loads
program also restricts such trades, allowing biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) for BOD, chemical oxygen demand88
(COD) for COD, albeit from different types of sources.
These restrictions ensure that we trade apples for apples, not
apples for oranges. This restriction is loosened in some
cases by the use of ratios for trades between point and nonpoint sources or habitat.8 9
Temporal nonfungibilities may be neutralized by restricting trades to narrow time periods. Bubbling and offsets require simultaneous trades. 9 In more complex schemes, the
currency's value can be restricted by issue, compliance, and
expiration dates. 91 In the wetlands program, mitigation is
supposed to occur only when the restored habitat is fully
functional.92 Sometimes, though, the time window is made
more flexible. Under the CAA's prevention of significant
deterioration (PSD) program, EPA allows trading of contemporaneous emissions, but "contemporaneous"
is gener93
ously defined as a five-year period.

86. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7671 f, ELR STAT. CAA §607 (CFC trades); id.
§7651 b, ELR STAT. CAA §403 (sulfur trades); id. 7511 a(g)(4), ELR
STAT. CAA §182(g)(4) (ozone trades); id. §173(c) (criteria pollutants and precursors in nonattainment areas).
87. In a letter to Congress at the time of the acid rain trading program's
passage, for example, EPA Administrator Reilly made clear that toxins would not be part of an ETM. Letter from John Sununu, White
House Chief of Staff, and William Reilly, Administrator, EPA, to
Tom Foley, Speaker, House of Representatives (May 22, 1990), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 2846 (1993) (setting out the features of the bill
and stating that toxins would be controlled by technology standards);
see also 59 Fed. Reg. 15504 (Apr. 1,1994) (considering only trades
within the same facility for hazardous air pollutants).
88. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED TRADING 2-10, app. B-2 (1996) (EPA
800-R-96-001) ("EPA does not currently envision a situation in
which 'cross-pollutant' trading could work under current regulatory
conditions and technical limitations.").

89.
Much of the success of a trading program, as measured by
improvements in water quality, rests with the difficult decision of choosing an appropriate trading ratio. A trading ratio
acts as the exchange rate that equates the environmental impact of point and nonpoint source loadings. It is the amount of
nonpoint source control that a point source discharger must
undertake to generate a unit of credit at the point source.
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B. Market Fragmentation,Background Markets, and
Other Design Pitfalls

1. Arbitrage
Notwithstanding their effectiveness in reducing externalities, there is a danger that imposing additional market restrictions to compensate for currency shortcomings can create second-order problems. Few constructed markets can
operate hermetically sealed from external free-market conditions. Thus in financial markets, absent Draconian restrictions, official currency exchange rates must coexist with
private currency trading markets, and price control regimes
must coexist with private goods trading markets. Private
market rent seekers, more commonly known as arbitrageurs
and black marketeers, will seek out and take advantage of
any imperfections in the constructed market. To an economist, these effects are simply evidence of "the market" at
work, weeding out inefficiencies in any market setting, constructed or not, so as to maintain a true market equilibrium.
There is no reason to believe that environmental trading
programs are immune to these market-driven forces. Consider the following situation depicted below in Figure 5, an
acre-based habitat trading program established using the
following market restrictions: two types of habitat, type A
and type B, are protected through a regulatory program that
requires compensatory habitat mitigation whenever habitat
is destroyed, i.e., a developer can trade destroyed habitat in
exchange for mitigation habitat. Moreover, although types
A and B can be traded for each other, because of general
habitat function differences, one acre of type A habitat is
deemed to be worth five acres of type B habitat. The conservation goal for the area is to achieve a balance of the two
habitats that favors conservation of type A habitat because
of its superior habitat value, and which is relatively consistent throuwhout the area so as to maintain overall ecological
function. A trading program, it is thought, will let "the
market" most efficiently decide which acres are developed
within this hoped-for pattern.
Once this habitat trading market is set in motion, however, it necessarily coexists with the background real estate
markets operating within the defined trading area. The real
estate market, of course, reflects values relevant to developers and consumers of developed habitat. The trading market, by contrast, is designed to capture values of habitat
function, albeit crudely reflected in the acre-based currency.
Yet the imposed habitat value exchange rate between type A
and B habitats cannot ignore the real estate market's exchange rate between the two types. When the constructed
habitat value system is overlaid on the relatively unconstrained real estate market, it is easy to see how "mistakes"
in trading valuation can undermine environmental protection values.

Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond
PotentialCost Savings, 23 ENVrL. L. 43, 67 (1993) (discussing ratios for water pollutant trading). We discuss the use of ratios for
wetlands trading in Part Il.
90. See 40 C.F.R. §51.165 (1999).
91. Dale A. Carlson & Anne M. Scholtz, DesigningPollution MarketInstruments: Cases of Uncertainty, 12 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 114,
121-22 (1994) (proposing "staggered" ETM credits).
92. See Part 11.
93. Elliott & Chamley, supra note 1, at 49-50.

94. This last requirement is an important condition. Consistent habitat
distribution both provides corridors for species to range throughout
the area and may be necessary for species that depend on the two
habitat types, e.g., for nesting and feeding.
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Figure 5

For example, the 1:5 trading ratio between type A and type
B habitat is intended to reflect the superior habitat function
value of type A habitat. But in real estate market I, type A
habitat is worth only three-and-one-third times as much as
type B. In real estate market I, therefore, a developer could
develop five acres of type B habitat and mitigate with either
five acres of type B habitat at a cost of $15,000, or one acre
of type A habitat at a cost of $10,000. Easy decision. Thus,
the result of using the 1:5 habitat value exchange rate in the
long term could be widespread depletion of type B habitat
throughout the trading area and extensive conservation of
type A habitat, which may not promote the original conservation goals of the trading program.
Another problem could arise if the trading area is defined
too broadly. As depicted in Figure 5, there may be more than
one real estate market encompassed within the trading area.
Say developers in the trading area believe that type A habitat
is undervalued in the real estate market and in fact presents a
more profitable development profile than type B habitat, so
that they wish to develop type A habitat and use type B habitat to mitigate. Type B habitat is worth the same in habitat
value throughout the trading area, but is worth more in real
estate value in market II than in market I. As a result, developers in real estate market II can practice a form of arbitrage
by reaching into real estate market I for cheaper type B conservation acres to compensate for development in market II,
facilitating more development of type A acres in market II.
Once again, we may wind up with a distribution of developed and conserved acres within the larger trading area
that is inconsistent with the conservation goals of the
trading program.
To an economist, this is simply evidence of market efficiency at work. Indeed, as the economist would predict, over
time the real estate market price of type B habitat will rise if
it is demanded for mitigation of type A development, and
price disparities in type B acres within the trading area will
dampen as demand for the cheap acres increases. That is
market efficiency. But it may not be environmentally acceptable to let that market dynamic play out-by the time
the real estate market adjusts, the conservation goals of the
trading program may have been irrevocably undermined.
Design defects in the constructed market can therefore cre-
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ate externalities that
95 exist independent of the currency design deficiencies.
Regulators detecting this problem would have a number
of solutions. In the arbitrage scenario, for example, the original trading area could be split into several trading areas corresponding to the two real estate markets, thus making arbitrage between real estate markets impossible. Or type B habitat could be divided into several types corresponding to
price differential ranges and the exchange rates between the
reconstituted habitat types could be altered. For example,
if the cheap type B acres were redefined as type C and new
exchange rates between it and types B and A habitat were
defined, the arbitrage opportunity can be foiled. In short,
any constructed market defect can be corrected with additional market constructions.9 6 The challenge is in detecting
the defect and its externality and designing market-procedure corrections that solve the externality without creating
a new one.
2. The Inevitable Trade Off Between Fat and Sloppy or Thin
and Bland
Recall the idealized trading situation, where parties exchange identical goods simultaneously in a small area. In
this case, there are few, if any, externalities to the trade but,
unfortunately, there are few, if any, trades, as well. The
temptation to add market refinement on top of refinement to
ensure exchange adequacy, to reduce nonfungibilities, must
be tempered by the need for nonfungibilities. The point of
using trading as an environmental policy instrument lies
precisely in its ability to take advantage of market commodity heterogeneity and different trader utility preferences.
People who feel exactly the same about small blue marbles
will not trade small blue marbles among themselves if the
marbles are indistinguishable, i.e., perfectly fungible. To
have a trading market, we have to include differences in the
marbles, differences in the way people feel about those differences, and have enough of the marbles and marble lovers
to engage in active trading. 97
95. Despite the goal of creating an even distribution of habitat types,
market participants have no incentive to abide by that goal and feel
no cost when they ignore it. It is external to the transactions.
96. Equally, the ratio between type A and B habitat could be changed to
act as an insurance buffer against further development oftype A habitat. Wetland mitigation trades often employ ratios, e.g., giving up
one acre of wetland for two acres of restored wetlands. This essentially discounts for the expected failure rate and uncertainty in restored wetlands. This decisionmaking under uncertainty, though,
may be one of false precision since, in any particular case, a 2:1 or
3:1 ratio might be no better than 1:1 if the currency fails to capture
important measures.
97.

If there is no difference in costs of control among sources
under a bubble, there will be no advantage to market trading.... Thus, the power of bubbles to improve efficiency and

save costs is a function of how broadly they can be extended
in time and space and across risks.
Elliott & Charnley, supra note 1, at 50; see also Powers, supra note
28, at 198 ("A rational basis for trading exists only if there is a substantial difference among dischargers in controlling agiven amount
of pollution."); Frank S. Arnold, S02 Trading Success Not Easily
Replicable, ENVFL. F., May/June 1999, at 11 ("The situations that
are tailor-made for tradable permit systems are those in which many
sources with substantially different abatement costs all contribute to
create an environmental problem, but polluters' locations and other
characteristics have no effect on the damages.").
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This is no less true in environmental trading markets.
Someone willing to buy 20 acres of mitigation bank
wetlands in return for authorization to destroy 10 acres of
wetlands 5 miles away from the bank has made a decision
that the trade is worth it, and so have the regulatory entity approving the trade and the wetland bank selling the bank
acres. The project developer weighed the trade based on the
dollar investment return potential, as did the wetlands bank,
and the agency weighed it based on the conservation return
potential. The trade could only occur because the acres were
in different locations and the developer, bank, and agency
had different utility preferences for those acres. In short, for
environmental policy to tap into the advantages of market
trading efficiency, there must be markets within which to
trade and traders willing to engage in trades.
In highly constructed environmental trading markets,
however, the market may become too "thin" to accommodate a meaningful volume of trading. In the previous habitat
trading arbitrage scenario, for example, if in our quest to
root out the arbitrage we subdivide the original trading area
too finely, we are left with many small geographic markets
within which there is no arbitrage but, equally, no trading.
Or, if trades are allowed only between like habitat types,
supply deficiencies may make trading difficult and limited
in scope and duration. The smaller the trading zones, in any
of the three dimensions of98type, space, and time, the fewer
the trading opportunities.
Therein lies the fundamental trade off in environmental
markets that rely on exchange restrictions to compensate for
crude currency design. Markets require heterogeneity of
goods and participants (over type, space, and time) and an
ample supply of each. The success of an ETM is a direct
function of the parties' variance across important dimensions. A "fat" or thick market would impose loose or no restrictions on those market dimensions, posing no transaction costs to traders besides complying with the rules. This is
fine if currency adequacy is achieved-if the currency can
meaningfully capture these differences and allow informed
comparisons. But in the absence of effective currency design, heterogeneity also carries with it the potential for externalities. Fat markets are sloppy. We can attempt to plug
the externality holes by constricting the type, space, and
time heterogeneity of the market, but in so doing we weaken
the market's trading potential.99 Thin markets are bland. Un98.
[A] system that limits the number of likely traders or that
segments the market into distinct subgroups increases the

risk that the number of buyers and sellers will be inadequate
to support a thick market. The two-phase approach of the

[SO 2] program, the geographic segmentation in the offset
and banking programs, and the separate treatment under the
offset program of new and existing sources all illustrate this

effect. In contrast, the lead phasedown's success stems at
least partly from its uniform regulation of relatively homogeneous entities.
Sohn & Cohen, supra note 12, at 432-33; see also Tietenberg II,

supra note 30, at 106 (describing how small zones reduce trading
opportunities); Hahn I, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that in thin
markets price taking behavior can no longer be assumed, even as a
rough approximation).
99. Clearly, not all exchange restraints cause excessively thin ETMs.

There exists a continuum along which restrictions become increas-

ingly burdensome for trading parties. The point at which the marginal loss of trading parties creates markets that are too thin will de-

pend on the particular ETM and the type of restriction.
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til we develop more refined currency instruments, therefore,
a significant policy choice in constructed environmental
trading markets will be how fat or thin to make the market;
that is, how much externality potential we are willing to tolerate in order to take advantage of the perceived efficiency
qualities of markets.It °
This is not a trivial dilemma. When the adequacy of a currency is impeded by lack of information, technology, or
money, market design can step in to take over the job of
dampening externalities in the market. But when the market
commodities are nonfungible in terms of type, space, or
time and the currency remains crude, attempting to solve all
the problems through market construction techniques runs
into the same problem as complex currencies-it may be at
the limit of our knowledge and technological capacity. And
even where knowledge and technology are available to perfect trading currencies, the expense associated with valuing
the traded goods may so increase the transaction costs that
no willing traders come forward.'0 '
The combination of sloppy currencies and fat markets
thus may be the most expeditious way of encouraging trading in the environmental policy context, at least until
cheaper ways of perfecting currency design and goods valuation are developed. But then what about the externalities?
Clearly, if the goal of increased social welfare is to be preserved in such trading systems, some method of policing individual trades will be required in order to exclude trades
that cause unacceptable externality problems. We explore
this issue in Part IV's discussion of review adequacy. To
make that analysis more concrete, and further explore the
dynamic between currency selection and market constraints
described in Parts I and II, we narrow our focus in Parts III
and IV to habitat ETMs. While the lessons we raise hold true
for other ETMs, the problems of nonfungibilities are clearest, and most difficult, in the contexts of wetlands mitigation
banking and habitat conservation plans (HCPs).
100. As a result, economists often argue to keep markets fat and deal
with nonfungibility problems on an ad hoc basis. Professor
Tietenberg, for example, argues that it's better to implement a basic
system around emission permit trades and deal with severe hot
spots on a case-by-case basis rather than create rigid zones or
wholesale trade restrictions.
Economic models of the trading process formulate the problem as searching for the lowest cost solution subject to the
constraint that trading equilibrium can result in the violation
of an ambient concentration constraint. The control authority
rules which govern the trades of nonuniformly mixed pollutants are usually not consistent with this formulation for the
simple reason that they disallow any trades which unacceptably increase the concentrations in any subportion of the region even if those trades do not result in a violation ofthe ambient constraint. The failure to accept those trades can increase the cost of pollution control considerably.
Tietenberg I, supra note 4, at 254; see also Mendelsohn, supra note
10, at 312 (arguing that dense central cities should be treated as separate markets, while rural and suburban counties should be combined
under a single standard).
101. See, e.g., Hahn II, supra note 23, at 97-98 (recounting the history of
the Fox River Water Permit system in Wisconsin, where the system's
complexity and uncertainty over property rights led to only one trade
in the first six years of the program); see also Arnold, supra note 97,
at 1I ("Clearly, when the same emissions from different sources
cause different amounts of harm, the modeling efforts and administrative costs necessary to implement a trading program that will reliably achieve the environmental improvement target are far greater
than for [SO 2] and similar cases.").
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Il.Currencies and Market Constraints in the Real
World-Wetlands Mitigation Banking
The success of ETMs in the SO2 and similar pollutant trading programs has buoyed efforts to expand trading into other
environmental contexts where nonfungibility is more acute,
most notably habitat protection. For example, after leaving
it dormant for almost a decade, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) recently discovered the so-called HCP provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 10 2 and leveraged it as a way of allowing land development that degrades
endangered species habitat by preserving or enhancing endangered species habitat elsewhere. In other words, a developer can swap acres of endangered species habitat here for
acres of endangered species habitat there. 0 3 This program,
with vigorous official support,' 0 4 is gaining tremendous momentum and has already accounted for hundreds of thousands of acres swapped.' °5 But there may be good reason to
question whether the trading success of the SO 2 program
can easily be duplicated in the habitat context. Can a trading
market for habitat be so easily established? Should the currency be acres, or something more refined such as a measure
of functional value of the acres? And if the currency turns
out to be imprecise, how easy will it be to weed out externalities through market constrictions without making the
market too thin? The fact that these questions have been relatively easy to solve in some pollutant trading contexts does
not necessarily mean that HCPs and other new wave habitat
trading programs will have the same experience.
Indeed, an example of how the HCP and other habitat
trading programs may fare under the trend toward aggres102. 16 U.S.C. §1539(aX2), ELR STAT. ESA §10(a)(2). Although Congress added the HCP provision to the ESA in 1982, it was not until
the early 1990s that the FWS began issuing any appreciable number
of HCP permits. By 1992, for example, the FWS had issued only 12
HCP permits, whereas it had issued 225 by October 1, 1997. See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS vi-xiii (1999). For
background on these developments and the HCP program in general,
see Eric Fisher, Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises and the Quest for Certainty, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 371 (1996); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of HabitatConservation Planning Under the Endangered SpeciesAct, 29 ELR 10592 (Oct. 1999); Albert C.Lin, Participants'Experiences With Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996); J.B. Ruhi,

How to Kill EndangeredSpecies, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts ofEndangeredSpecies Act "HCP"Permitsfor Real Estate Development,

5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999); Barton H. Thompson Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case Study in Takings andIncentives, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 305 (1997).
103. See Hsu, supra note 102, at 10594-600 (describing the HCP negotia-

tion process between agency and permittee, and concluding that
HCPs may provide environmental benefits when "valuable habitat
and low-quality development land is exchanged for valuable development land and low-quality habitat"); Ruhl, supra note 102, at
391-96 (describing the HCP mitigation negotiation process).
104. For example, the FWS has published alengthy handbook describing
the steps required to obtain an HCP permit. See FWS & NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP

HANDBOOK]; see also Hsu, supra note 102, at 10594-99 (describing
various official statements in favor of HCP permitting).
105. For an excellent statistical summary of the 208 HCP permits that the
FWS had issued nationally by August 1997, including acreage statis-

tics, see National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis &
American Institute of Biological Sciences, Using Science in Habitat
Conservation Plans (1999), at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/projects/
hcp. HCP permits cover areas within which swapping takes place
that vary widely in terms of size, with some covering a few acres
while others cover in excess of 1.6 million acres. Id.at 19-20.
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sive use of ETMs in environmental policy is provided
through the wetland mitigation banking experience, a habitat trading program that has been in existence, and thus
"field tested," for over a decade. 106 In wetlands mitigation
banking, a "bank" of wetlands habitat is created, restored, or
preserved and then made available to developers of
wetlands habitat who must "buy" habitat mitigation as a
condition of government approval for development. Building off the purported success of the wetlands program, current habitat trading proposals have increasingly been packaged as mitigation banking constructs. 0 7 Proponents of using mitigation banking in HCP contexts, for example, argue
that "[d]eveloping intelligent policy for endangered species
mitigation banking should not take as long as it did for wetland mitigation banking."'' 08 That assumes, of course, that
wetland mitigation banking has developed into an intelligent policy and that replicating the wetlands model in endangered species habitat banking also would be an intelligent move. We question both assumptions, and thus have
chosen wetlands mitigation banking as a case study to explore the lessons it offers for the use of ETMs when trading
involves significant nonfungible environmental features.
A. Establishingthe Wetlands Trading Market
Like any other ETM, the basis for wetlands trading is a regulatory proscription of behavior followed by regulatory ermission of the behavior under controlled conditions.' In
this case the behavior is filling of wetlands. Thus, although
CWA §311 broadly prohibits "the discharge of any pollutant
by any person,"" 0 which as defined would prevent filling of
106. For a comprehensive analysis of the wetlands mitigation banking
concept and its history, see ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11 (also
available in substantially the same form at ROBERT BRUMBAUGH &
RICHARD REPPERT, WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
NATIONAL WETLANDS MITIGATION BANKING STUDY: FIRST PHASE

REPORT (1994)); Gardner I, supra note 11.

107. See Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species Conservation Tool, 30 ELR 10537, 10537 (July
2000) ("Today, mitigation banking for endangered species is much
like wetland mitigation banking nearly two decades ago."); ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (EDF), MITIGATION BANKING AS AN
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION TOOL (1999), available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/programs/Ecosystems/
SafeHarbor/pdf/mb.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2001) (providing an
overview of the wetland mitigation banking program and describing
how it can be employed by analogy in the endangered species habitat
context) [hereinafter EDF-ENDANGERED SPECIES]; NATURAL
HERITAGE INST., WHERE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSrry
CONVERGE: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVA-

TION PLANNING 26 (2000) ("Mitigation banking can achieve habitat
goals in an economically efficient manner and can reconfigure habitat in ways that traditional HCPs cannot.").
108. Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10537 (emphasis added). For criticism of the trend toward ETMs in the endangered species protection
context, see Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Cross-Examining Market Approaches to ProtectingEndangered Species, 30 ELR 10721 (Sept.
2000).
109. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 7 ("Demand for compensatory [wetland] mitigation exists only because it is a government-imposed condition on wetland development."); Gardner I, supra note
18, at 10077 ("[U]nlike typical markets, regulatory agencies control
both the supply of and demand for [wetlands] mitigation."); Jennifer
Neal, Paving the Road to Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 27 B.C.
ENVI'L. AFF. L. REv. 161, 181 (1999) ("The market for mitigation
bank credits depends upon the demand for credits, which, in turn, depends upon governmental regulation mandating compensatory mitigation for unavoidable wetlands loss.") (citation omitted).
110. 33 U.S.C. §1311(a), ELR STAT. FWPCA §301(a).
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wetlands, CWA §404 authorizes the Secretary of the Army

to "issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
navigable waters at specified disposal sites."' 1 These permits, administered principally through the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (the Corps) and known ubiquitously as "404
permits," "wetland permits," or "Corps permits," are the2
cornerstone of federal protection of wetland resources."
The permitting program, however, admits of many exceptions and nuances, complicating whether a permit is required for a particular fill activity and how to get one."l 3 The
point for our purposes is that many routine land development activities require and receive 404 permits. Along the
way, permit applicants and1 4the Corps often must confront
the issue of "mitigation."''
The Corps' guidelines for mitigation provide that 404
permit applications should be reviewed using a "sequencing" approach.' '5 The first preference is to require the applicant to avoid filling wetland resources, followed by
minimization of adverse impacts to those wetlands that cannot reasonably be avoided, followed by the least desirable
Ill. Id. § 1344(a), ELR STAT. FWPCA §404(a). EPA has the power to
veto the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's (the Corps') permits if it
finds the discharge would have an unacceptably adverse effect on
environmental resources. Id. EPA has exercised this power infrequently. See U.S. EPA, EPA's CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION
404(c)
VETO
AUTHORITY
(2000),
available at
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/wetlands/facts/factl4.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2001) ("EPA has completed only 11 'veto' actions out
of an estimated 150,000 permit applications received since the regulations went into effect in October 1979"); see generally S. Scott
Burkhalter, Oversimplification: Value and Function: Wetland Mitigation Banking,2 CHAP. L. REV. 261,267 (1999); Gardner 1,supra
note 11, at 536 n.48.
112. With respect to federal Corps' jurisdiction under the 404 program,
early in the program's history judicial interpretation required the
Corps to extend its reach to tidal wetland areas. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686, 5 ELR
20285,20285 (D.D.C. 1975) (declaring that the term "navigable waters" as used in the CWA is not limited to the "traditional tests of navigability"). Since then the courts have upheld Corps' efforts to extend its jurisdiction even further inland. See, e.g., United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139, 16 ELR 20086,
20090 (1985) (upholding regulation ofwetlands "adjacent to the waters of the United States"). But see Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001)
(Corps' jurisdiction does not extend to isolated non-navigable waters such as ponds and mudflats).
113. For a concise description of the §404 permitting process, see
Burkhalter, supra note I11, at 267-74; Margaret N. Strand, Wetlands: Avoiding the Swamp Monster, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 720-56 (James B. Witkin ed., 2d
ed. 1999).
114. For a survey of environmental laws using mitigation techniques to
achieve compliance with regulatory requirements, see Thomas J.
Schoenbaum & Richard B. Stewart, The Role ofMitigation andConservation Measures in Achieving Compliance With Environmental
Regulatory Statutes: Lessons From Section 316 of the Clean Water
Act, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 237 (2000). Schoenbaum and Stewart define mitigation generally as any measure "aimed at reducing oreliminating the adverse environmental stresses imposed by a facility,
project, or activity." Id. at 237. They divide mitigation into
"source-based" methods designed "to achieve this objective by imposing technology-based controls or other regulatory requirements
on the source of the stress," and "ecosystem-based" methods that
"reduce or eliminate source-imposed stresses by enhancing the affected ecosystem or providing replacement or substitute resources
for those affected." Id.
115. 33 U.S.C. 1344(b), ELR STAT. FWPCA §104(b). Section 404 does
not mention a mitigation requirement for permit issuance. Rather,
this provision of the statute directs EPA, in conjunction with the
Corps, to develop guidelines that the Corps must apply in deciding
whether to authorize the fill disposal at a wetlands site.
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option of providing compensatory mitigation for those unavoidable adverse impacts that remain after all
minimization measures have been exercised. 116 With respect to compensatory mitigation, moreover, EPA and the
Corps traditionally have preferred on-site to off-site locations for the mitigation activity, 117 and have preferred
in-kind mitigation to mitigation that uses a substantially
different type of wetland (thus neutralizing
nonfungibilities of space and type)."18 Finally, regardless
of location, EPA and the Corps value measures that restore
prior wetland areas as the highest form of mitigation, followed by enhancement of low-quality wetlands, then creation of new wetlands, and least-favored of all, preservation of existing wetlands. I9

Notwithstanding its official status as the least-favored alternative behind avoidance and minimization in the agencies' sequencing pecking order, compensatory mitigation
has been the oil allowing the 404 permit program to move
forward because it greases the skids of permitting. Compensatory mitigation frees up highly valued wetlands for more
comprehensive and flexible development. 120 Building a
shopping center around an avoided wetlands site, presumably on choice commercial development land, obviously
presents more design constraints and development expenses
than transferring the wetlands to some less desirable portion
of the property. The developer is in the best position to evaluate these economic efficiencies and knows when the compensatory land swap is superior in that respect to the avoidance strategy. Compensatory mitigation thus has taken
some of the "sting" out of 404 permits and reduced the fre116. See Memorandum of Agreement Between Department of the Army
and the Environmental Protection Agency Concerning the Clean
Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210,
9211-12 (Mar. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement].
Section 404 thus uses both source-based mitigation (avoidance and
minimization) and ecosystem-based mitigation (compensation). For
background on the agencies' sequencing requirement, see
ELI-WETLAND, supranote 11, at 19-22; Gardner I, supranote 11, at
535-39.
117. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9211. For background on the agencies' preference for on-site mitigation, see
ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 30-32, 56-57.
118. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9211. For background on the agencies' preference for in-kind mitigation, see
ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 58-59. Wetland ecologists generally divide wetlands into seven major types, within which there is
tremendous variation from region to region in terms of physical
characteristics and functions. See id at 25-29.
119. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9211. For background on the agencies' mitigation type preferences, see ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 53-55. Another variation of compensatory
mitigation is to dispense with the identification ofmitigation habitat,
whether on-site or in off-site banks, and simply allow the developer
to pay a fee that can be used later to finance habitat restoration, creation, enhancement, or preservation. For a thorough discussion of
these so-called in-lieu fee methods, criticizing their use in wetland
protection contexts, see Gardner III, supra note 67.
120. The economics are very straightforward. As King describes:
The market value of an acre of dry land can be as high as a
few hundred thousand dollars per acre, even a few million
dollars per acre in some prime coastal areas. If the land is a
wetland but is "permitable," its market value might be
slightly less because developing it would require draining
and filling as well as some "compensatory mitigation." The
same wetland, if it had no hope of being permitted for development, could have a market value as low as a few thousand
dollars per acre.
King, supra note 68, at 7.
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quency of incidents when21404 permitting is portrayed as unreasonably obstructive.1
While attractive in theory, the project-by-project compensatory mitigation approach has been widely regarded as
having failed miserably in terms of environmental protection." Whether on-site or near-site, the piecemeal approach complicated the Corps' ability to articulate mitigation performance standards, monitor success, and enforce
conditions. 23 Many developers went through the motions
of so-called landscape mitigation-planting what was required or regrading where required to meet the minimum
letter of the permit-then moved on.124 As several commentators have observed, "[t]he success record for isolated mitigation projects has been spotty, and
' 25 few regulators believe
that these projects will succeed."'
In light of these problems, the Corps and EPA (supported
by many commentators) started shifting compensatory activities from on-site to off-site mitigation, thus opening the
121. See Gardner 1,supra note 11,at 586 ("The federal retreat from strict
sequencing is an attempt to provide regulatory relief to small landowners and small businesses."). One study ofcommercial wetlands
mitigation banks concluded that "it is the practice ofregulators to relax the first two sequencing requirements-avoidance and
minimization of wetland impacts-if the wetland that will be impacted is of low to mid quality," thus creating a market for mitigation. Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3
ENVTL. LAW. 441, 463-64 (1997).
122. See, e.g., Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10538-39 ("The track
record of traditional, project-by-project wetland mitigation is dismal."); Gardner I, supranote 1I,at 540 ("The failure of compensatory mitigation is wetland regulation's dirty little secret.");
Veltman, supra note 9, at 670 ("The California State Coastal Conservancy sponsored a review of[58] permits issued for creation and
restoration projects in the San Francisco Bay area between 1978
and 1983. The report found that only 2 of the 58 projects could be
deemed successful.").
123. See Michael S. Rolband et al., Wetlands Bankingfor Sound Mitigation? Yes, Virginia, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May/June 1999, at 4
("Off-site non-bank mitigation, authorized by individual project permits, is difficult to administer, monitor, and enforce.").
124. As one wetlands restoration expert has put it, "it is easier and cheaper
to hire, say, a landscaper who will design and build something that
looks green and wet.., than hire a restoration expert." Keith Bowers,
What Is Wetlands Mitigation?, LAND DEVELOPMENT, Winter 1993,
at 28, 33.
125. Lawrence R. Liebesman & David M. Plott, The Emergence of Private Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
341 (1998) (discussing a Florida state agency study finding a 27%
success rate of such projects); Gardner I, supra note I1, at 540-42
(discussing the Florida study); see also ELI-WETLAND, supra note
I1, at 31 (discussing the dismal record of piecemeal on-site mitigation projects); CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND., MARYLAND NONTIDAL
WETLAND MITIGATION: A PROGRESS REPORT 30-39 (1997) (discussing independent study finding poor record of compensatory mitigation). It is also worth noting that while compensatory wetland
mitigation policies relying primarily on wetland creation can result
in no net loss of wetlands, they are likely to result in overall loss of
habitat since the land being converted to wetlands usually is already
open space. That is, the net result is less undeveloped land than before. Compensatory mitigation that relies on enhancement or preservation of existing wetlands is likely to produce a net loss of wetlands.
See Alyson C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands,
Ecology, and Law, 7 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 105, 128-29
(1996). Under any compensatory approach, of course, there is no
guarantee that the mitigated site would have remained undeveloped
indefinitely, but even in this sense the compensatory mitigation approach can present a baseline problem. Wetlands are dynamic systems. By considering only existing wetlands in deciding what should
be protected, compensatory mitigation stifles the process of
wetlands creation, e.g., the hardening of coastal shorelines. The result is an "invisible loss of wetlands" that are not naturally created
and will never have the chance to become so. Interview with Alyson
C. Flournoy, Professor, University of Florida School of Law (Apr.
28, 2000).
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door to the wetlands mitigation banking technique. This approach, its proponents argued, would prove advantageous
both in terms of efficiency and ecological benefits, aggregating small wetlands threatened by development into
larger restored wetlands in a different location, 2 Defined
generally as "a system in which the creation, enhancement,
restoration, or preservation of wetlands is recognized by a
regulatory agency as generating compensation credits al' 27
lowing the future development of other wetland sites,"'

wetlands mitigation banking allows a developer who has
mitigated somewhere else in advance of development to
draw from the resulting bank of mitigation "credits" as the
development is implemented and wetlands are filled.
The concept has progressed beyond this personal bank
model, however, as large commercial and public
wetlands banks, not tied to a particular development, sell
mitigation credits to third-party developers in need of
compensatory mitigation.
Wetland mitigation banking now resembles a commodity
market, with freewheeling, entrepreneurial wetlands banks
offering for sale (and profit) finished off-site wetlands as
"credits" to anyone who is in need of mitigation for their 404
permits. 29 It is precisely this technique that the Corps and
EPA officially endorsed in their 1995 FederalGuidancefor
the Establishment, Use, and OperationofMitigation Banks

(Federal Guidance), articulating a standard review proce126. Veltman summarizes the rationales cited for shifting from on-site to
off-site mitigation locations and from small- to large-scale of mitigation sites:
[O]ffsite mitigation provides a greater selection of
hydrologically and ecologically favorable locations, thus increasing the opportunity for a well-functioning replacement.
Additionally, offsite projects can bejoined into one large mitigation, which is beneficial because "larger wetland systems
are generally more self-sustaining. They can provide habitat
for more types of species, a longer and more self-sustaining
food chain, more habitat niches, and a wider variety of habitat
types-which, in turn, can better accommodate ecosystem
succession, migration, and change." Thus, the presumption
in favor ofonsite versus offsite mitigation often encourages,
rather than prevents, poorly designed wetlands that will either fail or, if viable, provide a nonequivalent replacement.
Veltman, supra note 9, at 673 (citations omitted); see also Michael
Rolland, The Systemic Assumptions of Wetland Mitigation:A Look
at Louisiana 's Proposed Wetland Mitigation and Mitigation
Banking Regulations, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 497, 510-Il (1994) (noting also that on-site mitigation "puts the mitigation for wetlands loss
in the hands of a sometimes hostile developer").
Notwithstanding these oft-cited benefits, replacing many small
"postage stamp" wetlands with large contiguous mitigation projects
is not necessarily always a desirable approach, as research indicates
that some systems of small isolated wetlands provide more
biodiversity value than a large contiguous wetland of the same type.
In sufficient abundance and proximity, small isolated wetlands provide greater variability of conditions, insurance against natural perturbations, and source-sink population dynamics than can a contiguous wetland of equal total size. Moreover, the desirability of either
kind of wetland habitat will depend on the particular species in mind,
thus a policy favoring large contiguous wetlands necessarily disadvantages species that depend on systems of small isolated wetlands.
See Raymond D. Semlitsch, Size Does Matter: The Value of Small
Isolated Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 5.
127. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 3.
128. See Gardner I, supranote 11, at 581-87; Jonathan Silverstein, Taking
Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a
Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection,22 B.C. ENvrL.
AFF. L. REV. 129, 145 (1994).
129. There are over 70 such commercial mitigation banks operating in the
United States today. See Liebesman & Plott, supra note 125, at 341.
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dure for establishing and using wetlands banks in the 404
permit process.130 With the support of federal agencies, as
well as many environmental advocacy groups, land development interests,13 2 and academics, 33 the wetlands
mitigation banking program has blossomed since the late
1980s. 134 In a wide range of fora, its advocates have contended that off-site mitigation banking should be preferred over on-site or near-site compensatory mitigation
because of greater 1efficiency,
scale effects, and environ35
mental protection.
130. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58605 (Nov. 18, 1995) [hereinafter
Federal Guidance]. See generally Gardner I, supra note 11, at
563-69. A prospective bank sponsor must submit a prospectus to the
Corps. The relevant federal and state agencies, known as the Mitigation Bank Review Team, use the prospectus to evaluate the merits of
the bank pursuant to the sequencing approach and other preferences
applicable to compensatory wetlands mitigation in general. The
agencies and the bank sponsor then negotiate a banking instrument
outlining all the details of bank objectives, ownership, operation,
and enforcement. Finally, the proposed bank instrument is submitted
for public notice and comment before a final bank instrument is implemented. A number of states have also provided statutory or regulatory frameworks for using commercial wetlands mitigation banks
in satisfaction of state wetlands protection laws. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 16-18; Gardner I, supra note 11, at 569-77;
Rolland, supra note 126, at 511-44.
131. See ELI-WETLAND, supranote !1, at 153 (concluding that wetlands
mitigation banking can offer ecological advantages to on-site mitigation in some instances and "can also provide economies of scale
and greater regulatory certainty").
132. See Liebesman & Plott, supranote 125, at 371 (touting wetlands mitigation banking as "an innovative, market-based solution for many
of the problems with the existing wetlands regulatory system").
133. See Gardner I, supra note 11, at 557-62 (advocating the ecological
and efficiency benefits of wetlands mitigation banking).
134. Brumbaugh, manager ofthe Corps' Institute for Water Research National Wetlands Mitigation Banking Study, reports that there were
five banks in operation in 1985, 40 in 1992, and more than 100 in
1995 with hundreds more in development at that time. See Robert W.
Brumbaugh, Wetland Mitigation Banking: Entering a New Era,
WETLANDS RES. PROGRAM BULL., Oct./Dec. 1995, at 3 & fig. 1, at
http://www.wes.army.mil/el/wrtc/wrp/bulletins/v5n3/brum.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2001). An annual national conference on
wetlands mitigation banking, now in its third year of production, has
sponsors including the Corps, EPA, and a wide variety of private and
public entities and pitches itself to mitigation bankers, landowners,
developers, regulators, local government, suppliers, nurseries, engineers, and a host of others interested in banking policy and methods.
See Third National Mitigation Banking Conference: Learn About
Wetlands, Habitat, and Conservation Banking (brochure for May
17-19 conference, Denver, Colo.).
135. The Corps and EPA claim that:
Mitigation banks provide greater flexibility to applicants
needing to comply with mitigation requirements and can
have several advantages over individual mitigation projects,
some of which are listed below:
1. It may be more advantageous for maintaining the integrity of the aquatic ecosystem to consolidate compensatory mitigation into a single large parcel of contiguous parcels when ecologically appropriate;
2. Establishment of a mitigation bank can bring together
financial resources, planning and scientific expertise not
practicable to many project-specific compensatory mitigation proposals. This consolidation of resources can increase the potential for the establishment and long-term
management of successful mitigation that maximizes opportunities for contributing to biodiversity and/or watershed function;
3. Use of mitigation banks may reduce permit processing
times and provide more cost-effective compensatory mitigation opportunities for projects that qualify;
4. Compensatory mitigation is typically implemented
and functioning in advance of project impacts, thereby re-
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If these arguments seem similar to those advanced on behalf of mainstream ETMs versus the command-and-control
model of regulation, it is no coincidence. Notwithstanding
the substantial expense and procedural rigor associated with
establishing a commercial wetlands mitigation bank, the
program, both conceptually and by official endorsement,
has all the makings of a habitat trading market. One commentator describes it as "akin to a commercial paper transaction: Party A (the credit producer) informs Party B (the
regulatory agency) that the credits should be released to
Party C (the entity with mitigation requirements)." 36 The
Corps succinctly describes this feature of commercial
wetlands banks as "an implicit move away from a rigid,
onsite, in-kind preference for piece-meal compensatory
mitigation towards a broader-based trading system that
takes advantage of qualitative differences among wetlands
and that can use the potential economic profits from the development of some low-valued
wetlands (that may be
37
doomed in any event)."'
Indeed, the wetlands mitigation banking experience suggests that, like the pollutant trading context, laws requiring
mitigation of habitat destruction easily can be adapted into
laws allowing habitat trading. In addition to wetlands mitigation banking, the ESA HCP program now seems well on
its way to evolving into a full-blown ETM. Indeed, the FWS
has recently endorsed endangered species habitat banking
as a new method of satisfying HCP endangered species habitat mitigation requirements. Whether the HCP and similar habitat trading markets can control for nonfungibilities
as effectively as some of the air pollutant ETMs, however, is
a different question. Currency selection is the critical first
step in evaluating the degree to which a habitat trading market will face the nagging problems of externalities and
trades that reduce social welfare.
B. CurrencyAdequacy

To ensure equivalent trades of wetlands, the currency must
incorporate important values provided by both the wetlands
to be lost and the wetlands used for mitigation. Of course,
this begs the questions of what the relevant values are, how
we measure them, and how we reflect them in a conveducing temporal losses of aquatic functions and uncertainty over whether the mitigation will be successful in offsetting project impacts;
5. Consolidation of compensatory mitigation within a
mitigation bank increases the efficiency of limited agency
resources in the review and compliance monitoring ofmitigation projects, and thus improves the reliability of efforts
to restore, create or enhance wetlands for mitigation purposes; [and]
6. The existence of mitigation banks can contribute towards attainment of the goal for no overall net loss of the
nation's wetlands by providing opportunities to compensate for authorized impacts when mitigation might not otherwise be appropriate or practicable.
See Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58607. Banking also
avoids the threat of takings claims that may arise from exercising the
avoid and minimize requirements of sequencing. See infra note 209.
For a discussion of takings claims generally in the wetlands regulation context, see Robert Meltz, Wetlands Regulationand the Law of
Regulatory Takings, 30 ELR 10468 (June 2000).
136. See Gardner I, supra note 18, at 10075.
137. See Brumbaugh, supra note 134, at 4.
138. See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 3-21; see also RuhI, supra
note 102, at 395-96.
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niently traded currency. 139 If all we care about in wetlands
protection is acres ofwetlands, then the job is simple-identify wetlands and count up the acres. But if we care about the
delivery of the functional value of wetlands to the environment and society, acres leave much to be desired as a currency for trading wetlands. Not all wetland acres are created
equal-they are nonfungible when their ecosystem service
values are considered.14u
If mitigation banking encompasses trades between
nonfungible wetlands, i.e., involving different types of
wetlands, wetlands in different watersheds, and wetlands
lost and restored in different time frames, the range of values
traded broadens, and thus the need for a refined currency becomes more acute. If the currency does not accurately capture the value sought to be measured, e.g., the habitat service, the flood control service, the water filtration service,
we have less reason to be confident in the equivalency of
trades. Developing and using a wetland assessment methodology that measures these and other relevant values, or
some reliable indicia thereof, would thus be the critical
first step in developing a framework for wetland mitigaopen trades based on a universally
tion banking that allows
41
accepted currency.
The Corps has granted broad discretion to state and local
authorities to select currencies.' 42 Roughly 40 different
wetlands assessment methods have been used, varying in
terms of the type of habitats in which the method is used, the
basic targets of assessment, and the functional and social
values encompassed in the assessment. 143 Over one-half of
the methods go beyond assessment of habitat suitability to
encompass some assessment of wetland function, but many
of these function-based methods are bounded by limitations
on type of habitat for which the method can be used, e.g.,
139. The critical junctures at which currency selection must be incorporated into wetlands mitigation banking decisionmaking to efficiently
regulate externalities are at the wetlands assessment and wetlands
trading stages. ELI describes these as the "[ciredit definition and valuation" issues, and recognizes that they are the most complex issues
in mitigation banking. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 77.
140. For an excellent description ofwhy they are not fungible, see Dennis
M. King & Luke W. Herbert, The Fungibility of Wetlands, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 10. Indeed, research in-

creasingly points to the fact that habitat qualities vary tremendously
over geographic space, with some areas providing "hot spots" of biological diversity far in excess of others. See Norman Myers et al.,
BiodiversityHotspotsfor Conservation Priorities,403 NATURE 853
(2000) (noting that 25 hot spots comprising 1.4% of the earth's surface house as many as 44% of all vascular plant species and 35% of
all species in four vertebrate groups).
141. Wetland function assessment methods "attempt to establish, in either

a qualitative or quantitative fashion, the nature and extent of different services which a wetland may provide. Once those services are
known, they may be translated into a 'currency' which can serve as
the medium of trade for a wetland mitigation bank." ELI-WETLAND, supra note i1, at 77.
142.
Because wetlands are complex and incompletely understood, it is difficult to assign a quantitative number to their
value. Instead of confronting this difficulty head-on, the
Corps-EPA Mitigation [Memorandum of Agreement] provides broad guidelines for valuing wetlands, leaving local
permitting authorities with virtually unfettered discretion in
determining whether a just compensation for destroyed
wetlands has been achieved.
Veltman, supra note 9, at 673-74.
143. See CANDY C. BARTOLDUS, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF WETLAND ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES: A GUIDE FOR WETLAND PRACTITIONERS (1999).
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coastal wetlands only, and limited in terms of the functions
assessed, e.g., limited to avian species functions.'" Moreover, the data requirements for these advanced methods are
significant.1 45 Given the specific focus and data-hungry
techniques of the more advanced assessment methods, the
choice between counting acres and conducting in-depth scientific research for each trade makes currency selection in
wetlands banking a critical threshold issue for the trading
program's structure.
Reviews of wetland assessment methodology theory
and practice conducted since banking sprang onto the
scene in 1985 have categorized assessment methods into
three major types:
Simple indices are derived from quickly and easily observed characteristics of a wetland, and usually serve as
surrogate "indicators" of one or more ecological functions [e.g., percent cover of aquatic vegetation].
Narrowly tailoredsystems attempt to measure directly a
limited range of wetland services, such as wildlife habitat, through a detailed procedure focusing on that particular wetland service [e.g., percent duck habitat].
Broadly tailoredsystems examine a range of wetland functions covering a number of observable characteristics.'46
Simple index methods, such as counting acres, make mitigation banking easier and less costly, but "are often the least
sensitive to wetlands values and functions. Also, most sim14 7
ple indices do not take into account scale effects."
Clearly, it would be difficult to integrate ecosystem service
valuation into wetlands mitigation banking programs relying on simple index methods. Similarly, narrowly tailored
methods, such as those attempting to evaluate habitat values, are generally focused on specific habitat types or species, and thus can result in "mitigating to the test"-that is,
driving the banking process toward the favored habitat type
or species. Also, "comparing cumulative [habitat units] for
different sets of species involves risks inherent in comparing apples and oranges."' 148 In other words, the narrowly
tailored methods fail to produce a currency that can be reliably used across nonfungible features of assessment, suggesting that these methods will not successfully integrate
all the value measurements needed if the goal is to produce
a currency applicable across nonfungible biological, economic, and social factors. Thus, the Environmental Law
Institute (ELI) concludes, "[fjor wetland managers concerned about the spectrum of functions provided by a wetland, there is no substitute
4 9 for a carefully considered,
broadly tailored analysis."'
In practice, however, these broader assessment methods
tend to be expensive and to produce reams of qualitative results that, for ease of comparison, wetlands managers tend
to reduce to quantitative value scores that often mask the
ecological rationales.' 50 Indeed, comprehensive reviews in
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.bs. 1-3.
Id.tbl. 3.
ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 78.

Id. at 89.

Id.at 90. For example, if we measure habitat value based on what
makes good habitat for ducks, which for a variety ofinstitutional reasons many of the habitat-based indices use as the benchmark, we will
wind up with more duck habitat and less habitat for species that do
not thrive in duck habitat. See id.at 36.
149. Id.at 90.
150. Id.at 91.
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1992 and 1993 of wetlands mitigation banks in operation
concluded that only a small number employed a broadly tai-

lored method (a comprehensive currency), while among the
rest "debiting and crediting transactions are based on two
basic currencies-acreage and functional replacement."' 5 1
To determine whether banks established after these studies
have adopted more complex currencies, we contacted new
banks by telephone and e-mail. I1 2 We identified and were
53
able to describe in detail 36 banks established after 1994.1
Overall, we found
that simple currency methods continue
54
to dominate.
For the most part, then, wetlands assessment methods in
actual use in wetlands mitigation banks have advanced very
little from the beginning of the decade, meaning that the
trading currency has stagnated at the relatively crude
acre-based form.'" Wetlands mitigation banking entities
151. Writing in 1994, ELI found four banks used the wetland evaluation
technique (WET), a broadly tailored method, and the rest were split
between using acre counts (a simple index) and the habitat evaluation procedure (HEP) (a narrowly tailored method). See ELI-WETLAND, supranote 11, at app. B. Similarly, in its 1994 First Phase Report of the National Wetland Mitigation Study, the Corps' Institute
for Water Resources (IWR) reviewed 44 banks existing in 1992.
IWR's conclusions were consistent with those of ELI, finding 12
banks used an inventory method (acres) exclusively, 8 used a function evaluation method (usually habitat units) exclusively, and the
other banks used other methods and combinations of methods. IWR
counted none using what ELI would call a broadly tailored index
method. INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, NATIONAL WETLANDS MITIGATION STUDY: FIRST

PHASE REPORT 31-32 (1994).
152. This work was conducted under an EPA STAR grant with Jim
Salzman as principal investigator. Abridged results are published in,
J.B. Ruhl & Juge Gregg, IntegratingEcosystem Services Into Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 365 (2001). For project summary, see supra
note 71.
153. Nineteen of these banks use an acre-based index; 15 use one of the
function-based methods, and 2 use a "best professional judgment"
approach. This split between acre-based and function-based methods is consistent with ELI's and IWR's earlier findings. See INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, supra note 151, at 31-32 (providing
pre-1994 data).
154. Indeed, the Corps has been criticized for being unwilling to engage
in broad functional measurement in other aspects of the 404 permit
program as well, including wetland delineation and permit approval
and denial. See Michael J. Mortimer, IrregularRegulation Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Is the Congress or the Army
Corpsof Engineersto Blame?, 13 J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 445,460-73
(1998) (providing an empirical study of Corps actions). Many state
wetland protection programs are accused of suffering from the same
shortcoming. For example, Maryland has one of the most sophisticated regulatory programs in place for wetlands protection yet it, too,
relies on a simple currency. As a Chesapeake Bay Foundation report
described, the Maryland Department of the Environment's method
"to calculate the amount of mitigation required to compensate for
wetland impacts is replacement ratios. While this method considers
acreage, vegetation, and to a limited extent, uniqueness, it does not
specifically consider wetlands functions gained or lost." CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND., supra note 125, at 10.
155. See Jack T. Chowning, hI-Lieu-Fee ProgramsBelong Among Mitigation Options, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., July/Aug. 1999, at 9
("Dating back to before 1990, an acre-for-acre requirement for mitigation has been the most common starting point for wetland mitigation, because a technical framework for decisionmaking has not
been available."); Veltman, supra note 9, at 675 ("Despite the availability of these [broad-based] valuation techniques, permitting authorities most often choose to value wetlands purely on number of
acres."). One exception is Florida's recent legislative initiative requiring state and local agencies engaged in wetland mitigation banking to adopt a uniform wetland mitigation assessment method that
"must determine the value of functions provided by wetlands and
other surface waters considering the current conditions of these ar-
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seem focused on using the simplest and most expedient assessment method that the relevant regulatory bodies will ap-

prove, and the regulatory bodies do not appear widely to re-56
quire or even encourage a more sophisticated approach.
Trades based on gross wetland classes and fixed ratios, e.g.,
two acres of type A are worth three acres of type B, dominate the wetlands mitigation banking practice. And, so long
as the regulatory framework accommodates that practice,
there is little reason for those in need of wetlands mitigation
banking units to integrate the more complicated, costly, and
time-consuming tasks that a refined currency would entail
without evidence that it will improve their net trading position. As the ELI report thus aptly concludes, a wetland mitigation bank currency must be:
(1) simple to determine and to monitor, and (2) able to
represent a sufficient range of values and functions.
None of the existing systems do both of these things

well. The multivariate systems are quite useful for
onsite, or project-specific, mitigation, but they lack the
simplicity for use in banking.
The simple systems over57
look critical functions.'

In practice, the currency choice has been based on the
path of least resistance. A comprehensive currency is too
expensive to mint 5 8 and too arduous to use. 59 Given these
practical realities, it is no surprise that instead of developing
and refining valuation approaches for assessment and
eas, utilization by fish and wildlife, location, uniqueness, and
hydrologic connection." Fla. H.B. 2365, §4 (2000) (amending FLA.
STAT. §373.414(18)). For a discussion of the Florida wetlands mitigation banking program within which this new assessment method
will fit, see John J. Fumero, Environmental Law: 1994 Survey of
FloridaLaw-At A Crossroadsin Natural Resource Protectionand
Management in Florida, 19 NOVA L. REv. 77, 101-08 (1994).
156. Others concur in this bottomline assessment:
Apart from gaps in scientific knowledge, do we have the
funds, expertise, and time to carry out relatively detailed and
accurate assessment of wetland functions and values on a
wetland-by-wetland or area-wide basis in regulatory or other
management efforts? There is no indication from the experience of any federal agency, state, or local wetland program
that we can.
Jon Kusler & William Niering, WetlandAssessment: Have We Lost
Our Way?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 1, 11.
Although the MOA [Memorandum of Agreement] calls for a
minimum 1:1 functional replacement, in practice, this has often been read to mean a precisely 1:1 acreage replacement
This occurs as a result of the broad discretion given to permitting authorities to select valuation methods and make compensation decisions.
Veltman, supra note 9, at 676.
157. ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 91.
158. See Rolland, supra note 126, at 513 ("The more functions that are
considered when assigning credits, the more likely the exchange
will be accurate; yet greater accuracy is also more costly and difficult to determine.").
159. As one study concluded, "as wetland assessment techniques become
more complicated and couched in technical language ...the number
of potential users diminishes." Kusler & Niering, supra note 156, at
11.Some advocates of wetlands mitigation banking overlook this
problem, suggesting the currency difficulties in wetlands ETMs are
simply a matter of the Corps' failure to mandate a particular assessment method for all trades. See, e.g., Lisa M. Schenck, Wetlands Protection:Regulators Need to Give Credit to Mitigation
Banking, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 103, 120 (2000) ("Since
regulators have so many valuation methodologies to choose from,
they should select the procedure or combination that provides the
most accurate valuation and accounts for the many different wetland types and functions.").
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trades, wetlands mitigation banking assessment methods
have stagnated in the acre-based and narrow function-based
approaches, resulting in the use of relatively crude currencies for wetlands habitat trading purposes.
C. Exchange Adequacy
Because they fail to account for the significant environmental and social welfare values across space, type, and time, it
is difficult to evaluate the environmental performance of an
ETM that uses crude currencies. For example, despite
claims by the Maryland Department of the Environment that
the state had gained 122 acres of wetlands between 1991 and
1996, a Chesapeake Bay Foundation study found that there
had been a net loss of 51 acres of wetlands functions.161
More recently, a study by the National Academy of Sciences
was even more damning. Concluding that the "no net loss"
goal for maintaining fish and wildlife habitats was not being
met.162 The analytical framework we propose in this Article
predicts that crude currencies, such as those derived from
the simple index measures of wetland qualities that prevail
in wetlands banking programs, will result in tightly constrained trading schemes if the market maker desires to control for environmental externalities. By contrast, sophisticated wetland assessment methods, such as ones that fully
reflect wetland function values, can be converted to currencies that limit externalities sufficiently to allow the market
maker to permit trades to be made regardless of type, space,
and time differences. The comprehensive currency, reflecting function and service value, would make differences in
type irrelevant, allow comparison of impact to different locations and allow discounting for purposes of timing differentials)63 The wetlands banking program, hamstrung as it is
by its crude currency forms, bears out this postulated inverse relationship between currency sophistication and intensity of market constraint.
160. This problem is likely to be more acute in the endangered species

habitat context. As EDF has explained, "as a practical matter, our
ability to quantify precisely current survival probabilities and the impacts of helpful or harmful actions is rudimentary to nonexistent."
EDF-ENDANGERED SPECIES, supra note 107, at 31. Turning to
acre-based formulas is of little advantage because we "have no neat

formula by which to weight [sic] each of these many variables and
produce a meaningful index value to assign to the acre." Id. Hence, it
is "the practical reality that the varied circumstances and needs of
particular species will inevitably produce different 'currencies' to
define bank credits and debits." Id.; see also Bean & Dwyer, supra
note 107, at 10548-49. The need to mint a currency for each species
may price most endangered species ETMs out of reach, or, more
likely, lead the ETMs to rely on simple acre-based currencies despite
their shortcoming and hope to control externality problems through
exchange constraints.
161. See CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND., supra note 125, at i.
162. John Heilprin, Government Faulted on Wetlands, Associated Press
(June 27, 2001).
163. For example, when Florida recently enacted legislation requiring all

state and local agencies engaged in wetland mitigation banking to
devise and adopt a uniform functional assessment method, see supra

note 155, it anticipated the type, space, and time nonfungibilities inherent in the process. The assessment method thus must (1) "account

for different ecological communities in different areas of the state";
(2) "determine the value of functions provided by wetlands... considering... location"; and (3) "account for the expected time-lag associated with offsetting impacts." Fla. H.B. 2365, §4 (2000) (amend-

ing FLA. STAT. §373.414(18)). The Florida Department of Environmental Protection has until January 2002 to devise this all-encompassing currency for mitigation banking. We wish them luck.
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1. Nonfungibility of Type
The preference the Corps and EPA demonstrate for
in-kind compensatory wetland mitigation reflects the
substantial differences in rarity, time to maturity, and
functions that different wetland types exhibit. Because
crude currencies such as acres and habitat function fail to
capture these complex differences in wetlands, wetlands
mitigation banking programs also are reluctant to stray
far from a strict in-kind policy. For example, the Federal
Guidance allows out-of-kind mitigation in banking only
"if it is determined to be practicable and environmentally
preferable." 164 Even when out-of-kind trading is allowed,
however, banks typically impose fixed trading ratios between acres of the wetland types as a surrogate for more
165
precise measurements of comparative function value.
In short, as compared to open or fixed ratio out-of-kind
trading, "[i]n-kind mitigation requires less understanding
of tradeoffs because it is based on the assumption that certain wetland functions . . . will follow the wetland
form."' 166 The cost of this in-kind requirement, however,

is a thinning of the wetlands trading market from all
wetlands to the defined in-kind type.
2. Nonfungibility of Space
The value of wetlands' services depends fundamentally on
their landscape context.167 Even controlling for type, a bog
wetland in Maine may not provide the same function values
as one in Oregon, or even one in the next county. And even if
it does, it certainly will not deliver the services of nutrient
trapping, flood control, or nursery habitat to the same parties. Obviously, however, the preference for on-site mitigation the Corps and EPA have adopted for compensatory mitigation in general cannot apply strictly to wetland mitigation
banking. Instead, the concept of a geographically defined
"service area" is imposed on wetlands banks to define the
area "wherein a bank can reasonably be expected to provide
appropriate compensation for impacts to wetlands and/or
other aquatic resources."' 68 In general, service areas should
be no larger than the watershed within which the bank is located, unless reaching beyond that market is "practicable
and environmentally desirable."' 169 Coupled with an in-kind
constraint, this service area constraint could significantly

164. Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58611.
165. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 92. Trading ratios also are often imposed to adjust for different mitigation forms, e.g., restoration
versus preservation, and for the general uncertainty that the bank

wetlands will exhibit as much acre-for-acre integrity as the filled
wetlands. See id.
166. Id. at 30.

167. See Salzman, supra note 63, at 896 ("The value of a wetland's nutrient trapping services, for instance, depends on the location of its
flow to shellfish beds (high value) ora fast-flowing
out-flow.Does it
ocean current (low value)?"). In our EPA grant, we are studying a
trade in Florida of inland wetlands for wetlands located on asmall island ina river. Even ifthe two wetlands have the same biophysical
capacity,the delivery, and therefore value, of their services will differ significantly. See also ELI-WTLAND, supra note 11, at 30
("[M]ost wetland functions have value because of where they exist

inthe landscape.").
168. Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58611.
169. Id.
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further narrow
the potential supply of wetlands in the trad170
ing market.
3. Nonfungibility of Time
One of the purported advantages of wetland banking programs is that the bank has created the wetlands before the
credits are drawn, so that the mitigation is secured before the
wetlands are filled. In general, therefore, the FederalGuidance provides that "[t]he number of credits available for
withdrawal (i.e., debiting) should generally be commensurate with the level of aquatic functions attained at a bank at
the time ofdebiting."7r With large commercial banks, however, the expense and time involved with establishing functional wetlands, particularly those of types that require long
maturation periods, could make the banking cost prohibitive
if credits could not be drawn before the bank's wetland values are fully in place. The Federal Guidance thus allows
some leeway in the timing requirement, allowing credit
withdrawal before equal wetland values are established, if
the bank possesses adequate financial assurance and has exhibited a high probability of success. 172 In some cases this
policy results in lags of up to six years between the
73 times of
wetland destruction and wetland replacement.
170. The spatial fungibility issue is even more complicated in the endangered species context, where strategic siting of bank service areas
must account for species movement, habitat succession, and discontinuities in suitable habitat locations. See EDF-ENDANGERED
SPECIES, supra note

107, at 30-31; Bean &Dwyer, supra note 107,

at 10537.
171. Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58611. Studies of wetland restorations have found a remarkably low rate of success. The Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation found a success rate of
45% for tidal wetlands creation, 12% for freshwater wetlands creation. Veltman, supra note 9, at 669.
172. See Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58611. Explaining the
pressure to relax time restraints, a Corps official has written:
Among the most critical issues that affect the financial success of commercial banks, and thus the willingness on the
part ofthe private sector to get involved in commercial banking, is the timing of debiting versus accrual of credits in the
bank. Ideally, mitigation banks are constructed in advance of
development projects that result in wetland losses and are
seen as a way ofreducing uncertainty in the wetlands replacement process. However, virtually all private commercial
bank entrepreneurs argue that for their banking ventures to be
economically viable, they need to be allowed to sell credits
before replacement wetlands are fully functioning or
self-maintaining. Allowing a bank to be debited before it
achieves a fully functioning stage involves a trade-off between ecologic and economic risks. The later the bank may
be debited (along a time continuum from planning through
design, construction, and operation), the lower the ecologic
risk. However, delays in allowing debiting increase the financial risk to the investor. The private sector generally needs
some level of immediate return to justify the financial risk or
to supplement initial funding.... Private commercial banks
implemented to date reflect the value of time. Regulators
have allowed debiting (generally to a limited extent) shortly
after bank construction, during construction, or even shortly
before construction, if there was an approved site plan and
appropriate real estate arrangements and financial assurances
(such as funds for remedial work, if needed, and for
long-term management).
Brumbaugh, supra note 134, at 4-5.
173. See Michael G. Le Desma, A Sound of Thunder: Problemsand Prospects in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 497,
506 (1994).

31 ELR 11461

D. Fat and Sloppy Versus Thin and Bland
Our findings and those of others suggest that practical constraints on the implementation of more sophisticated assessment methods designed to produce a refined currency for
trades-in terms of costs, time demands, and complexity-have prevented wetland mitigation banking from ensuring currency adequacy. Thus, wetlands banking has been
forced into the next best alternative-designing market constraints to plug up the holes that the crude currency otherwise leaves open to externalities. Assessment methodology has become the proverbial tail that wags the dog, keeping the wetlands program from tapping the full benefit of
market trading efficiency as the market makers (EPA and
the Corps) attempt to shore up the weak currency with market constraints.
There is good reason to believe this problem will be endemic to habitat trading programs in general until ecologists
can deliver a cheaply calculated, refined currency for habitat values. The cost of valuing the currency in the S02 program is low-a ton is a ton. But the cost of creating habitat
currencies is either very cheap-an acre is an acre--or, if we
demand reliable measures of environmental and social service values, very expensive. Developers have an incentive
to use the least expensive currency the government will allow. The government has an incentive not to make the currency too expensive to mint, or no one will use it and the
trading program will expire of its own accord. 174 Because of
these agency and participant incentives, as described inPart
I,the net result has been Gresham's Law inpractice-simple currencies have driven out complex ones. Despite policies mandating that habitat trading ensure equivalent value
and function,1 the experience isthat the programs are not
administered this way. In practice, most habitat trades to
date inwetlands and HCP programs have been approved on
the basis of acres, inmany instances ensuring equivalence in
neither value nor function. If parties have a choice between
a complex (and expensive) currency that measures equivalent function or a simple metric, and both deliver a 404 permit, simplicity will always win. Thus, given the choice in
the habitat context of acres or complicated measures of
value, acreage has won. Moreover, now that the Corps has
committed to the mitigation banking program as the ideal of
compensatory mitigation, many believe that there is pressure within the Corps to facilitate the program by easing the
official avoid-minimize-compensate sequencing policy that
has already eroded substantially. 76 Avoiding wetlands and
minimizing wetland impacts reduce the demand for mitigation bank credits and thus thin the market. Predictably, the
pressures to adopt crude currencies and to keep markets
thick combine to allow the seepage of externalities from the
wetlands mitigation banking market.
174. For the public choice analysis of agency decisions, see Part IV.B.
175. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9212 (Wetland
values shall be determined "by applying aquatic site assessment
techniques generally recognized by experts in the field and/or the
best professional judgment of Federal and State agency representatives, provided such assessments fully consider ecological functions
included in the Guidelines.").
176. See Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10550 ("Clonservation interests worry that the practical effect ofthe mitigation banks is to tempt
regulators to skip rather lightly past avoidance and minimization and
proceed instead directly to compensation in the form of purchasing
credits from a bank.").
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For example, a recent study of wetland banking in Florida
found that trades, even in the same watershed, have produced "a transfer of wetlands from highly urbanized,
high-population density areas to more rural low-population
density areas."' 7 7 The same problem has plagued mitigation
banking in Virginia, where a recent study found that most
mitigation banks are located in rural areas while most wetland losses take place in urban and suburban areas. 178 In
other words, as can be expected from a market efficiency
perspective, developers want to develop wetlands where
land is dear (urban) and wetland banks want to locate where
land is cheap (rural). The existing wetlands mitigation banking framework lets them do so, or at least fails to scrutinize
the externality effects of the practice. The result is trades
that move wetlands out of areas where they may provide services to urban populations and into sparsely populated areas. Should we be concerned about this "market-driven 'mi' 79
gration' of wetlands across the urban-rural landscape,"'
even though it is a reflection of the efficiency of trading? If
we care about the equity of who receives wetland services
and their value, then the answer is yes, and we should
closely examine the redistribution of wetland service values within the environment and between human populations. 81 0 But if we care primarily about keeping the wetland banking market thick, then the answer is no, for to
add another location restriction based on keeping trades
within the same "population-shed" would surely thin the
market considerably.
Given this state of affairs, the aggressive integration of
open trading models into wetlands and other habitat contexts poses concerns for environmental protection. Even the
most developed habitat assessment methods presently in
use are ill-prepared to produce reliable, inexpensive, and
ready measurements of a habitat's environmental and service values. Such measurements require far more money
and time to produce on a site-specific basis than developers,
habitat bankers, and the government seem prepared to allocate. In the absence of such measurements, the government
and environmental groups will likely require at a minimum
177. King & Herbert, supra note 140, at II.
178. See Ann Jennings et al., Down Sides to Virginia Mitigation Banking,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 9, 10. The Virginia
study also found an increasing trend toward the use of banks in one
watershed to compensate for losses in a different watershed. See id
at 9-10.
179. King & Herbert, supra note 140, at 11. In a similar example, our EPA
project is studying a mitigation banking trade in Florida where a wetland near a community was filled in exchange for restoring a wetland
on a small island in the middle of a river.
180. We are not suggesting that the shift from urban to rural wetlands is
necessarily an unwise policy in all cases. In some settings, the urban
wetlands to be developed may be comprised of many small, isolated
wetlands ofpoor quality, whereas the rural mitigation bank may produce a large, contiguous, high-quality habitat. We are suggesting,
however, that the shift between the human populations serviced may
be significant and thus should be considered in the evaluation of the
mitigation banking policy, whereas the Florida and Virginia studies
show that it has not been. Moreover, research has revealed the importance of small, isolated wetlands to maintaining biodiversity and
habitat for some species, thus the ideal of large, contiguous rural
wetlands will not always provide superior environmental value. See
supra note 126. There is also evidence that restoration ofsmall urban
wetlands can yield significant ecological benefits both within the urban area and to distant aquatic systems by controlling urban runoff.
See Elizabeth H. Smith & Sandra Alvarado, Enhanced Wetlands in
Urban Landscapes:A DemonstrationWith the Corpus ChristiBay
National Estuary Program,NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov./Dec.

1998, at 9-11.
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constraints on habitat trading markets, i.e., stronger exchange adequacy.
But even the current trading constraints are seen by many
as too restrictive. Observers have criticized the Federal
Guidance for adhering too strictly to the sequencing approach and other conditions applied generally to compensatory mitigation, arguing that "this policy could prevent a
banking market from ever emerging."' 81 This is the inevitable pressure any regulated market faces when externalities
must be controlled through market constrictions rather than
through a refined currency-at some point the constraints
threaten to swallow the market. Surely a loosening of type,
space, and time constraints would make banking more flexible and economically attractive to entrepreneurs, but at what
price to the environment?
Indeed, the FederalGuidanceinvites further pressure to
restrict the market with its "practicable and environmentally
desirable" standard for exceptions to the set of trading constraints. As commercial banking becomes more widespread, it is likely that the criticisms bank sponsors have already lodged against the FederalGuidancewill intensify if
the market for credits does not swell. Moreover, to the extent
mitigation banking is intended to replace the project-by-project approach to compensatory mitigation in the
regime of 404 permits, the Corps already feels pressure to
ensure that the market does not become too thin. And make
no mistake, the Corps is feeling pressure to loosen the timing restrictions of the FederalGuidance and other exchange
adequacy safeguards
and has openly discussed relaxation of
18 2
its restrictions.
At the extreme, of course, land developers and bank sponsors most prefer a nationwide bank of freely transferable
credits, and have been pushing for this and relaxation of
other restraints. 83 Such relaxation of space, type, and time
restraints may seem reasonable if the Corps believes the existing crude wetlands currencies are sufficient. Ifso, though,
it will be banking on sheer serendipity to believe that
wetlands banking and other habitat trading programs will
produce consistently positive results for the environment.
Where pressure is high to keep the market thick and currencies simple, the alternative to leaving matters to chance lies
in integrating a mechanism into the market for reviewing
bad trades, which leads to the next section of our analysis.
IV. Review Adequacy: Designing Approval and
Intervention Mechanisms
Once an ETM has designed its currency and imposed trading restrictions to compensate for externalities created by
the currency's shortcomings, how does the ETM assess
trades? Unlike children trading baseball cards, when trading
involves the environment there are interests beyond those of
the traders that must be taken into account. The previous dis181. Liebesman & Plott, supra note 125, at 342; see also Gardner II, supra note 18, at 10075 (stating that the FederalGuidance"doesnot go
far enough to encourage private-sector investment in the process of
wetland mitigation"); William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 74 OR. L. REV. 95 1,
981-90 (1995) (arguing for relaxation of strict sequencing, on-site
mitigation preference, and in-kind mitigation preference in order to
increase the demand for mitigation banking credits, i.e., to thicken
the market).
182. See supra note 171.
183. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note II, at 58.
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cussion demonstrated that broadened use of ETMs in settings such as wetlands, endangered species protection, and
similar habitat-based programs where nonfungibilities run
high can result in exchanges that all but ignore environmental and social welfare values important to the public at large.
This does not necessarily mean that ETMs should be
avoided in such contexts. But it does suggest that they
should be implemented only when an efficient and effective
institutional structure can be grafted onto the ETM to protect the public goods involved.
This need to account for the public interest poses a fundamental, and largely unrecognized, challenge for ETMs. Two
competing views have dominated in the quest for an environmental policy institution that best represents the public
interest. One view advocates the market, the other politics. 184 ETMs represent a shift from politics to the market as
a means of allocating environmental resources. But when
the market lacks a currency to measure commodity equivalence and exchange rules do not capture all significant externalities, is fully relying on the constructed market sensible?
If it is not possible to meaningfully compare environmental features using the crude currencies of many ETMs, how
will anyone know if the market is serving the public interest, i.e., increasing social welfare? It may behoove the public, therefore, to retain some mechanism of market intervention to screen for and correct ETM exchanges that reduce social welfare.
As Part IV explains, the provision of a meaningful review
mechanism presents the most problematic design issue for
ETMs trading in nonfungible environmental features. Most
ETMs effectively employ ex ante generic rules rather than
ex post review of individual trades, relying on the currency
and exchange restrictions to prevent trades that reduce social welfare. This might work fine for a commodity market
exchanging identical goods, where the traded habitat or air
pollutant is as fungible as pork bellies. But, as we argue in
the sections below, this commodity vision of habitat
ETMs is inapt. The more appropriate model is that of a
barter market, where the goods exchanged are not generic. In this setting, ex post review may be necessary to
ensure equivalent trades.
We next examine the institutional incentives of the relevant parties, finding that this, too, suggests the need for an
ex post review of ETMs. Fundamentally, trading parties
seek not the conservation of wetlands but, rather, a development permit and profit from the transaction. As a result, they
will seek to maximize nonfungibilities to drive down costs.
Agencies, who are supposed to serve as the check to ensure
equivalent trades, have strong incentives to keep markets
thick. Thus on the margin neither the trading party nor the
agencies will favor rigorous (and therefore costly) review.
Only those public interests that value the public goods being
traded have an incentive to demand a meaningful review
mechanism. While this analysis argues in favor ofex post review, it complicates its design. The question thus boils down
to how to satisfy the public's demand for ex post review
without bringing the ETMs to a halt.
In the last section of Part IV, therefore, we evaluate alternative institutional review procedures based on how well
they respond to the tension between the needs for rigorous
ex post review and a functioning market. This forces consid184. See DANIEL A.

FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 35-69 (1999)

ing the competing views).

(describ-
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eration of the timing and form of intervention, the various
interests that must be taken into account to make intervention meaningful, and the process through which trades are
assessed once intervention authority is exercised. We also
focus on the current practice of wedging ETMs into traditional permitting programs, revealing a potentially intractable conflict between the objectives of government, the regulated industry, and the public. In the final analysis, we have
no perfect solution for an institutional design. Rather, we
make what we consider to be a reasonable demand-advocates of trading nonfungible environmental features should
bear the burden of producing a comprehensive currency that
works and is affordable, devising exchange restrictions that
minimize the opportunities for significant externalities, or
creating institutional mechanisms to ensure meaningful review of trading outcomes. When neither currency, exchange, nor review adequacy is satisfied, ETMs risk losing
much of their credibility.
A. Approval Strategies

1. Wholesale Review
Starting our discussion with an idealized ETM helps set out
the significant challenges of designing institutional approval mechanisms for trades. Assume, then, an ETM in
which the demands of currency and exchange adequacy are
fully satisfied. The ETM's currency captures all the relevant
attributes of the traded environmental goods in easily calculated units, and trading restrictions compensate for any externalities created by the currency's shortcomings without
thinning the market. It would be reasonable to expect that
such a trading regime could operate relatively free of government oversight because "bad trades" would not take
place. Beyond the initial allocation of rights and the need to
uncover cheating, there would simply be no need for govemment intervention.
This idealized ETM scenario suggests at most the use of a
wholesale strategy of approval. Here the government sets
the initial trading rules, grants entitlements to private parties, stands back and acts as a referee. 85 The government
still needs to monitor compliance and undertake enforcement efforts, much as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) does in regulating stock markets.
Cheating is a concern, but one might argue the situation is
qualitatively no different than the role the Internal Revenue
Service or the SEC plays in monitoring compliance with tax
and security laws. One could simply penalize cheating with
a big fine after the fact.186 The government may have to step
185. See, e.g., Sohn & Cohen, supra note 12, at 431-32 ("[l]n the lead
phasedown program, the regulatory authority only records and
tracks credit ownership; trades require no prior approval or public input."); Polesetsky, supra note 14, at 395-96 (describing the limited
administrative role under the RECLAIM credit trading regime).
186. This enforcement assumption of the passive model bears scrutiny.
Unlike monetary sanctions that can largely undo the harm caused by
tax and securities fraud, habitat destruction is irreversible. Saying
"oops" after the fact has very different consequences with ETMs
than in traditional enforcement settings. Retrospective correction
of environmental errors cannot be assumed. Moreover, one might
argue that the problem of monitoring ETM compliance is far
greater than the problem of monitoring income or securities, both
because of the relative cost of monitoring performance and the lack
of checks within the system, e.g., both employers and employees
report the employee's income, yet they do not share the same interests in cheating.

31 ELR 11464

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

in and tinker with the rules or allocations to perfect the market, much as central banks intervene to reduce high levels of
arbitrage by influencing foreign exchange rates. Beyond
that, however, the government sits back and contentedly observes exchanges, assuming the commodities are fungible
and environmental protection is assured, so long as the trading rules are followed. Importantly, this model reduces uncertainty, increasing the likelihood of thick markets." 7 Thus

market advocates routinely call for a more passive approach

without government oversight of each transfer.188 And, not

surprisingly, generic approval serves as the status quo for
most ETMs.
2. Retail Review
Many environmental reform proponents seem practically
exuberant over the prospects of using trading markets to
shape environmental policy, reciting the success stories of
the SO 2 and leaded gasoline ETMs while calling for the use
of trading in an even broader spectrum of environmental
contexts. But we suspect that the low-hanging fruit, where

currencies serve as effective proxies for environmental values, markets are rich with supply and diversity, and policing
is straightforward, has largely been picked.'" In short, it
will be difficult to replicate the acid rain trading program
more than infrequently. More realistically, informational,
technological, and financial limits will keep currencies
sloppy, regulatory bodies will struggle to design trading restrictions that reduce externalities while keeping markets
thick, and policing poor trades will require vigilant monitoring and a strong will to intervene. The preceding discussion
in the Article considered how design strategies could tackle
these inherent challenges. As Parts I, II, and III demon-

strated, however, in some cases, perhaps many, currency
and exchange adequacy will not in and of themselves ensure

trades that preserve public goods and promote social welfare. Currency design and trading restriction strategies may
not eliminate all the important externalities.
The referee model of wholesale review-broad rules for
conducting multiple transactions-assumes that the rules
work and simply need to be enforced. By contrast, a retail review-individual review of each transaction-is appropriate when one has little confidence, despite the currency and
exchange rules, that the market will select environmentally
protective trades.190 In this role the government defines the
currency and sets the trading rules, but it also retains the discretion to reject trades. 19 The government acts as arbiter,
187. One could theorize, a priori, that greater uncertainty over government approval of trades would lead to a poorly functioning market.
The closer a trade moves toward becoming a risky investment, the
less the potential interest among trading parties. See Hahn & Hester,
Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 14, at 140 ("Because
firms value certainty when considering major investments, they are
likely to find internal trading advantageous, even if emission credits
might be acquired at a lower cost through an external trade.").
188. See supra note 184.
189. Even in the air pollution setting, experts are beginning to doubt the
ease and success with which the SO2 ETM model can be transported
to other pollutant markets. See Trading Programs May Cut Emissions, But No "Silver Bullets, " EPA Official Says, 30 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1321 (Nov. 19, 1999).
190. The authors are grateful for Stewart's suggestion of the retail/wholesale terminology.
191. In this respect, ex post ETM review resembles the Hart-ScottRodino process at the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department ofJustice, where private parties have an incentive to create
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assessing private trades to ensure they satisfy the policy
goals of the program.192 Since habitat trades represent private resources that have a public goods component, there
may be a strong public interest at stake. An ex post mechanism can therefore provide a critical safety net for trades that
satisfy currency and exchange adequacy yet result in loss of
social welfare, i.e., trades that ex ante approval would not
catch. 193 The choice of general rules of trade over case-bycase review will reduce transaction costs but, unless the
rules of exchange are carefully crafted, will not effectively
detect trades where environmental values are lost.
Put differently, if wholesale review resembles the government's oversight of a commodity market, then retail review requiring substantive approval by the government
looks more like a bartermarket. When fungibility of com-

modities cannot be assumed, as it can for markets in pork
bellies, gold, or soy beans, discretionary authority to evaluate individual goods becomes important. As trades increasingly resemble apples for oranges, it becomes necessary for
the government to say, borrowing a phrase from Justice Pot94
ter Stewart: "I know an equivalent trade when I see it.'
mergers that concentrate market power. In practice, about 90% of the
4,000 mergers per year that fall under the act raise few concerns, but
about 10% get a serious look. If the government chooses not to approve the merger, it shoulders the burden oflustifying in court why it
would be contrary to public policy. Few of these challenges ever go
to court, though, since the parties work out side deals where certain
interests are divested. Interview with Jonathan Baker, former Director,
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 17, 1999).
192. The government can act even more directly as a market participant,
offering to swap federal for state or private lands, purchasing habitat
from landowners, obtaining commitments from polluters to reduce
their emissions, or buying commitments from fishing boats not to
fish beyond certain limits. The private party determines for herself
whether the government benefit offered (money or land) is sufficient. See John P. Dwyer, California 's Tradable Emissions Policy
and Greenhouse Gas Control, 118 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 59,61
(1992) (claiming that offset trades in California are subject to public
review and agency approval).
193. See generally Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 1275 (1999) (ex ante regulatory powers shield agency discretion and should be used sparingly in substantive areas where agency
discretion can threaten important social interests); Mark Seidenfeld,
Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraintson Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 429 (1999) (examining the rationales for ex ante constraints versus ex post review of agency decisions and arguing that ex ante constraints are often unworkable in
contexts where normative quality is important to the program).
194. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description
[of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that."). For example, one critic of federal
land exchange programs, through which public lands are traded for
private lands, has observed that the trading parties' assessment of
trades is difficult because:
Land exchanges are essentially barter-trade without a medium of exchange such as money. Those who engage in land
exchanges therefore face the problem of finding some way to
measure the value of different goods. Without the benefit of
prices or some other standard, people with different products
have a difficult time determining whether a trade makes sense
for each person engaged in it-that is, whether it is fair.
Tim Fitzgerald, Federal Land Exchanges: Let s End the Barter,
PERC Policy Series No. PS-18, at 8 (June 2000), available at
http://www.perc.org/psl 8.pdf(last visited Apr. 17,2001). The additional question we suggest must be asked ofETMs is, fair for whom?
As trading in habitat contexts affects values of concern to groups outside of the trading parties, the evaluation ofthe fairness of the trades is
even furthercomplicated by the barter nature ofthe trading market.
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The challenge lies in devising a program that enables the arbiter to "see" bad trades and provides the institutional authority and incentives to do something about them.
This sort of review mechanism, though, poses two obvious problems. The first is little different from the challenge
we observed in Parts I and II. An additional review layer
adds to transaction costs through sheer administrative expense, delay in approval, and added uncertainty for approval. In this regard, it is instructive to note that in the
early days of the bubbling and offset programs, EPA generally insisted on ex post (retail) review of every trade while
state programs relied on ex ante policing (wholesale review). EPA's approach increased the transaction costs and
uncertainty of final approval, resulting in fewer than half
the trades than195 would be permitted under more generic
state reviews.

Moreover, unless intelligently designed and monitored,
there exists a very real possibility that a retail review process
could lead to overvaluation of exchanged commodities as
significant in magnitude as the undervaluation prompting
the initial concern. That is, any system put in place to catch
trades that undervalue public goods runs the risk of catching trades that are correctly valued, as well, and unnecessarily requiring additional compensation. Intelligent design, discussed below, can reduce these problems but not
eliminate them.
B. InterestAnalysis
Even if one believes a retail review strategy is appropriate to
ensure review adequacy of nonfungible trades, the key question remains as to the proper kind of oversight and approval
process. The answers depend first on the likelihood of such
trades that need to be caught and second on our expectations
of the parties with a stake in the outcome-the agency, trading parties, and the public. As to the first inquiry, the analysis in Parts I and II demonstrates that ETMs with sloppy currencies and loose restrictions will systematically fail to capture values represented by nonfungibilities. On balance, this
will not reduce overall environmental protection and social
welfare so long as the externalities (both positive and negative) are evenly distributed. The case study in Part III,
though, shows that this is not the case. Developers trading
for wetlands will always choose less expensive mitigation
sites. These tend to be distant from populations for the obvious reason that land prices are lower. But wetland services
such as flood protection, water purification, and detoxification are more valuable when delivered to populations. Distant wetlands, ceterisparibus,will provide less social welfare for the simple reason that their services are delivered to
smaller populations where their marginal contribution is
likely less valuable because other nearby undeveloped land
may make additional service provision redundant.'96 While
195. See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 14,
at 127-28; Richard B. Stewart, Emissions Trading: Lessons From

Domestic Experience, Remarks at Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading Policy Forum (Denver, Colo.) (July 31, 2000) (on file with
authors). It is worth noting, as well, that the wholesale strategy fol-

lowed by the states was also employed by EPA in its successful lead,
CFC, and sulfur trading programs.
196. Recall, too, that proponents of ETMs argue that trading's efficiency
gains should provide better protection at the same or less cost. This
claim loses its force if the best one can argue is that on balance the result of ETMs using crude currencies is a wash. And even ifone might
argue that overall gains and losses in services balance out, some level
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each case will present unique factors, as a general rule the
greater the nonfungibilities involved, the greater the likelihood of unequal trades, and thus the potentially greater social welfare loss.
How large that potential loss may grow depends in large
part on the interest group dynamics inherent in ETMs. We
observed previously that trading in environmental commodities necessarily requires consideration of the effect
trades have on social welfare. If the public interest were
consonant with the interests of the trading parties and the
government entity running the ETM, then we could rest
comfortably on the assumption that what is good for the
ETM is good for the public. And if deviations between the
public interest and the interests of the ETM participants varied randomly, we could console ourselves that in the long
run the differences would net out as a wash. But there is
good reason to believe that the institutional framework of
ETMs will cause the interests of ETM participants, traders,
and government alike, to systematically deviate from the
public's, thus squarely posing the problem of having to devise some way of determining what the public interest
is-not an easy challenge in itself-and of identifying and
correcting instances197 when ETMs produce results in sharp
conflict therewith.
1. Trading Parties
In exploring the public choice pressures on institutional interests, let's start with the trading parties and revisit the assumption posited at the beginning of Part IV. We assumed
the idealized case where there are no deficiencies in currency adequacy and suggested that, beyond government
oversight of allocation and enforcement issues, the environmental protection goals should be assured by a purely private trading regime. But this is only true if the parties to the
transaction value environmental protection. What if the currency does capture metrics of environmental significance,
but the trading parties are indifferent, ignoringthese values
of retail review makes sense (given risk aversion to negative outcomes) as an insurance policy to ensure that a wash remains the
worst-case scenario.
197. Determining the public interest in objective terms would seem to require assessing social welfare functions. In practice, relying on the
Arrow Impossibility Theorem, Michael Levine has argued this cannot be done.
[A]s hard as it is to determine whether two outcomes are
equally efficient in the Pareto sense, it is demonstrably impossible... to construct a democratically derived and consistent social welfare function that would allow one to assert objectively that one outcome is socially preferred over another.
Of course, it would be possible to choose outcomes preferred
by a particular firm or group with references to their preferences, but that would violate the democratic condition which
public interest theorists generally hold dear ....

Unless a

democratic, consistent aggregation of the preferences of individuals in a group is possible, there is no objective way to tell
what is socially preferred (in the "public interest").... [I]t is
best to describe those policies that would be ratified or
adopted by a polity using its usual political procedures as
"general interest," rather than "public interest" policies.
Michael Levine, Regulatory Capture, in NEW PALGRAVE DicrioNARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 268-69 (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter Levine]. In our view, if a trade leads to an overall loss of
ecosystem services to a population, then it reduces social welfare
and is likely not in the public interest (depending on the benefit produced by development). Using Levine's terminology, such a trade
would not be in the general interest.

31 ELR 11466

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

and acting instead on a different set of interests? In that setting, the ETM will promote environmental protection only
when environmental protection and the traders' interests
happen to coincide.
Take the example of wetland mitigation banking.
Throughout this Article we have described the exchange
through the eyes of the public as one between conserved
habitat B and destroyed habitat A. But in the eyes of the trading parties, the real exchange taking place is between the requirement to provide conserved habitat B and the permit to
destroy habitat A. The conserved habitat is the price of the
permit, pegged to the level of destruction. While the public
and environment are experiencing a trade of habitat, the developer is simply paying for a permit. 198 For private parties
seeking to maximize profits, the goal of the transaction is
permission to develop at least cost, not to promote environmental protection. As a result, the private parties to the trade
are not quality-conscious, so long as the trade results in per-

mit approval.There is no benefit in mitigating or restoring
any more than is necessary.199
Indeed, to keep costs down trading parties will seek to
promote nonfungible trades, pushing the market to the limit
in order to exploit differences of type, space, and time between the commodities for least-cost transactions. If a party
can gain a permit to fill a hardwood wetland in a growing
suburb today in exchange for starting restoration of a cattail
wetland in a distant rural area at some point in the future, it
surely will. In fact, the regulated industries from which the
habitat ETMs recruit traders increasingly demand forms of
contractualprotection requiring that the agencies treat the
barters they strike as final sales. 200 As explained earlier,
trading parties can be expected to desire certainty, simple
currencies, and low transaction costs in an ETM. Not surprisingly, that is how they are behaving.
Thus there seems little doubt that trading parties would
prefer to retain the "curtain" of the traditional permitting
system, negotiating ad hoc trades in the same closed
agency-applicant format used to process permit applications. Delegating some form of decisionmaking power to
198. As far as the developer is concerned, her only transaction is paying a
mitigation bank in exchange for a permit from the Corps. She could
care less about the services provided by the restored wetlands, or
even where they are, so long as she receives the permit to develop.
See Alyson C. Flournoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 7 ARIZ. L. REV. 187, 208 (2000) (observing that by making mitigation the "quid pro quo" for the permit, permittees seek only
enough mitigation success to obtain and retain the permit, thus placing a heavy monitoring burden on the permitting agency).
199. See generally Marylee Guinon, No Free Lunch, 7 RESTORATION &

MGMT. NOTES 2 (1989) (examining the frequency of under-reporting of costs in the restoration business and the severity of resulting
problems); Dennis M. King, Costing Out Restoration,9 RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 15 (1991) (examining economic issues and
expected results of restoration projects).
200. See generally Jean 0. Melious & Robert D. Thornton, Contractual
Ecosystem Management Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Can
Federal Agencies Make Enforceable Commitments?, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 489 (1999) (analyzing whether contractual obligations entered
into by federal agencies are enforceable). This trend is part of what

many scholars perceive as a movement toward greater use of contract and quasi-contract instruments in administrative regulation
processes. See David A. Dana, The New ContractarianParadigmin

EnvironmentalRegulation,2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35 (presenting motivations behind, examples of, and legislative proposals for a contractual relationship between government agencies and private parties); Daniel A. Farber, Triangulatingthe Future, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 61; Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
-v. (forthcoming 2001).
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"the public interest" within the permitting process raises the
costs of uncertainty because there is no assurance, a priori,
that any trade will withstand review even if the agency's
guidelines are met. One might just say, "live with it industry,
here are the new rules," and hope that private parties grudgingly go along. 2° But doing so gravitates toward command-and-control models and hardly seems consistent with
the notion that ETMs provide market efficiencies.
2. Agencies
Absent strict oversight to ensure that environmental values
form the basis of exchange, analysis of the trading parties'
interests suggests that the final exchanges may well not be
environmentally equivalent. What are the agency's inherent
interests in approving trades? We posit that the agency's
and trader's interests in fostering trades will often coincide
such that, on the margins, it leads to a market that is not environmentally quality conscious. The raw evidence for this
is clear. The case study in Part III demonstrated two
trends-the Corps' vigor in endorsing mitigation banks
and the FWS' vigor in promoting HCPs-both of which
have been pursued despite crude currencies and minimal
public input. Why are these agencies so eager to promote
trades in the face of
20 2inadequate currencies and limited public participation?
To be sure, trading can deliver important environmental
benefits. The odds for long-term conservation of habitat are
much greater if the regulated party genuinely accepts the restrictions imposed by a wetland or endangered species on
his or her land, which will be more likely if the restriction is
arrived at through a yuid pro quo bargain rather than prescriptive regulation. 2° 3 Moreover, trading may allow the
agency to get more environmental protection bang for its
buck than it practically could have gained through prescriptive regulation. 20 4 In an era of tight and often shrinking budgets this is a genuine advantage. These explanations are
sound, defensible environmental justifications often presented by government when promoting ETMs in habitat
protection settings. 20 5 But there are additional interests at
play here.
First, trading strengthens the agency's hand. Despite the
agency's desire to promote trades, the developer wants the
trade, too. When it seeks to develop wetlands or endangered
species habitat, the developer faces uncertainty in obtaining
agency approval through a permit. In terms of financing, uncertainty costs money. The agency can leverage the uncertainty of litigation or permit approval to force a trade more to
its liking. It is not uncommon for the FWS, for example, to
201. In contrast to the recent FWS strategy in the Federal Register, see
Federal Guidance, supra note 130, where they effectively say, "live
with it public, no radical change."

202. One could equally ask why the Corps is pushing for further relaxation of the in-kind, on-site requirements.
203. See Schoenbaum & Stewart, supra note 114, at 329-30.

204. See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 3-7 to 3-8 (describing
multi-species focus), 3-19 to 3-26 (describing range of mitigation options); Ruhi, supra note 102, at 404 (multi-species),

393-96 (mitigation).
205. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 102, at 10598 (summarizing Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt's stated rationales for supporting HCPs);
U.S. FWS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR(U.S. DOI),
MAKING THE ESA WORK BETrER: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEN

POINT PLAN AND BEYOND 7 (1997) (describing agency's vision for
HCP program).
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withhold issuance of the permit until its habitat swap condi-

tions are met. 2°6 Hence, some trades would not happen absent the agency's aggressive 2interpretation
of regulations to
07
create trading opportunities.

In addition to wielding trades as a sword, agencies have
strong incentives to foster trades as a shield. It is no secret
that endangered species and wetlands have long served as
political lightning rods for property rights groups. The
Corps and the FWS have become wary of conflict over these
provisions as the result of incessant sturm und drangin public fora. And for good reason, since every congressional session witnesses new proposals to weaken the habitat
protections of the ESA and the CWA. This combination of
public attack and political threat has led to real, pounding
pressure on the agencies. 208 To a great extent, then, habitat
ETMs serve as politicalsteam valves, dissipating
public at2t 0
2 9
tacks and blunting pointed legislation 0 and litigation.
ETMs thus serve as politically important defensive policies
to ensure the viability of habitat protection. As a result, and
as a consequence of the Clinton Administration's high-profile support of ETMs, the agency is invested in the programs
and does not want them to fail.
206. See Ruhl, supra note 102, at 391-96 (explaining the practical leverage FWS has over the HCP permit applicant in the negotiation of
mitigation given its power to issue or deny the permit).
207. This strategy flows from Gerd Winter's observation that "[t]he
agency's basic bargaining chip is its ability, either in law or in practice, to refrain from exercising its full authority," and thus:
[E]ven the failure to assert questionable power may be a bargaining chip. What an agency is giving up is the possibility
that a court will decide that it in fact has the power it pretends
to....
Indeed, the ability to regulate at the borderof its authority may be a reason why an agency prefers bartering to efforts
at full legal enforcement.
Gerd Winter, BarteringRationality in Regulation, 19 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 219,221-22 & n.3 (1985). For example, the FWS' authority to
prohibit development of habitat under the ESA is far from certain in
most circumstances, but the agency has used that uncertainty to lead
many developers to seek HCP permits in lieu of testing the bounds of
the FWS' power in court. See Dana, supra note 200, at 47 (stating
that one necessary characteristic of contractarian approaches to environmental regulation, such as HCPs, is that the agency threatens
application of regulatory power as a bargaining chip); Hsu, supra
note 102, at 10597 (suggesting that the FWS could be even more aggressive than it has been in its legal positions, thus providing more
leverage for aggressive negotiation of HCPs); Ruhl, supra note 102,
at 356-64 (explaining why it is often uncertain whether an HCP permit is required or simply a safe move for the developer and how the
FWS can use aggressive legal positions to move more developers toward opting in favor of the HCP approach).
208. Interview with Ray Ludwiszewski, former General Counsel, EPA
(Feb. 24, 2000); see, e.g., Citizens for Private PropertyRights, at
http://hometown.aol.com/proprts/cppr/home.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2001) (describing the HCPs in San Diego County as "legalized
land theft"); American Land Rights Association, at
http://www.landrights.org/Mission.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2001)
(comprising a 26,000-member organization committed to combatting "the excesses of regulations such as the [ESA], wetlands, etc.")
(on file with Stanford Law Review).
209. See Hsu, supra note 102, at 10596 (HCPs provide the FWS "a situation where they could 'bargain in the shadow of the law,' rather than
take their chances with the legislative or judicial branches.").
210. See Gardner 1,supra note 11, at 542-50 (describing wetlands mitigation banking as a tool to avoid successful regulatory takings claims);
Hsu, supra note 102, at 10595 ("The upsurge in HCPs can also be explained by an increasing threat of unfavorable precedent being set in
takings jurisprudence."). For a comprehensive treatment of the
takings compensation issue using the ESA and its HCP permits program as a case study, see Thompson, The EndangeredSpecies Act,
supra note 102.

31 ELR 11467

We therefore suggest that the policy entrepreneurs in
agencies and the business entrepreneurs of habitat devel-

opment have sufficient overlap of interests that both can
benefit from increased trading in the habitat context. On
the margin, then, one would expect the agency's and applicant's interests to coincide closely in promoting trades,
even if that means papering over nonfungibilities. 21 A
"culture" of trading emerges, in which agency and traders
operate informally under norms of behavior they develop
over time and which are not always fully transparent. 212 To
be sure, those norms could coincide closely with environmental protection goals, as repeat players, such as mitigation banks and developers who frequently enter the trading
market, work to stay on good terms with the agency. 213 But
once it has embraced the ETM, the agency may develop
values that are idiosyncratic of the trading program and
which may lead it to diverge from the public interest values
embedded in the regulatory program as a whole. 2 4 This is
particularly problematic in the case of nonfungibilities because, as Bill Pedersen has succinctly observed,
"[m]arkets work best under simple trading rules. That
gives those who design markets an incentive to oversimplify environmental problems to make their market mechanisms more workable." 21 5 One can therefore see why
agencies charged with administering ETMs have persuasive reasons to keep the currencies sloppy and markets
21 6
thick, and why they will also resist squelching deals.
211. We have already discussed why trading parties prefer simple currencies. One would expect that the optimal precision of the currency,
from the agency's perspective, would also be an imprecise currency.
Because such a currency maximizes discretion, the agency will be
less exposed to judicial review. The economic theory of regulation
describes this as "slack," providing "a zone of freedom of action for
regulators or legislators in which they can operate with lessened fear
of punishment by the polity for decisions that deviate from those the
polity would adopt on its own." Levine, supra note 197, at 269.
212. See Dana,supra note 200, at 47 (describing HCPs as part of the "new
contractarian paradigm" in environmental regulation, for which the
default position in case of unsuccessful negotiation is the command-and-control regulatory program); Freeman, supra note 200
(describing the culture of informal negotiation that arises in contexts
such as HCPs); Hsu, supranote 102, at 10597-98 (proposing that because in formal legal terms the ESA allows the FWS only to regulate
or not regulate, informal HCP mitigation negotiations allow the
FWS to "escape from a binary world where either the FWS or the
landowner is a winner, and the other is a loser"); Ruhl, supra note
102, at 391-96 (describing HCP mitigation as a "project-specific
topic of negotiation").
213. See Freeman, supra note 200 (suggesting the repeat player factor
may be strong in this sense).
214. Seidenfeld, supra note 193, at 474-79 (describing the problem of idiosyncratic agency values). See generally Michael E. Levine &
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 167
(1990) (examining the competing theories of why agencies act, or
believe themselves to be acting, in the public interest).
215. Pedersen, supra note 13, at 10175. These assertions are empirically testable and, while worthy of further research, they are certainly consistent with our findings in the wetlands mitigation
banking program.
216. It is worth noting, in this regard, the EPA's quiescence in vetoing mitigation actions. There have been roughly 20 vetoes in the past 25
years. The most comprehensive history and review ofEPA's veto authority contends that the low number is due primarily to resource
constraints. A more probing political economy analysis might well
uncover other important factors such as low return of political capital, low public salience of the program, and interinstitutional costs of
exercising the veto. William B. Ellis, Section 404(c): Where Is the
Balance?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 25, 64.
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3. Public Interest
So what about the public interest? As a threshold matter,
ETMs generally expand the scope of the public interest by
expanding the scope of the affected citizenry. In so far as the
agency and applicant have clear incentives to keep the market thick, this will necessarily result in more diverse sectors
of the public being touched by trades. In wetland mitigation
banking, for example, the mitigation bank community will
usually be different than the development project community. When delivery of ecosystem services are involved, as
will often be the case with habitat, these communities
should have real and often diverse interests in the trade ne-

gotiation and its outcome. 217 Each community will want to

minimize the negative externalities it is forced to bear and
maximize the positives it retains.2t8
From an advocacy perspective, concerned sectors of the
public will want to ensure the possibility for meaningful review of trading outcomes, which in turn requires development of an objective, verifiable record documenting the
agency rationale for the trade. The affected parties presumably will also seek the opportunity for meaningful participation in approving and reviewing trades. Assuming relevant
interests are represented, their combined efforts to minimize
externalities can push trading outcomes toward a public interest outcome. If all relevant interests are not represented,
however, the self-interested efforts of those that are involved may cause trading outcomes to deviate from the
larger public interest. The interest analysis thus leads directly to a procedural analysis.
C. ProceduralAnalysis
We do not mean to suggest in these preceding analyses that
the Corps or the FWS have completely abandoned their
statutory mandates or have been captured by trading interests. There is good reason to believe, however, that the confluence of agency and trading interests to promote ETMs,
coupled with ineffectual public participation, significantly
increases the potential on the margin for nonfungible
trades that fail to provide adequate environmental protection and promote social welfare. How should these objectionable trades best be caught and corrected? There are
five basic questions, and we believe the last warrants the
most attention.
1. Constrain Agency Discretion
The option implicit in Parts I and II is to constraindiscretion
up front. By requiring application of sound currencies and
trading rules that restrict nonfungibilities, currency and exchange adequacy can minimize the likelihood of substantive inadequacy. As we have shown, however, technical,
217. It is a separate, though important, issue whether these communities
are knowledgeable, or really do care, about the loss ofecosystem services, particularly since their effect is often indirect and delayed. See
Salzman, supra note 63, at 894-96.
218. As one practitioner has observed in the public lands field, where
trades between public and private land parcels are common, "every
parcel ofpublic land has its own constituency that will urge retention
of that parcel in public ownership.... [M]any interests are aligned to
oppose any sale or other disposition of resources from the public domain." Murray D. Feldman, The New Public Land Exchanges:
Trading Development Rights in One Areafor Public Resources in
Another, 44 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-38 (1998).
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practical, and public choice constraints suggest that currency and exchange adequacy will rarely be achieved, particularly in the habitat context. We are not suggesting that
work on these fronts to perfect currencies and exchange
rules is wasted effort. Indeed, there is large room for innovation in this area. If retail review and its attendant problems-high transaction costs and overvaluation-can be
avoided by improved currency and exchange adequacy, that
clearly is a preferred alternative. But what do we do in the
meantime, which we believe may be a long time, with ETMs
that have a strong
2 19 potential to produce trades that reduce social welfare?
2. Inform Agency Discretion
One might look to the example of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and requiregreaterimpact analysis
prior to approval of each trade. 220 Analyzing the trade in
more detail and allowing public comments would clearly
slow down the process and increase transaction costs, but it
could also flag problematic trades where public goods could
be lost. At its best, such an approach would, in the spirit of
Calvert Cliffs CoordinatingCommittee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,221 force the agency to take a hard look at
each transaction prior to approving it and give the public an
opportunity to ferret out defects in the trade. To reduce the
transaction cost problem, one could imagine scoping reviews that focused not on trade by trade but, rather, on a review over a series of trades or time periods, or perhaps calibrating the impact review to the size of the project. This
would be a version of adaptive management-impact planning that leads to better government decisions. Certainly the
inherent agency incentives to let trades go through in order
to keep the market thick, discussed above, could reduce the
ex ante impact review to a post hoc rationalization of preordained trade approvals, but this potential problem is little different than that currently faced by NEPA. 2 1 Overall,
however, it does seem hard to square the model of project-by-project environmental assessments, which routinely take many months or more to complete, with the vision of a vibrant, ongoing market driven by multiple traders and transactions.
3. Increase Political Accountability
A third option lies in increasing political accountability.
One might argue that if concerned citizens truly care about
trading practices that reduce social welfare, they will make
219. It is important to keep in mind, as well, that the current rules for
wetlands mitigation banking require trades that ensure equivalent
value and function. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note
116, at 9210 (stating that the Corps "will strive to achieve a goal of no
overall net loss of values and functions"). If these rules are not
closely followed, it is not clear why additional rules would be.
220. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370a, ELR
STAT. NEPA §§2-209.
221. 449 F.2d 1109, 1ELR 20346 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that NEPA requires an agency to consider alternatives to its actions to the fullest
extent possible).
222. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26
OKLA. L. REV. 239,239 (1973) ("I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative decisions. I think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.").
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their concern felt through the ballot box or traditional channels of advocacy. In fact, this seems to be occurring in the
case of spatial nonfungibilities and environmental justice,
hence the Executive Order on Environmental Justice and the
creation of EPA's National Environmental Justice Advisory
Committee.223 This approach seems unlikely to achieve
similar success in the case of habitat ETMs, however. Unlike the confluence in environmental justice of racial equality and human health risks, habitat trades concern social
welfare loss from ecosystem services. While important,
these losses are often indirect and only appreciated after a
natural crisis, e.g., flooding along the Mississippi River or
crashing fisheries. Moreover, as the preceding discussion
argued, the balance of political pressure to reduce or promote trades likely weighs toward even more trades, since
they operate effectively as political steam valves.
4. Strengthen Judicial Accountability
A fourth option would be to promote greater judicial accountability.The deferential standard of review for permitting decisions remains a strong hurdle for those challenging
habitat trades, particularly since neither the ESA nor §404
speaks clearly enough to the issue to allow courts simply to
apply the statutory text.224 Courts have overturned a handful
of HCPs, but the rarity of such decisions proves the rule.225
Thus, Congress or the agencies could set a higher standard
of judicial review, perhaps placing the burden on the applicant to demonstrate no net loss of social welfare or services
caused by the trade, or providing liberal citizen suit rights to
enforce trading performance standards under strict standards ofjudicial review. But leaving it to litigation between
agencies, traders, and public interest groups to hash out the
details imposes high transaction costs and leaves the ultimate decision to a disinterested observer.226 In fact, if barter
223. Exec. Order No. 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 3
C.F.R. 859, ADMIN. MAT. 45075 (1997); EPA Administrator
Browner created NEJAC to provide "'independent advice to EPA on
all matters relating to environmental justice"' and to serve as a "'forum for integrating environmental justice with other EPA priorities
and initiatives."' Michael D. Mattheisen, The US. Environmental
Protection Agency's New Environmental Civil Rights Policy, 18 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 183, 196 (1999) (citing OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUSTICE,
U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 3
(1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/docs/oejpubs/94report/
94report.txt.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2001)).
224. See Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,981-82,

15 ELR 20455, 20456 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law' standard of judicial review to an HCP permit).
225. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1280-82 (S.D.
Ala. 1998) (holding adequacy of HCP off-site mitigation funding
was not supported in the record); San Bernardino Valley Audubon v.
Metropolitan Water Dist., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 844 (Cal. App. Ct.
1999) (holding that state environmental impact review did not adequately consider impacts of HCP using "habitat value units" as basis
for habitat trading program). In the wetlands context, see, e.g.,
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d 847
(Conn. 1999) (holding that monetary and in-kind contributions are
not acceptable mitigation for wetlands damage when the use of the
funds is not specifically directed for wetland remediation activities).
226. Given the difficulty of selecting currencies that define nonfungible
values and of constructing markets that identify and weed out externalities, an evaluation of the "goodness" of any particular trade is
necessarily left to the reviewing body. Given how value laden that
decision can be for habitat trades, there are serious questions as to
whether judges will be any better at sorting out the bad trades in ex
post proceedings than will be other reviewing bodies in different ex
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is a more accurate description of habitat trades than is the
commodity market model, then it is not at all clear we want a
disinterested observer making the decision on the trade's
merits. Indeed, because the trades will involve the loss of
ecosystem services for some communities and perhaps a
gain for others, our concern is precisely that we do want interested parties involved in assessing the impact of trades on
nonfungible values.
5. Provide for More Meaningful Public Participation
To account for the concerns of interested parties requires
consideration of the fifth option, increasedpublicparticipation, and a foray into administrative law. As trading has
spread into more and more environmental contexts, it is becoming increasingly evident that the familiar institutional
settings of environmental decisionmaking themselves are
ill-equipped to facilitate trading and maintain some of the
core values of environmental policy. Most environmental
policy today is implemented through permitting regimes in
which a single regulated entity applies for authorization to
carry out an otherwise prohibited activity and can obtain
that authorization only upon demonstrating to a government
agency that it has satisfied a long list of emission limits, performance criteria, monitoring requirements, and other prescribed standards. 227 The setting within which this takes
place, known ubiquitously as "permit processing" and a
trademark of command-and-control regulation, involves
the applicant and agency haggling over whether the litany of
standards has been met.228
Although the standards often leave some room for negotiation, generally the agency and applicant know at the beginning of the process the realistic outer bounds of the final permit, set in place through objective technical standards or
emission limits. Those limits are decided ahead of time
through the rulemaking process from which the standards
are derived, as well as through well-known case law and
agency policy. The applicant hires a team of consultants
who are familiar with those standards and laws to hash out
the issues with the agency's staff of experts and lawyers,
and out of this process pops a final permit for the public
to behold.
Environmental permitting as just described has played a
central role in the successes achieved toward protection of
public environmental values. Ironically, however, the permitting process itself occurs mainly between the applicant
and the agency. For a program devoted to protection of public values, the public is remarkably absent from the process.
ante or ex post mechanisms. The adversarial model may appease
those interested most in the rule of law, but it is doubtful that its transaction costs are worth it in terms of improved substantive performance of the ETM. See Seidenfeld, supra note 193, at 480.
227. The environmental law literature is replete with handbooks and
other manuals describing how applicants should prepare and pursue
permit applications. See, e.g., THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK
119-40 (Robert J. Martineau Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998);
THE RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL 70-92 (Theodore L. Garrett ed.,
1994).
228. See, e.g., Donna L. Kolar, PracticalAdvice for Permittinga Waste
Disposal Facility, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1989, at 11
(describing the negotiation points for hazardous waste permits);
Mary Ellen Ternes & Ross A. Macfarlane, Negotiating itle VOperating Permits: A View From the Provinces, NAT. RESOURCES &

ENV'T, Fall 1998, at 417 (describing the negotiation points for
CAA permits).
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Environmental permitting regimes have been premised on a
fundamental trade off in this respect: in return for the security of prescribed ex ante permitting standards (developed
by the agency through public notice-and-comment
rulemaking and applied to each applicant in a permit proceeding), the public has yielded an equal seat at the permit
negotiating table. The public can usually provide comments
to the agency after a draft permit is negotiated between
agency and applicant, 229 and can seek judicial review of the
permit once issued, but has neither veto power in the first
stage nor an easy time in the second under standards of review that are deferential to agency decisions. 230 The quid
pro quo has been, at least in theory, that the permit negotiation is bounded by the standards adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking and enrolled in the code
books for all to see. Agency discretion is limited, variances
are rare, and failure to abide by the standards is easily detected and constitutes reversible error.
Enter trading, and that settled state of affairs is rocked to
its core. Trading appears in the habitat protection picture
awkwardly wedged into permitting programs as a form of
"mitigation" and under cover of the reform flags of flexibility, innovation, and efficiency, not as an integral part of permitting, not as an independent process.231 Rarely do agencies, applicants, or public advocates consider this as forcing
trading into the permit setting.23 2 But that is precisely what
is involved. The heavy reliance on loosely worded
nonlegislative rules means that agencies do not clearly circumscribe their trading such that the public can know in advance that its interests are protected at the table.233 In other
words, the quid pro quo of notice-and-comment rulemaking
that provided the basis for permitting has not been duplicated in habitat trading.
Permitting in the era of trading has thus become a hybrid
creation. The problem is not that wedging trading into permitting necessarily fails to deliver mitigation values, but
rather that the permitting regimes were not designed with
trading in mind and have evolved in ways that will make it
difficult to squeeze trading in without pushing out some of
the fundamental institutional premises upon which permitting regimes have evolved. The traditional permitting model
is hardly a market in the traditional sense of markets, but
with the advent of trading it is increasingly being used as the
market mechanism for trading public environmental values.
229. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §1539(c), ELR STAT. ESA §10(c) (public no-

tice-and-comment requirement for HCP permits).
230. See supra note 224.
231. As the wetlands mitigation banking case study explained, mitigation
banking is designed to satisfy the Corps' so-called sequencing approach to §404 permit application evaluation, v hich places compensatory mitigation behind avoiding and minimizing impacts to

aquatic habitat. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
HCPs are based on specific statutory criteria requiring the applicant
seeking the permit to demonstrate that it "will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such taking."
16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), ELR STAT. ESA §10(a)(2)(B)(ii). In
the absence of a viable habitat trading program, therefore, developers would be left with avoiding and minimizing impacts as their only
compliance options.
232. Neither the EPA/Corps Federal Guidance nor the FWS HCP
Handbookuse the term "trading" at any point to describe the mitigation program.
233. Though published or noticed in the Federal Register, neither the
EPA/Corps Federal Guidance nor the FWS HCP Handbook was
promulgated as a notice-and-comment rule.
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Our concern in this sense is straightforward: placing the
applicant and agency in charge of trading public environmental values raises serious questions as to whether the deal
struck between the permitting system and the public's participatory role-in which the public agreed to keep its nose
largely out of "permit processing" in return for bounded permit issuance standards-is still a good deal for the public.
The traditional permitting system works fine for the agency
and applicant even in the era of trading; it is the public
whose interests are difficult to square. It is thus no surprise,
for example, that environmental groups have begun to complain that mitigation decisions in the HCP program are taking place without following "biological standards"-in
other words, not according to the traditional permitting syshave called for more pubtem-and environmental groups
234
lic participation as a result.
In this respect, consider the following description of the
HCP permitting process by Defenders of Wildlife.
Citizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal
role in the HCP process except through the public comment period and, for some plans, through [NEPA] or requirements of state or local law. Often, by the time public
meetings occur or official drafts are released for comment, however, both the regulated interests and the services have invested so much money and time in plan development that they are unlikely to change course ....
[C]itizens (including those representing the environmental community) generally have not had a seat at the
negotiating table in many major recent negotiations
despite the fact that conservationists (in addition to
FWS) represent the public's interest in protecting endangered species....
For the vast majority of plans ...public participation
was not adequate, given the plans' large effects on public
resources. The most glaring examples are large-scale,
single-landowner plans that significantly affect public
resources.... While those plans did have public meetings and/or formal comment periods, the conservation
strategies resulted from private negotiations with largely
token attempts at listening to the public's concerns. In
addition, numerous small-scale HCPs reviewed here involved exclusive negotiations between the landowner
and [the] FWS.... This lack of public participation has
resulted from an absence of formal requirements to involve the public and the limited leverage of citizens who
235
do not have a direct financial stake in negotiations.
Defenders of Wildlife's assessment, based on a study of
over 20 HCPs, comports with the general experience of
one of this Article's authors who, when in private practice,
regularly represented a wide variety of public and private
entities seeking HCP permits.236 It does not differ substan234. See, e.g., DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS, supra

note 102, at 59-61, 80-81 (summarizing Defenders of Wildlife's cri-

tique of HCP program).
235. See id.at 41, 43-44.
236. Professor Ruhl has since described the mitigation negotiation process in terms consistent with the Defenders of Wildlife's public participation findings. See Ruhl, supra note 102, at 385-86 ("In practice
...[the] FWS and [the] NMFS have delayed public notice until the
time when the HCP has undergone that formative negotiation
step."). In the typical single-owner, large-scale HCP project setting
for which the Defenders of Wildlife expresses the most concern in
this regard, the developer and the FWS haggle over the amount of
take the project will cause and the amount of mitigation land the developer must trade in return. Once that issue is settled, the developer
enters the real estate market to find the least expensive tract of land
that will satisfy the mitigation requirements, which usually are spec-
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tially, either, from descriptions of some air pollutant
ETMs.237

D. Design Impasse?
This shortfall of meaningful public input described above is
particularly problematic if inherent agency and trader institutional interests encourage approval of trades with significant, and unexamined, nonfungibilities. The interests of the
agency, applicant, and public change fundamentally as mitigation under permitting programs gradually becomes synonymous with trading. Trading of nonfungible commodities, if it is to thrive and promote social welfare, is an
open-ended game requiring robust markets and plenty of
room for negotiation that considers the multiple values exchanged. That does not square easily with the relatively
closed permitting system. Simply put, as more public values
are up for grabs in trading regimes, the public ought to rethink whether it wishes to continue to limit its checks on the
process to notice-and-comment and deferential judicial review. Thus, we believe the most fundamental design challenge trading poses to environmental policy lies not in currency adequacy (finding the second-best currency) or exchange adequacy (structuring a viable market that restricts
nonfungibilities), but in review adequacy and confronting
the pressures trading places on the institution of environmental permitting.
Identifying this problem, though, makes its resolution no
easier. What role exists for the public between the largely ineffectual practice of commenting on trades that effectively
arefait accompli and absolute veto power? Currently, parified based on habitat type and location, and seeks the agency's approval of the trade. Unlike the wetlands mitigation context, most
HCP mitigation is through preservation at trading ratios of 3:1 or
higher, though occasionally mitigation involves habitat enhancement and management. These significant issues are almost always
settled by the time the draft HCP permit is submitted for public comment. Thus, in the authors' experience, having allowed environmental groups and other public advocates a "seat at the table" during the
negotiation phase would have substantially altered the HCP habitat
trading process. See also Holly Doremus, PreservingCitizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The EndangeredSpecies Act

Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1999) (examining the growing
tension between the HCP and other ESA reform programs and public participation values).
237. Many of the air pollutant ETMs employ ex ante approval mechanisms and thus leave no opportunity for public input on trades. Compare the Defenders of Wildlife's account of public involvement in
HCP approval with the following description of ETMs in California's SCAQMD.
Most states have permitting procedures through which affected community members can advocate for pollution control requirements on facilities. However, pollution trading allows facilities to avoid those permit requirements-usually
without the knowledge or involvement of the affected community. Pollution trades made pursuant to Rule 1610 and RECLAIM are not subject to public review or comment. In fact,
the public faces numerous difficulties finding out what companies are trading to avoid compliance with pollution control
standards. For instance, RECLAIM credits can be purchased
from independent brokers, without any environmental
agency or public oversight. A company wishing to increase
or continue its pollution need only purchase the required
credits on the open market, without any public review or
comment. In this way, the democratic will, as represented in
permit and regulatory requirements imposed after full public review and comment, can be reversed by a simple economic transaction.
Drury, supra note 45, at 278-79.
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ties seeking to develop habitat review the regulations and
guidelines when preparing their application. There may be
room to haggle when seeking a permit as issues come up,
but, equally, there is a shared expectation that if the trading
party meets its side of the bargain the agency will too. By the
time of public input, the agency has made its findings and
the deal has largely been cut. Hence, the calls from environmental groups for something more. But what?
At one extreme, we could put trades in the democratic
hands of the public, leaving the deals struck by agency and
traders to ratification or veto by popular vote. The democratic model pushes public participation to the forefront,
where interested parties can play a direct role. Mass public
participation can serve many interests-including increasing agency accountability, minimizing concentrations of
power, and facilitatin the flow of information to citizens
and decisionmakers. 238 But at some point the introduction of
more and more participation from broader and broader segments of the public gives rise to serious concerns about the
potential for interest group interference with program goals,
grandstanding, and dissemination of misinformation-what some call "participation run amok., 239 The
democratic model may appease those interested most in participation, but in its purest form it is tantamount to giving the
public the whole table, not just a seat.
Another alternative could be patterned on calls for more
collaborative forms of decisionmaking. 24° For example, an
independent panel comprised ofpersons with no investment
in the trading program could be modeled on architectural review boards or regional planning boards used in land use
contexts to act as the arbiter of trades. 24 1To serve the goal of
public participation, the panel could be comprised not only
of scientific experts, but also representatives of the full
range of public interests involved in the trading program.
Most trades would be handled through the routine of
agency-trader haggling, but the agency, trader, or any member of the public could flag controversial trades for deliberation and final resolution by the panel. As the early experience of bubbling made clear, however, the review requirement cannot be open-ended.242 Even more faithful to the
collaborative model, all trades could be hashed out by stakeholder groups composed on an ad hoc basis to be representative of the various interests at play in each trade and operating under rules of consensus. 243 The result of this form of
trading by mediation would be an agreement the traders
could take as final and presume to be secure from attack by
other interested parties.
238. Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor DeliberativeAgency Decisionmaking,92 Nw. U. L. REV.
173, 182-87 (1997).
239. See id. at 211-40. Not to mention the immense transaction costs and
likely low level of interest among potential participants.
240. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State,45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1997) (advocating increased use
of "collaborative governance" structures).
241. John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen
Advisory Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J.

903 (1998).
242. See supra note 194.
243. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754,
795-801 (1984) (advocating involvement of parties to a legal dispute

in a problem-solving endeavor as a means of overcoming intransigence and refusal to relate to the needs of others).
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Such collaborative approaches, however, merely beg the
question of institutional choice, for meaningful consent requires institutions through which local public interests can
give their consent. How are the representatives of local interests selected for the expert panel or the stakeholder
group? Are they drawn from the city council, the planning
board, a referendum, universities, citizen advisory panels,
lottery? 2 " To whom are they accountable? How does one
deal with the problem of the persistent objector, obstreperous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or other strategic behavior in which citizen participation may block real
environmental progress? And regardless of the structure,
greater public involvement still requires analyzing the appropriate role of government as decisionmaker, as well as
the appropriate level of intervention, since different regulatory entities behave differently. 245 Collaborative models, in
other words, have their own institutional baggage to handle, and we, like many others, are not confident they offer
more hope than the adversarial and democratic models in
cutting through the
24 6 obstacles for using ETMs in habitat
trading contexts.

Apparently finding no satisfactory solution either, the
U.S. Department of the Interior has responded to the design
dilemma with a measure that it touted as meeting the concerns of meaningful participation, but which in fact provided the public no rights of participation in the permitting
process that it did not already have. 247 The agency apparently had no insights into what additional public participation it could provide without transforming the permitting
process into something different. By the same token, the environmental groups have failed to define exactly what form
of participation they desire over and above that level. Presumably, they have the same concerns that have been raised
in the commodity trading-style ETMs, where trading is
shielded from any public input, 248 but no one expressing
concerns with either context has cogently described a union
between ETMs and public participation that does not result
in one subjugating the other.
The seeds of a design impasse are thus apparent, though
its solution is not. ETM critics argue that bargains struck in
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approving trades are often inappropriate, insufficiently considering public interests. The preceding analysis of commodities, currencies, and exchange restrictions in Parts I, II,
and III has shown why this occurs. But it is apparent that
each of the three interests involved-agency, traders, and
public-has something different in mind in response to the
question of what the proper institutional approval design
should look like. Each, in its own way, envisions a "permit-plus." For all interests, the ideal "plus" is an efficiently
operating ETM that consistently delivers appropriate levels
of environmental protection at lower cost. Where that Holy
Grail is not easily attained, the interests diverge.
For agencies, the "plus" is ultimate discretion to approve
or disapprove trades. The rules of permitting constrain
agency discretion, both through the ex ante standards promulgated in the rules and through ex post citizen suits and
judicial review. But prescriptively dictating too specifically
the standards for trades, or subjecting the agency to strict review after trades are struck, denies the agency the room to
maneuver and barter. 249 Thus, agencies that want to barter
will stake out room by keeping the rules of agreement loose
and unbounded. The FWS, for example, has authored hundreds of pages of informal "guidance" for developing
HCPs, but very few formal rules. 250 In describing the
agency's need for broad discretion in the same terms an inspired artist might use, the FWS guidance document explains that the agency chose not to "establish specific
'rules' for developing mitigation programs [because] that
would limit the
251 creative potential inherent in any good
HCP effort."
For traders fearful of the discretion the agency wields in
that setting, the "plus" is a contract fixing the terms of the
barter and protecting the trader from subsequent reneging
by the agency. Traders argue that these contractual
protections are necessary to encourage their commitment of
land and other financial resources to the long-term habitat
protection solutions the agency seeks to attain through trad249. See Freeman, supra note 240 (describing why the trend toward
contractarian models of regulation requires the agency have space to
work out the content of negotiations); Winter, supra note 207, at

228-29 (describing agency implementation processes generally as
244. In the idealized setting, the same people would be affected by devel-

barter systems in which the agency requires discretion to maneuver).

245. See Hahn II, supra note 23, at 111-12, on the effects of having different levels of government implement selected policies:

Readers familiar with local land use and zoning law may observe
that bargaining has long been a tradition in that setting. But local land
use decisions fall into two categories: legislative and quasi-judicial.
Legislative acts such as comprehensive rezonings often do involve
raw political bargaining, but they are decided by legislative bodies,
e.g., the city council, where politics rule the day. Many land use per-

oped and restored wetlands. In this case, it would make sense for
them to determine the adequacy of the trade. Once the costs and benefits are no longer uniformly shared, however, difficulties arise in
reaching agreement.

It might seem, for example, that if the problem is local, then
the logical choice for addressing the problem is the local regulatory body. However, this is not always true. Perhaps the
problem may require a level of technical expertise that does

not reside at the local level, in which case some higher level
of government involvement may be required.... [T]he level
of oversight can effect the implementation of policies.
246. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Regulatory Stakeholders:
Limits on Collaborationas the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).
247. See Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for

Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35342, 35346-47, 35456 (June 1, 2000) (the FWS
expands the public comment period on most proposed HCP permits
from 30 to 60 days and states it "will strongly encourage potential applicants to allow for public participation during the development of

an HCP," but does not specify what such participation might entail or
what the agency might do if the applicant refuses to allow it).
248. Drury, supra note 45, at 279.

mits, however, are decided in administrative settings where rules of

procedure, criteria for decision, and standards ofjudicial review ostensibly are more tightly bounded and room for negotiation is more
limited, such as is the case for variance and special exception procedures. JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND
USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 173-76 (1998) (describing
generally the differences between legislative and administrative actions in local land use authorities); Carol Rose, Planningand Dealing: PiecemealLand Controlsas a Problem ofLocal Legitimacy,71
CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983) (describing the origins of the distinction

and the role bargaining has played in various settings). While bargaining undoubtedly occurs in practice even in the administrative
land use setting, the insertion of trading into environmental permitting introduces a level of informal bargaining in the permitting setting not heretofore officially endorsed in land use or other regulatory
settings controlling land development.
250. Compare HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104 (extensive informal
guidance), with 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (limited formal rule structure). This
would be predicted by the economic theory of regulations. See Levine, supra note 197.
251. See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 3-19.
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ing. 252 Thus, for example, many of the recently developed
HCP policies are geared toward assuring the applicants that
the government will keep its side of the bargain. 3 However, putting aside constitutional doctrines that may limit
the effectiveness of such a contractual remedy,254 any trend
toward contractarian approaches to environmental protection simply exacerbates concerns that the agency may assume undemocratic, idiosyncratic
2 55 values that move public
interest norms to the sidelines.
For the public fearful of both the agency's unbounded
discretion 216 and the possibility that traders may get too
good a deal at the public's expense,257 the "plus" is a seat at
the negotiating table. As noted previously, however, while
many environmental NGOs have complained about the direction in which wetlands mitigation banking and HCPs are
headed, and have demanded a seat at the table to correct the
alleged problems, none have described what power comes
with that seat. Presumably, they seek not only information
and process transparency, but also some mechanism for exerting direct influence over the trading outcomes. Exactly
what the scope of that power must be to satiate their participation demands, and how they propose it be exercised, remains unclear.
What is clear is that groups like Defenders of Wildlife
want to take away some of the protections applicants currently receive in the permitting process. Whether this
amounts to a veto power or simply reserving the ability to
change the terms of the trade as the public representatives
see fit is less certain. Also clear is that traders are seeking
protections they do not currently receive in the permitting
process. They seek some finality to the trade, though the exact form is uncertain. Through it all, agencies want the flexibility to barter with a free hand, and yet the power to override the will of the public and the traders when the trade does
252. Melious & Thornton, supra note 200, at 491.
253. See id. at 491, 501-04 (discussing the No Surprises, Safe Harbors,
and Candidate Conservation Agreements policies in this context).
254. See id. at 514-22 (discussing the application of the Winstar doctrine regarding the extent of government sovereign immunity in
contract settings).
255. As Freeman has argued, the growth of "the Contracting State" challenges the dominant administrative law theories.
Although most administrative law scholars would surely acknowledge that informal negotiation, bargaining and exchange pervade the regulatory process, none of the several
competing theories of administrative law-public interest,
pluralist, civic republican and public choice-advances the
normative claim that regulation ought to be the product of
explicit contracting between agencies and stakeholders....
Perhaps an agency cannot easily occupy both a contractual
and hierarchical [i.e., regulatory] position with respect to
stakeholders simultaneously. One might reason, for example, that to act as a contractual partner an agency might need
to surrender its unique role as a trustee or guarantor of the
public interest.
Freeman, supra note 200.
256. Indeed, there is good reason to believe environmental groups fear
agency discretion more than traders do, and that controlling discretion is more important to environmental groups than achieving effective regulatory strategies. See generally John Scholz, Cooperative
Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 115 (1991).

257. Environmental groups have aggressively opposed the ESA reforms
designed to provide HCP applicants more "assurance" that the
agency will not change the terms of the agreement except in limited
circumstances. See Ruhl, supra note 102, at 402-03.
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not strike the agency as a good deal. This state of affairs thus
has all the makings of an intractable design problem.
Permitting is not about discretionary agency trading. Permiting is not about private contracting. Permitting is not
about the public ratifying or vetoing the permit. It is an understatement, therefore, to observe that it will be difficult to
accommodate all these "plusses" at the same time. In all
cases, the bigger the "plus" in permit-plus the less it looks
like permitting.258 The "plus" risks swallowing the assumptions on which permitting is based and overshadowing its
own trading function. This is not to suggest that there is no
longer a role for permitting in the habitat protection context.
Rather, the question is whether we continue to allow agencies to wedge ETM mechanisms into habitat permitting programs, or, if we are committed to making ETMs work in
highly nonfungible settings, whether we design an independent institution within which the trading takes place.
Our preceding description of the contending models to
ensure review adequacy may well bring to mind haggling in
a bazaar, and we believe this is an entirely appropriate image
to consider. In valuing nonfungibles that cannot easily be
captured in currencies, the commodity vision of ETMs
breaks down. Absent adequate currencies that capture important values and adequate rules of exchange that minimize externalities, we are left only with barter to identify
trades that promote environmental protection and social
welfare-an imprecise yet ultimately exacting process.
This leaves us with no shortage of decisionmaking models
for ETMs that operate in the habitat trading context and
elsewhere where nonfungibilities run high. But none escape
the basic trade off between the interests at stake.
Currency and exchange inadequacies prevent us from
knowing in advance which trades fail to satisfy basic program demands of environmental protection. When we lack
confidence in the ETM operating independently, the question of assessing "fair" trades has to be left in the hands of
some reviewing body. Is it an agency with ultimate discretion? Is it the public with power of veto at the polls? An expert review panel? A court? Each alternative improves one
interest's position at the expense of another's, or depends on
unrealistic behavioral assumptions, or both.
V. Conclusion
In this Article, we have demonstrated the central roles that
nonfungibilities and currencies play in determining the
258. For example, recent policies liberalizing trading between public
land and private land holdings, i.e., efforts to keep the market fat,
have significantly unsettled the process for permitting private development projects planned for formerly public land. One practitioner

in that field observes that
the new land exchanges short-circuit the normal project permitting and evaluation process. An almost premature value
judgment is made, before the full comprehensive review and
rational planning exercises under NEPA and other federal authorities, of whether a particular project should proceed in a
certain area. There is not a full opportunity to examine mitigation measures that might be used to offset development impacts, nor is there an opportunity to evaluate and gather in one
place an analysis of the potential environmental impacts of a
project and provide agency decisionmakers with a range of
how to proceed with project approval and permitting. Significantly, this short-circuiting of the normal project permitting
process also results in the loss of public involvement.
Feldman, supra note 218, at 2-41.
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structure and success of environmental trading markets. The
standards ofcurrency adequacy, exchange adequacy, and review adequacy provide a comprehensive framework
through which to analyze and understand the various trade
offs inherent in the design of ETMs. They also reveal the
particularly difficult challenges of institutional design.
Ultimately, a meaningful permit-plus approach for habitat-based ETMs requires institutional analysis of decisionmaking bodies at fundamental levels. It requires a root-level
examination of regulatory theory to design the most appropriate structures that systematically improve protection of
public interests currently overlooked and, at worst, actively
ignored. The needs for such a research initiative are clear.
The commodity model of trading cannot, we believe, sufficiently satisfy the demands posed by the trading of
nonfungible environmental amenities. This is not to say
such markets are necessarily inefficient or undesirable;
but when significant values remain unaccounted for in the
trades, barter becomes the more appropriate model and
the need for a more rigorous evaluation process presents
itself. Crafting this process represents a serious and difficult challenge for environmental law, particularly as the
trend toward diversification of ETMs into broader contexts continues.
On whose shoulders should this challenge be carried? We
have no quarrel with the general proposition that trading can
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be efficient and thus the public has good reason to promote
and finance research into better currencies and exchange
rules for ETMs. But it ought not be the public's burden to assume the risk of inadequate trades while that research program is underway. The SO2 program, blessed as it is with a
relatively fungible trading commodity, has satisfied the
challenge, and perhaps other ETMs can do so as successfully. But the burden should be on proponents and practitioners to answer persuasively three fundamental questions.
Is the currency capable of capturing what we care about?
Answering this requires not only a technical consideration
of measurement capacity but a clear judgment by the body
politic of the proper environmental protection goal, e.g., no
net loss of wetland acres or services? Will exchange restrictions be sufficient to dampen significant externalities? This
brings into play how one decides the proper balance between market constraints and thick markets. And, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, are there mechanisms in
place to catch trades that reduce environmental protection or
social welfare? Exchanging environmental apples for oranges may be a beneficial policy choice, but let us be honest
about what the ETMs are trading. Given current knowledge
and financing, we recognize that the burden of answering
these questions may prove difficult for ETMs involving
highly nonfungible environmental features. The magnitude
of the challenge, however, makes it no less important.

